Posted By David Rothkopf Share

I spent a lot of time this weekend stewing over my appraisal of Gen. Jim Jones as national security advisor. I stick by my conclusion that he was a highly unsuccessful national security advisor. But I don't think my assessment was nuanced enough. Because Jones was a good man who had an extraordinary career before serving in the Obama administration and who has contributed a great deal to his country.

Sometimes when one is in the instant-opinion business, as many of us are in Washington, nuance is the first casualty. A premium is placed on finding the pithy quote or sound-bite. Speak first, think later would be a way to describe the standard operating procedure if in fact, most people thought later.

The main reason Jones faltered as national security advisor was not his aloofness nor was it his unwillingness to roll up his sleeves and manage the policy process. The main reason Jones faltered was he served a president who did not empower him, did not embrace him and worse, allowed other members of his team to upstage him, circumvent him, and undercut him.

There is much Jones could have done to have been more successful. But he could never achieve much without the support and collaboration of an experienced commander in chief who knew something about national security policy.

For these reasons I also chose to describe him as unsuccessful rather than as a "bad" national security advisor. While I think the signature foreign policy decision of the first two years of this administration, doubling down in Afghanistan, was a serious error, and while I think the policy process was almost as new ideas-free as it was allegedly (but not actually) drama-free, worse policies were found in the Bush administration and there have no doubt been national security advisors in the past couple decades who I do not reckon had many of the personal qualities of Jones.

Beyond these clarifications of my thoughts about Jones, I have also had some time to think about the appointment of Tom Donilon as Jones's successor. Throughout the past two years Donilon has received great credit for managing the policy process smoothly. No doubt he has done that. He is also a smart guy who is tirelessly working to support the president. In the times I have met him and in the view of people I deeply trust, he is also a very good guy. He deserves credit for these things.

But, if the policy process runs smoothly and produces weak policies, then how good is it?  And if you hire people for jobs based primarily on their intelligence, work habits or loyalty (not unimportant traits, to be sure), you run the risk of undervaluing other characteristics that are even more important to devising new policies -- like creativity or the kind of sophisticated understanding of policy that can come only from a lifetime spent rigorously grappling with critical questions.

The times I have met Tom, I have been struck by how likeable and capable he has seemed. His work in the State Department and in the NSC certainly has helped prepare him for this job. I have every hope that he will succeed. (For more on this, see Steve Clemons thoughtful piece on the appointments that he produced over this past weekend.) And as I said, Tom Donilon has one big advantage over Jones, he is working for a considerably more experienced president.

But it has to also be said that not Donilon but the Donilon choice is worrisome on some levels. His record as an author of policy is spotty where it is not sparse. That his relationship with the leadership on the military side is not terrific poses the risk of brewing problems, especially given the military's unease with the president and the rest of his team and the impending departure of Secretary of Defense Bob Gates.

To me, however, the primary reason I am worried about the Donilon appointment is that taken with the fact that the president has filled the other prominent recent openings in his staff from within is that it puts the administration at risk of deepening a case of the worst thing to afflict the most unsuccessful of White Houses: groupthink.

The president -- already open to criticism that he is captive to his inner circle -- is, through recent actions, suggesting that the whole "team of rivals" approach for which he was hailed early in his tenure might well have been a momentary impulse, an expedient or perhaps an idea he no longer feels he needs to embrace. At just the time when the administration would benefit from new blood, new ideas, and other voices of stature bringing real experience to bear, the president is sending the message that no, he's just fine with the way things have been going.

As is known to readers of this blog, I am the first to give the president credit for his achievements and to argue on behalf of some of the terrific appointments he has made (Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, Secretary Duncan, CIA Director Panetta, Fed Chairman Bernanke, Secretary Chu, Elizabeth Warren, the list of terrific people at high levels is a good one). But I know that administrations evolve and that doesn't always mean they grow stronger. There are always tensions between the path of least resistance (which is to say the path of political expedience) and true leadership.

Perhaps Tom Donilon will rise to the occasion as some of his best predecessors have (Sandy Berger was a deputy who became one of the best national security advisors) and for all our sakes I hope he does. But if he does it will be because he grows into the job, displays new confidence, offers a strong voice of his own, is unafraid to challenge the president, embraces a diversity of views as energetically as he seeks to produce consensus, makes a real effort to re-engage and restore trust with the military, and transcends the useful political training of his past to place national interests ahead of those of any party or candidate. And if he does, it will be in part because when future openings occur in the administration, the president returns to his original impulse to bring in women and men of stature to challenge him and to press for the changes we need.

Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

 

MARTY MARTEL

11:04 AM ET

October 12, 2010

Disconnects can doom Obama presidency

Comfort level and smooth operation comes from choosing people whose opinion jives with yours whereas confusion and mixed messages comes from choosing people who challenge you.

Selection of people like Gates, Petraeus and Mullen who do NOT necessarily agree with the President’s own assessment of terrorism ’cancer’ being in Pakistan as reported by Bob Woodward in his book, brought troop surge that President himself did not agree with.

But when it comes to the vexing problem of Afghanistan, President’s own goal of preventing that ’cancer’ spreading from Pakistan to Afghanistan can not be achieved without standing up to Pakistan that is fueling Taliban insurgency as everyone in the know, knows. Standing up to Pakistan requires long time commitment of more massive surge that neither the President nor his Congressional Democratic allies and the vice president share.

To top it, the trio who implements President’s Afghan policy - Gates, Mullen, Petraeus - are only going partially to the roots of ‘cancer’ in Pakistan, the one residing in North Waziristan while expecting their dubious Pakistani ally Kayani to take care of other half of the problem residing in Quetta, Baluchistan.

So these two disconnects - one being Obama’s own and the other being that of his Afghan trio team - are going to lead to failure of Afghan mission and most likely one term Obama presidency.

Only question will be - if Democrats do lose the House and the Senate to Republicans come November, will Obama like Johnson in 1968, himself declare his intention not to seek second term, paving the way for Hillary candidacy come 2012? Or will Obama run again and lose to Republican Romney or Palin in 2012?

 

DRLAKE777

4:20 PM ET

October 13, 2010

What makes you think he'll be

What makes you think he'll be likely to lose in 2012? The disconnect between what candidates like Romney and Palin stand for and what the American people want (based on survey data) is unlikely to help them defeat Obama, especially when we see what kinds of garbage come out of a Republican House after this election.

 

ZATHRAS

2:19 PM ET

October 15, 2010

I agree...

...with Rothkopf's concerns about Donilon's position in this administration.

In an administration that needed an NSA primarily to make the process work, I think Donilon would be fine. The elder President Bush had an administration like that; the important foreign policy decisions were made by the President and Secretary of State, with the NSA in charge of ensuring that other stakeholders within the executive branch had their views and interests represented. That's not the only way to make policy, but it would accommodate someone of Donilon's evident talents.

President Obama doesn't work that way, which is the problem. Substantive foreign policy decisions in his administration are not worked out between the President and his Secretary of State; Sec. Clinton has a seat at the table, but nothing more than that. I blame Obama more than Clinton for this situation, but frankly a President wanting to make foreign policy through his Secretary of State should choose someone with talent and experience for the task. The elder Bush did, with James Baker; Truman did, twice, with Marshall and Dean Acheson. Even Nixon, under duress, finally did it when he made Henry Kissinger his Secretary of State.

Obama doesn't want to make foreign policy through the State Department, and picked his Secretary of State accordingly. He doesn't want to make foreign policy through the NSA either, and so has chosen a process person for the job. As Rothkopf points out, this begs the question of how foreign policy substance issues will get resolved. Obama evidently thinks he can resolve them himself, after thorough debate among a large number of stakeholders. I don't think he's being realistic either about his own abilities or about the capacity of any large group to come up with timely and directed guidance on multiple interrelated foreign policy issues.

 

David Rothkopf is the CEO and Editor-at-Large of Foreign Policy. His new book, "Power, Inc.: The Epic Rivalry Between Big Business and Government and the Reckoning that Lies Ahead" is due out from Farrar, Straus & Giroux on March 1.

Read More