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WAR OF IDEAS
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PASSPORT
Remembering Michael Hastings
Posted By David Rothkopf
Tuesday, October 19, 2010 - 12:17 PM
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This is a critical moment for the United States's most fraught diplomatic challenge.
Pakistani officials arrive in Washington this week for meetings designed to shore up a relationship that is both vital and exceedingly dangerous for both regimes. The Pakistani delegation will nominally be led by the country's foreign minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi. But the real focus will be the man who many feel is so powerful that the fact he is not yet president reflects only a personal choice on his part. As Pakistan's top military officer, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani might as well be known as General Plan B. If the current government stumbles, if unrest spreads, U.S. officials are fully counting on him to step in and put a lid on the problem.
The conversations this week will be publicly focused on gestures of support for the Pakistanis from the U.S. government, from beefing up civilian and military aid to generating public statements of common purpose. But behind the scenes there will be palpable tension. The United States is dissatisfied -- the feeling being that Pakistan is not doing everything it can to assist in tracking down extremist groups living within their borders.
That discomfort undoubtedly is not eased by the exclusive report in Britain's Guardian today that is entitled, "Pakistan intelligence services 'aided Mumbai terror attacks.'" The story describes a 109-page Indian government report based on the interrogation of David Headley; the Pakistani-American arrested in relation to the Mumbai attacks. "Under questioning," writes Jason Burke, "Headley described dozens of meetings between officers of the main Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI, and senior militants from the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) group responsible for the Mumbai attacks."
While the perspectives provided by Headley offer just one view and include a number of statements suggesting that senior ISI officials may not have been plugged into the entire Mumbai plan, they corroborate much of what has long been suspected about ties between the ISI and extremist groups. Further, they tell an unsettlingly logical story of how the Mumbai attacks were undertaken as part of a deliberate strategy by the historically more regionally-focused Lashkar-e-Taiba to remain relevant in a world in which competing terrorist groups were attracting members seeking the grander mission of jihad against the West.
It is a nauseating image: officials of a government nominally allied to the United States working with terrorists to plan a murderous attack on innocents as a marketing ploy on behalf of their stone cold terrorists of choice. Nauseating, but despite Pakistani denials that it is baseless, with the unmistakable ring of truth.
The contrast between the meetings and the report reveal the core conundrum the Obama administration faces with regard to Pakistan. No country is home to more urgent risks. While near the top of the list of those risks are the presence and day-to-day violent agenda of al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other such militant organizations, at the very top is that the rational elements in the Pakistani government might lose control of some or all of the country's nuclear arsenal. The United States seeks to shore up those rational elements -- led in a practical sense more by Kayani than civilian officials -- and collaborate with them in addressing the threats that President Obama himself has famously likened to a "cancer." But in so doing, the United States must embrace a government that is fractured -- divided in and against itself (within every sub-unit it seems, you find another split).
In fact, within the ISI and elsewhere among Pakistan's power structure, there are forces that are among the most direct enemies of the United States, the most vital allies of al Qaeda, the most important supporters the Taliban ever had. Circumstances have dictated that to contain and seek to undercut those forces, the United States and its allies have had to engage the other, moderate side of the house. In short, the United States must, in order to pursue its most vital interests, make love to a cactus.
This is realpolitik at its most stark, loaded, and complex. And it underscores that within every compromise or look the other way associated with the "swallow-hard and pursue the national interest" dimension of realpolitik there are the seeds of the strategy's own destruction. Embrace flawed allies and the relationship turns on whether it is driven by the objectives of the alliance or the flaws that are being overlooked in its favor. And -- as we have seen from Saigon to Baghdad to tin pot dictatorships worldwide -- more often than not the flaws win out in the long run.
The fragility of this relationship and the tensions associated with it will be on display in the meetings this week -- perhaps more visible in what is unsaid -- body language and via indirection -- than in what is actually said in the open. But so much is riding on the success of the delicate diplomacy involved here and the United States's leading spokespeople -- like Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and the U.S. point man for South Asia, Richard Holbrooke -- who are so famously forthright that it is likely there will be a number of very candid and blunt exchanges as well.
All of this is made even more crucial not only because the administration fears that should another major terrorist episode emanate from Pakistan that the entire fragile enterprise could become undone, but because the circumstances surrounding the relationship are now changing in important ways.
The United States wants out of neighboring Afghanistan in the worst way … and typically when you want something in the worst way, you get it in the worst way. The Afghanistan government appears to making a place for our former enemies, the Taliban, and thus is beginning to look very much like the Pakistani regime in terms of its divisions -- so much so that it will likely be linked to and guided by elements within that Pakistani government -- and not the ones we are most comfortable with.
Next, there will be a tension because of another factor. Next month, President Obama will be going to India. Historically, due to India's Cold War ties to the U.S.S.R., the United States embraced Pakistan for strategic reasons. But for even more compelling historical reasons -- from roots in the British Empire to the embrace of democracy to a host of cultural affinities -- India, not Pakistan, is the United States's natural ally in South Asia. India is also a rising major power and an important counterweight to China. Since the late Clinton years, the United States has been turning ever closer to New Delhi and that is a trend the Obama visit will and should continue.
Given India and Pakistan's history of conflict -- accentuated again by the Mumbai-attack focus of the Guardian report -- the United States is about to wrap its gnarliest diplomatic relationship in a fabric of even greater complexities. It is what the United States must do, to be sure. The Obama administration has in fact, thus far handled all this with considerable dexterity (no small feat considering the factors involved and the fact that this is the first time in history that South Asia policy has topped the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities). But one cannot help but wonder if -- given the underlying forces at play -- the biggest challenges we face lie in the future.
AAMIR QURESHI/AFP/Getty Images
U.S. - Pakistan, a cursed alliance
1. US policy keeps up the pretense that the real terrorist threat springs from al-Qaeda, even though the published US intelligence assessment admits al-Qaeda has been weakened to the extent that its remnants are holed up in mountain caves and is in no position to seriously endanger US homeland security.
2. Washington draws a specious distinction between al-Qaeda and the Taliban to treat the former as inveterate foes of America and the latter as made up of many "reconciliables". Another deceptive distinction is to tie the Taliban with Islamist ideology, rather than directly with terrorism. President Barack Obama repeatedly has labeled the Taliban militia as obscurantist rather than terrorist a tag he reserves exclusively for al-Qaeda.
3. US policy has split the Taliban into the Afghan and Pakistani parts. The US is going after the Pakistani Taliban, led by Baitullah Mehsud, while it encourages the Pakistani intelligence to continue to shelter the entire top Afghan Taliban leadership in Baluchistan province. Mullah Muhammad Omar and other members of the Taliban's inner shura (council) have been ensconced for years in the Quetta area. Yet, US drones have targeted militants in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), but not the Afghan Taliban leadership operating with impunity from Baluchistan. US ground-commando raids also have spared the Taliban's command-and-control network in Baluchistan.
4. While employing the Saudi, Afghan and Pakistani intelligence for back-channel negotiations with the Afghan Taliban shura over a political deal, the Obama administration is dramatizing the Pakistani Taliban threat but ignores Pakistani government and Army’s shelter and support of Afghan Taliban headed by Mullah Omar who control the current Taliban insurgency from his base in Quetta.
5. Washington continues to pretend that terrorist safe havens exist only along Pakistan's western frontier while nothing can be further from the truth. Terrorist safe havens exist in entire Pakistan - in Karachi, in Punjab, in Baluchistan and even in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir as well as in Pakhtunwa.
6. The fact that America has helped amass a huge sum of money in international aid for Pakistan (not counting Chinese assistance) shows it will not allow its long-established pawn to become a failed state. But when Pakistan is most vulnerable to external pressure, Washington refuses to exercise leverage to force Pakistan to snap its ties to terror.
No wonder US continues to have troubles in its Afghan mission. These troubles are of US’s own making.
American involvement in Afghanistan has resulted into increased terrorism inside Pakistan and not the other way round. IF you keep shouting at the top of your voice calling it a day when its pitch dark all around I wonder how many will believe you. Pakistan has a delicate balance of relations to cater. On one side is India which only gets what it deserves from Pakistan, on other Afghanistan which with all its good and bad will stay here even after America is gone (just like 1988). US can only win the battle of hearts and minds if it is sincere......
OK. So poor Pakistanis organized camps, did this n that for U.S without receiving anything in return. Poor lady appears to have been fucked but not paid.
Pakistan arranged for him to meet leaders of the Afghan Mujahedeen, he punched his fist in the air and yelled "Allah-u-Akbar.
How come Pakistanis were hand in gloves well in advance. Out of sheer innocence.
For a whole decade, we fed and clothed, armed and trained the Mujahedeen, set up camps for their families in Pakistan and gave them diplomatic support throughout the world.
And U.S did not support you or pay you. You paid starving your own people and circumscribing the nuclear program.
To bring inter-tribal conflict to an end,
Pakistan organized militias of the Taliban (literally, Students, from Afghan refugee camps)
and helped them bring most of Afghanistan under control. Many of them are sons of our former darlings, the Mujahedeen.
This is the first time a candid admission (or confession) by a Pakistani.
The Taliban disarmed the country, and brought poppy cultivation to almost zero--no mean achievements.
Now they are themselves cultivating poppy. Any comments please.
Now the Taliban are our enemy. We have been fighting them for nine years.
Really. Are you really fighting them.
If we think 2.5 cents a day for every Pakistani (that's what $1.5 billion a year comes to) is being wasted, why give it?
Then why does Pakistan go out begging every alternate day. Today U.S tomorrow China again U.S. Flip, Flop, Flip. Choose one husband.
Especially meaningful (for me) items 4 & 5--Marty's post. Much Mufti's post.
I'd like examining a map: pin-pointing many the terrorists's "safe" havens & training camps--Pakistan & Kashmir?
Considering our timidity to destroy the terrorists's "safe" havens & training camps--we wage (unfairly for our troops, aid workers) something less than war--Afghanistan & Pakistan. But we've a penchant for same (even greater costs)--Vietnam & Korea.
Yea, the War Bondsman (we know him well...more as Beast of Prey) smirks our learned reason, while (all the while) extracting, grinding down our political "will".
I often see the kind of confident assertion Rothkopf is making above, that Kayani is "one of the good ones." He may be, and barring some questionable associations I've no evidence he's not, and he's certainly been saying good things.
But I find this unquestioning trust of Kayani -- well, a little dumb, which is surprising from Mr. Rothkopf. Maybe he's our friend, maybe he's not. Try to help people who see rational in Pakistan -- hey, I'm down with that, good idea. But anyone who's real real sure who in the Pakistani military is rational and who is not -- is not someone thinking well or clearly about the policy.
Pakistan's military knows that stoked tensions with India means more defense dollars for the generals to play with. They are fully aware that the last thing India wants is more Muslim population, but Pakistan allows the myth of India's threat to continue.
Hence the border is stocked with troops to repel an Indian invasion while the northern tribal areas are beyond Pakistan's military capacity. It's time to tell Pakistan that if they can't take on the tribal territory and knock out the terrorists, we would be glad to do it for them.
Underwriting Pakistan's Cold War strategy
Fareed Zakaria pointed out that India makes a terrific enemy for the Pakistani military - it looks big and scary, so it needs to build up its own military. But, Zakaria noted, since India is not going to invade a nuclear armed nation, the Pakistani military gets to have its shiny toys, but won't ever have to use them. Meanwhile, the equipment and training that Pakistan does need, such as counter-insurgency, is only now being addressed.
Pakistan has certain aims in the region, and it has developed a portfolio of means to achieve those aims. It lends support to LeT and the Haqqani network when necessary, it provides occasional help to the U.S. and NATO when necessary, and is even rumored to be building a "just-in-case" nuclear weapon for Saudi Arabia.
Issues such as development fall further down the list, as this summer's floods have shown.
Thanks for using gendered metaphors of sexual assault in your political analysis. Totally enhances your masculine-corporate-power trip vibe.
Oh, please.
Hypersensitive gender-studies-analysis is so Oberlin, circa '92. Get a life already. The world has grown up. (*slightly)
It is high time we present Headley to internal media to some clarity on issue of terrorism.
America used safe heavens card and then back down.
Let us use terror card and see what happens. Mr Rothkopf can tell us the scenario day after.
AmPak relationship is like marriage where there is no love or passion, unwilling for divorce but have side affairs galore. Hillary knows a lot about that kind of relationship.
led by the most incompetent and stupidest white men in uniform. ever. Why are we still in A'stan? Was any Afghan involved in 9/11? We went in 9 years ago ostensibly to wipe out 800 or so Alqadea terrorists, not massacre Afghans! .gonna be a cake walk! Like Ieaq. according to cia chief panetta there are now just 100 or so al qaeda left and they have taken on 200,000 uniforms and 50,000 merecenaries (who behave like the waffen SS). And we are losing despite $trillion spent/looted by the contractors and 000 s of Afghans killed. Oy veh! you do not invade Pushtoon lnds and expect to win even if you are the most powerful killer the world has known. you fight Pushtoon with $$$$.
the brass defeated themselves so they and their hacks in the media now blame pakistan's ISI. were the world that simple.
led by the most incompetent and stupidest white men in uniform. ever. Why are we still in A'stan? Was any Afghan involved in 9/11? We went in 9 years ago ostensibly to wipe out 800 or so Alqadea terrorists, not massacre Afghans! .gonna be a cake walk! Like Ieaq. according to cia chief panetta there are now just 100 or so al qaeda left and they have taken on 200,000 uniforms and 50,000 merecenaries (who behave like the waffen SS). And we are losing despite $trillion spent/looted by the contractors and 000 s of Afghans killed. Oy veh! you do not invade Pushtoon lnds and expect to win even if you are the most powerful killer the world has known. you fight Pushtoon with $$$$.
the brass defeated themselves so they and their hacks in the media now blame pakistan's ISI. were the world that simple.
David Rothkopf is the CEO and Editor-at-Large of Foreign Policy. His new book, "Power, Inc.: The Epic Rivalry Between Big Business and Government and the Reckoning that Lies Ahead" is due out from Farrar, Straus & Giroux on March 1.
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