At a moment when the United States is involved in three wars and the world is afire with security challenges, it may well be that the trickiest conflict for Obama in 2011 is the one that is emerging between his own defense establishment and key members of his civilian national security team.

The relations between the military and Obama have been professional but never warm. The firing of Stanley McChrystal illustrated this when the outspoken general's views were made public and were so harsh that they were deemed insubordinate. There has always been a degree of unease between General David Petraeus and some on Obama's team who view him as a potential political wildcard, someone Obama may need more as a validator of his policies than Petraeus "needs" Obama. While Secretary of Defense Gates has been, by any measure, one of Obama's two or three most effective and prominent aides, in recent months as his tenure draws to a close he has expressed views -- on issues from the lunacy of undertaking future ground wars in the Middle East to the difficulties of imposing a no-fly zone --that have created complications for the White House message machine. Certainly, the decision to intervene in Libya was one that many senior defense officials were more reluctant to undertake than were their civilian counterparts.

Looming on the horizon, as reported in today's Washington Post, is the coming debate over just how many troops the United States will pull out of Afghanistan starting this summer. The president has promised to begin withdrawing and has let it be known he wants to take meaningful rather than purely symbolic steps to draw down forces in that country. As reported in the Post story and as is known to all who interact with the senior military leadership involved, there is considerable reluctance on the part of the responsible military brass to rush the withdrawals.

Since the mistreatment of the American military that came out of the frustrations of Vietnam, beginning in earnest with the presidency of Ronald Reagan, there has been a strong impulse in American politics to treat our military with great deference publicly. This has grown over time to the point that it is a quasi-theological issue at this point and that showing the slightest disrespect for leaders in the armed services is cause for immediate fierce criticism, particularly but far from exclusively from the right. Anything like criticism of regular troops is even more politically fatal.

This trend grew even more pronounced in the years after 9/11 -- all this despite the fact that there is a great tradition in American history of open criticism of military and defense leaders from their civilian bosses and colleagues. It is worth remembering that it was one of America's most prominent military leaders who, as president, warned of the threat of the rise of the military industrial establishment and that war presidents from Lincoln to Roosevelt to Truman were involved in open scraps with their generals. In other words, the willingness to challenge the views of the military is actually a hallmark of many great American leaders and frankly, civilian control of the military is one of America's most hallowed traditions for good reason.

Thus, it is to be hoped that Obama and his national security team show sufficient intestinal fortitude when it comes to the decisions concerning the Afghanistan draw-down. More than a decade into that conflict, spending at the rate of $120 billion a year, it is actually important to ask not only how fast we should leave but why it is that our military strategies have produced such frustrating results. Clearly, clearing out terrorist threats in the region and developing a local capability to maintain the peace after America has left would have been difficult under any circumstances in Afghanistan but it was all made nearly impossible by the fact that the real threat was in Pakistan, a country into which we could not venture in real force. That said, knowing the conditions well after several years of combat, the military still advanced ideas for massive troop increases that have produced frustratingly halting progress and that many felt then would be as futile as they have been.

In other words, the military has given bad advice in Afghanistan and, by saying let's get out very slowly, is giving it again. That the conflict has been stained by ugly breakdowns in military discipline and morality as illustrated by the current "kill team" scandal and that there have been too frequent instances of collateral civilian casualties that while perhaps inevitable in war have also undermined our political objectives, suggests other areas in which greater willingness to scrutinize our commanders is in order. That no senior officers have yet been called to account for the "kill team" offenses is a symptom of a system that still protects its own too assiduously.

Some of America's very best leaders are in our military and very often, the capabilities of those leaders and their typical professionalism set them a cut above most of their civilian counterparts. That their service should be honored and their sacrifices respected is inarguable. That some in the civilian national security establishment at the moment have precious little military experience or understanding is also indisputable. Frankly, in my view, that is the reason that those civilian officials were ultimately cowed into accepting plans in Afghanistan that were deeply flawed and destined to fail.

But now, with scandal in the air, results coming slowly, and the American people increasingly restive and desirous of focusing our resources on problems much closer to home, it is time to acknowledge that even America's best can become too caught up in their own groupthink.  Significant withdrawals should not only begin this year, but the pace of those withdrawals should remain brisk throughout 2012 until we are essentially out of that conflict.

Personally, I feel leaving behind a small force in the region to help monitor and respond to isolated threats and to keep an eye on Pakistan and its growing nuclear arsenal (paid for, it seems likely, in large part with aid dollars pumped in from the United States) makes sense -- though in all likelihood the bulk of that particular mission will be best handled by the Navy from offshore, by the Air Force from space and via other over the horizon tools and by the intelligence community. But waging a war that cannot be won on behalf of an ally who is flirting with our enemies, undermining our goals, and hurting his own people is neither something America can or should be engaged in no matter how accomplished, distinguished, or worthy the advocates for a prolonged involvement may be.

 

BLUE13326

2:31 PM ET

March 31, 2011

It's hard to make that

It's hard to make that argument if we're fighting in Libya. Why start a war there and leave a war that was said to be vital to our interets. It's all such nonsense.

 

MUTT3003

7:46 PM ET

March 31, 2011

Nonsense!

The only nonsense is believing that any of these countries affect our national security. All of this nation building is BS. Carpet bomb the hell out of them, pick some good spots out for permanent military bases and be done with it. How can these countries be a threat? It takes something vastly more powerful than a 747 to do real damage to this country. Lets keep that miltary / industrial complex getting bigger!

 

HURRICANEWARNING

10:18 PM ET

March 31, 2011

Unfortunately, Mutt, I think

Unfortunately, Mutt, I think you are right. A 747 can indeed create harm, and cause panic, and inflict economic damage...but how much a threat is it really to America? Not much of one. Indeed, when compared to state conflict against nuclear and conventional arms wielding army's like China or Russia...Terrorism suddenly feels ridiculous. it's almost as if a tiny fringe of muslim society wanted to become relevant, they got lucky on 9/11 (by Bin Ladens own admission) and suddenly we have played right into their hands and given them such relevance that it boarders on insanity.
It also seems obvious now that our conventional military should NEVER do nation-building or FID. It should always be focused on fighting a big conflict...its job is true national defense. Leave the counter-terrorism, FID and nation building to the experts in the SF/SOF and intel. communities. I have decided, after much internal debate, that despite the temptation offered by nation-building and humanitarian efforts, a true success in those arenas is just too unlikely to warrant us ever trying it again. In other words: Our military shouldn't be used as an arm of our state department...ever. Lines are being blurred, and I don't think we will like the outcome. If you commit the military, then COMMIT the military. Our armed forces are not a multi-tool, nor should they be used as such...they are a knife.

Walk SOFTLY, and carry a big stick; Best advice any president could get regarding how to comport oneself on the international stage.

 

QUELL

3:56 PM ET

April 1, 2011

wrong parallel

Quite simply, we need to leave Afghanistan. We are spending one billion taxpayers per month to commit atrocities and make more Taliban. We have spent approx 400 billion to date and there are more Taliban than ever, and there is a 100% probability that the Taliban will be part of whatever government we leave behind.
Atrocity incidence is ramping up (Gharani massacre, NATO chopper on boys gathering firewood, the Kill Squad, 40 tribesman droned in Waziristan, etc, etc), and neighboring countries are falling to an enemy ideology (islamic democracy).....like dominos.
Remind anyone of My Lai and Cambodia?
The mini-surge failed and that is why McC fired himself.

It is time to develop an exit strategy.
Otherwise the US is going to get a forced exit strategy. If Obama and the mil-brass dont get sane real quick, our exit is going to be some variant of Operation Frequent Wind II.

 

QUELL

4:08 PM ET

April 1, 2011

please note

The mini-surge WAS the exit strategy and it has failed.
We need a new one, stat.

 

THOMROBB

5:07 PM ET

April 1, 2011

Leaving Afghanistan

The U.S. cannot leave Afghanistan; either overtly or covertly, ever. Get used to it. The day after we do, the Taliban set up shop, start murdering the populace, start planning another attack on the Great Satan. It's infantile to argue otherwise. Iraq is a modern, rich base for U.S. interests. We are there forever also. Get used to that. The chants for freedom, started by Bush in Iraq and Afghanistan have spread. We are the policeman of the world, whether we have the intelligence to see it or not. If we ignore this duty, Islamic/Al-queda nuclear bomb(s) in our cities and Isreal's will be the next 9/11. Get used to it.

 

EXMOD 27

5:53 PM ET

April 2, 2011

explain Bosnia

I would argue we successfully used our military in preventing a larger crisis in the Balkans and we didn't level Belgrade in the process nor are we bleeding out as we are in Afghanistan. We just need to pick our battles more carefully.

 

WINSTON SMITH 9584

1:57 PM ET

April 1, 2011

It is time we reclaim control

It is time we reclaim control of our democracy and our nation's interventionist, highly militarized foreign policy which has been controlled for many decades by a out of touch 'bi-partisan' elite, which of course include our military generals who are far to eager to wage war and have become increasingly brazen as they push the president and Congress to adopt their 'war' preferences and reduce the vital role of civilian, democratic control of the military...this foreign policy uses the military as its main tool, acts undemocratically by supporting and arming despots, and has caused the deaths of countless people...this must stop.

“Peace is a dirty word, derided because Obama won the Nobel peace prize. We know what it is like to be killed for peace. The peace we have seen pursued has no plan. It is not based on love, reconciliation, and truth”...this smart individual knows why our nation is in such an Orwellian state...sadly the crazy state of affairs where a US president is presented with a 'peace prize' just as he escalates a highly questionable war in Afghanistan and leads a globe-spanning imperialistic military will not change unless we demand that our unnecessary, extremely costly empire consisting of hundreds of bases around the world, 12 aircraft carriers, thousands of jets and bombers is dismantled...our nation and its foreign policy will not become more peaceful as long as the projection of military power is easy, as long as bombing via jets, drones or waging undeclared war is so easy...remember Bush's invasion of Iraq in 2003?

On another related issue, of course the US Military is mistreating Bradley Manning, who by the way is still a US citizen with constitutional rights, brutally...Manning's whistleblowing exposed the war crimes, corruption, and truly undemocratic, liberty threatening nature of the US Military...this unfortunately is the nature of standing armies as they become overly powerful and unaccountable.
Many of our nation's founders warned us of the undemocratic nature of standing armies...it is time for us to wake up. As on several other issues Obama has been unwilling to reform the military...he is now part of the problem and is perpetuating the dedication of vast amounts of our resources to undemocratic militarism, up to half of our federal budget is wasted on the military when we have many many needs at home.

 

THOMROBB

5:12 PM ET

April 1, 2011

Manning

Manning is a traitor to the core. He knew the risks, knew the law, had the scienter, so he cannot complain now that the baloney sandwhiches and jello-cups are cold.

 

CPTPETE08

6:49 PM ET

April 1, 2011

Chapter-out Mr. Rothkopf...

At most, Mr. Rothkopf should be removed from his position as a writer on matters generally important so as to dethrone him from a position of "expertise." In the least, "How the world is really run" should be removed from the banner at the top of the page. How much cliché can be packed into one article? The mandatory reference to the military-industrial complex... The token nod to the service and sacrifice of the members of our armed services... The brief history lesson on the "scrapes" between past Commanders-in-Chief and their generals... I'm surprised we didn't trot out General MacArthur's firing.

In the vacuum that would have been left had the aforementioned been forgone, we could, perhaps, have had some real analysis of the evolution of our involvement in Afghanistan from both military and a developmental perspectives and how the two are crucially interrelated. But all we really get from Mr. Rothkopf is the standard we've-been-there-forever-spending-a-bojillion-dollars-a-year-it's-time-to-leave-behind-SOF-and-spooks-and-get-the-hell-out. This summation is far too one-dimensional, far too prevalent and will cause readers who have no direct knowledge or experience of what is actually going on in Afghanistan to have a highly jaded view.

There are several military evolutions which could be adumbrated from the last ten years of our presence in Afghanistan. For now, I will emphasize the latest phase which only began with General McChrystal's arrival as COMISAF and has been carried on and modified by General Petraeus. This phase, which focuses PRIMARILY on securing what are referred to as key terrain districts - the population centers which by virtue of their size or other strategic importance are the centers of gravity in Afghanistan - has only been underway since the summer of 2009, when General McChrystal became COMISAF. Prior to the summer of 2009, American and Coalition forces were mainly engaged in what is referred to as the kinetic fight, that is, the killing of bad guys be they Taliban, Al Qaeda, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin, Lashkar-e-Taiba, et al. In other words, for the first several years after the toppling of the Taliban up until the summer of 2009, we were PRIMARILY engaged in the very whack-a-mole focus on killing the enemy which Mr. Rothkopf (and apparently Vice President Biden - at least during the elections and into President Obama's first term if Woodward is to be believed) now promotes as our fallback strategy but with a significantly reduced footprint.

For Mr. Rothkopf to assert that we could even wage a successful campaign against the worst of our enemies in Afghanistan and Pakistan from over-the-horizon platforms in the Arabian Sea, or that the appropriate amount of actionable intelligence could be developed from means of collection in orbit above the earth simply betrays how truly little he knows about how "the world is really run [ran]" in Afghanistan. At the peril of being labeled a "COINista," one, especially Mr. Rothkopf, ought to be familiar with the tenets of COIN and its fairly recent appearance in Afghanistan before the entire enterprise is chalked up as an utter failure beyond the point of no return. To start, how would we acquire the appropriate amount and fidelity of information to target bad guys, given the strategy Mr. Rothkopf advocates (and by the way, I'd like to know how much "a small force" is that should be left behind)? Spy satellites aren't simply on station in geosynchronous orbit above Afghanistan and Pakistan 24/7, 365 days a year scanning inch-by-inch the terrain and systematically coming upon people at a particular location, or their houses, or bases, or weapons caches, etc. The same could be said of UAVs and UCAVs like Global Hawk, Predator, Reaper, etc. Occasionally, these latter platforms do come upon targets of opportunity, but that is a relatively rare event.

Both satellites and UAVs require directions, places to specifically search based on intelligence from the ground. Where will that ground intelligence come from? There aren't enough SOF in the entire U.S. military to make such a strategy effective, i.e., to run around the countryside, covering all the key terrain districts I mentioned, identifying the threats that exist. SOF are a force multiplier - their efforts can be focused on very specific and limited objectives and they contribute to a much larger effort being carried out by conventional forces being employed in new (relatively new) ways. COIN requires that conventional forces essentially embed within the populations they're designated to protect. They have a persistent presence in those populations and develop relationships with the local leadership and populace. Through increasing interactions with the people, we're able to develop what is called the human terrain starting from the most basic questions, e.g., who are these people? what is their history? who are the new guys on the block (yes, the mapping of the human terrain can go from provinces, to districts, to neighborhoods and blocks)? what are your needs? what are your gripes? and on and on. From this information, over time, we're able to develop not just actionable intelligence to find bad guys and to isolate them from the population, but we're able to learn how to best provide basic services which lends to the first goal [of driving a wedge between them and the enemy].

Quickly addressing the point about the "Navy offshore," what does Mr. Rothkopf mean? I'm not sure if he's solely referring to dealing with some contingency involving the Pakistani nuclear program, or if he means to also use it as a tool in the over-the-horizon efforts to combat bad guys in both that country and Afghanistan. I won't touch the first, for now, but to the extent that he means the second, well, common sense should prevail. How effective were our cruise missile strikes in the 90s against Sudan and Afghanistan as responses to Al Qaeda in the aftermath of bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania? Not to mention, if one simply does the math, it takes hours for that ordinance to reach its targets from their sea-based platforms - the probability that we're not simply spending a million dollars to hit an empty tent or a "camel's ass" (as I believe it was once eloquently put) decreases enormously.

Since I've just mentioned development, what does Mr. Rothkopf have to say on the matter? Ah, nothing. Again, very little development, save for some big end-item projects, was occurring in a coordinated and big way prior to the summer of 2009. By development I mean economic and political, that is, creating not just the basis of a functioning economy, but assistance in developing the institutions of governance and law which are crucial to the success of this effort. These last two areas are, indeed, the most difficult to tackle. I will say that Mr. Rothkopf is right to point out the difficulty in this area. But what is his recommendation for that problem set? He offers nothing. Although the number of State Department and USAID personnel have increased recently, where is the "civilian surge" that was promised for Afghanistan? Where is the army of accountants, civil engineers, lawyers, law enforcement personnel and other vital professions to assist with the development and governance problem? Again, Mr. Rothkopf doesn't even ask the question.

So while our efforts in Afghanistan are inhibited by the deficit of inputs (which is just recently being addressed) on the development/governance side of the equation, the overall problem is much more complex than Mr. Rothkopf's formulation that President Obama's military establishment is failing him. If this was real and serious journalism taking place, we'd have a much greater appreciation of the dynamics occurring with Afghanistan, we might even be asking:

- What is the specific military strategy now underway?
- How does the current military effort differ from the past?
- What are the development/governance efforts underway?
- Are the development/governance efforts synchronized with the military strategy?
- Are sufficient efforts being devoted to the development/governance side of the house?

There are many more important questions, but maybe Mr. Rothkopf can at least start with these.

 

EXMOD 27

6:11 PM ET

April 2, 2011

Excellent points

You've done this before, no?

 

EXMOD 27

6:10 PM ET

April 2, 2011

God how I hate Rumsfeld...

but he was right when he said this is a generational war. He told the military and the nation it was a generational war, as most COIN strategies are, and yet now we have folk saying they don't have the stomach for it. Fine, I understand you lack the political will to do what is necessary or you think the costs are too high to accomplish the desired objective. All reasonable points. Just don't blame the troops you ordered to the job for you. The military did not fail the politicians, the politicians just changed the parameters. And who elected the politicians? We did. Move on, nothing to see here...

 

David Rothkopf is the CEO and Editor-at-Large of Foreign Policy. His new book, "Power, Inc.: The Epic Rivalry Between Big Business and Government and the Reckoning that Lies Ahead" is due out from Farrar, Straus & Giroux on March 1.

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