Thursday, August 26, 2010 - 12:06 PM

With new reports of flood-related calamity in Pakistan today, it is time to launch a different sort of international response to the problem in the Indus River Valley. Because as tragic as this disaster that has shattered the lives of perhaps as many as three New York Cities full of people has been, it is really only a prelude to even greater problems.
On one level, those problems are associated with the ever-present possibility of future floods, a threat that exists because of inadequate flood control infrastructure, flood warning mechanisms, and flood response resources within the country. On another level, as highlighted in Steve Solomon's insightful August 15 op-ed in the New York Times, perhaps an even greater problem in the years ahead -- due to both population growth and melting Himalayan glaciers that might even be a culprit in the current disaster -- will be linked to potential water scarcity, droughts, and resulting food shortages in the same region.
But there is a third looming problem, also addressed but not fully explored in Solomon's piece. That is the problem associated with the fact that the waters of the Indus are shared -- which is to say competed for -- by Pakistan and India. The less water for irrigation, drinking and energy production in the region, the more likely it is that there is conflict between these two nuclear states. Indeed, despite the ethnic and political tensions that have existed between these countries since Pakistan's founding, it could well be that water rather than religion or border disputes is the most likely trigger of future fighting, a prospect made deeply unsettling given the arsenal these two massive nations possess.
The U.S. and the international community have responded generously in the wake of the Pakistan flood crisis. America's $7.5 billion aid effort is a step in the right direction. But it is only a tiny fraction of the several tens of billions that are needed to better manage and preserve the water resources in this fragile, vital region. Further, it is clear that money alone will not solve the problem. Existing treaty relationships between India and Pakistan on the use of the water from the Indus are being strained to breaking by dam projects and shifting demand.
Perhaps this is one of those moments where it might be possible to harness the awareness raised by the current disaster and the sensitivities heightened by rising tensions to produce a different kind of response, one that if managed properly could also produce much larger benefits. Few relationships on the planet are as important or as potentially dangerous as that between India and Pakistan. Further, as we have seen in Afghanistan or in the recent Mumbai terror attacks, it is a relationship with growing ramifications and multiplying risks. Seeking to stabilize it -- daunting a prospect as that seems given its history -- must be a top foreign policy priority for all the world's powers. Further, for the United States, for whom both countries are increasingly important to a host of our international interests, playing an active role in resolving this distant and growing resource crisis is not only in our direct national interest, it could be a model for helping to address a proliferating set of similar challenges that seem likely in the very near future.
President Obama is planning a trip to India in the fall. Top American diplomats are engaged in both countries constantly at the moment. The U.N. and other international agencies are deeply engaged due to the current flood crisis. Perhaps the time is right to propose a massive, multilateral Indus River Valley Development Initiative. Perhaps such an initiative could provide an area of common interest to promote a constructive dialogue between India and Pakistan (after all, notes Solomon, agreements such as the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty do exist even if they have been somewhat strained by time and circumstance). Perhaps with a redouble initiative and ingenuity a consortium of nations can fashion a program via which the United States, other major powers, and multilateral organizations can marshal the massive resources such an initiative would take. The effort could and should cover modernization of flood control infrastructure and capabilities, irrigation systems, and the efficient, smart production of the region's under-tapped but mismanaged hydro-power resources. It could provide technical assistance, education programs to train those who will be needed to manage the resources at the local, regional and national levels and it would also provide jobs in a region where the absence of jobs creates human kindling for extremism and border tensions. It might also include other elements like sharing the kind of satellite imagery and resources that are essential to understanding and managing long-term water issues and thus anticipating and defusing future tensions where possible.
Obama needs to make his trip to India count. The relationship with India is one of the most important the United States will have in the century ahead. Given the shared interests, commitment to democracy, and shared language of the two countries, his trip should signal a real commitment on the part of the United States to making the deepening of U.S.-India ties a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy, a true "special relationship" that goes well beyond the hyperbole typical to diplomatic labeling of such bilateral links. One challenge of the trip will be finding the "big deliverable" or "big deliverables" that will show there is more than rhetoric binding the two nations. The Bush Administration did this effectively with the U.S.-India nuclear deal. Obama should do it with a package of programs including those in the areas of economic links, relaxing export controls, defense cooperation, energy and climate initiatives, and so on.
The challenge associated with the urgent business of building that relationship is that it is sure to cause stress in our vital dealings with the Pakistanis. (Much as our vital dealings with the Pakistanis associated with the war in Afghanistan and against extremists who reside with Pakistan has caused tensions in the U.S.-India relationship.) Among the most delicate diplomatic balancing acts we face is finding ways to build both relationships in ways that do not add complications.
Both Pakistan and India have very compelling motivations to find solutions to the water problems that divide them and tie them together. The U.S. and the world -- for humanitarian reasons and for the common sensical reasons associated with trying to defuse tensions in a part of the planet that lives under the threat of nuclear war -- also ought to work on something in this area. Begin with a conference. Find common ground. Build from there. Make real commitments. Treat the matter with the urgency it warrants. It could be a rare chance to turn a crisis into a much-needed breakthrough.
The Indus River Valley is a common artery shared by two of the world's great nations. Either we ensure that water flows freely through it or we run the very real risk that in the not too distant future more blood and tears will.
Need a scalpel not a hammer, Mr. Rothkopf
Better water management and better sharing of information of the Indus water system between India and Pakistan is necessary. Where I disagree with Mr. Rothkopf is that we need massive multi-lateral initiative to do just that - talk of using a sledgehammer where you need a scalpel. Such large politico-bureaucratic initiatives, which make good political rhetoric, often hog most of the resources assigned to address the problem leaving little impact on the ground.
The Indus water treaty is a robust and a living agreement between India and Pakistan which has stood the test of time. The water commissioners of India and Pakistan meet periodically, share information, and if either country has reservations about any issue it can invoke the arbitration of an expert from a third country. Unfortunately, what we witness in the media is the needless sensationalization provoking fear among masses and the policy experts trying to reinvent the wheel.
After reading your article, I checked the map of the world. I did not find the Indus river flowing thru India, Pakistan and America. So, why does America have to go and poke its nose into another issue that is none of its business? And why would India even give two cents for Obama or Hillary yammering on about this topic? What possible benefit would it be for India to involve or include America in this issue? And don't we in America already have enough problems to fix in Iran, Israel, Palestine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc, etc that we need to take up the problem of water use inside Pakistan? Pakistan needs to figure out how to solve its own problems without this constant flow of money and "help" from the US foreign policy and national security elites who seem to still think that they have the same clout that their predecessors enjoyed in the 20th century.
Indus was there before Europeans invaded America. It was there before Jesus was born or before Buddha reached his Nirvana. It was a civilisation before Alexander invaded India and called people living on eastern side of Indus as "Hindus" people.
US of A was nowhere all through this.
Point is, Indus is for India and Pakistan to manage. As in past, so will be in future.
India already has enough problems generated by American help in past of nurturing Taliban with Saudi money and their Pakistani friends.
Thank you but no thank you!
If the Obama administration tries to interfere in this area, India should cancel Mr. Obama's forthcoming visit to the region and downgrade relations with the US.
This is one of the worst ideas ever on South Asia and there have been some boffo bad ones coming from DC of late.
Pakistan has done less than nothing in the last 63 years of its existence to manage water and now seeks to blame India for all its woes.
India should build as many dams, reservoirs and diversion systems as the Indus Water Treaty allows and keep using water as a strategic weapon until Pakistan gives up its terror option. For every Mumbai like attack, India should hit Pakistan where it hurts.
Not one drop more than what's agreed to. Period.
The Hindoo Indians have shown their cards in their comments
The Hindoo Indians have shown their cards in their comments above and their machinations against Pakistan continuously for the past 60+ years.
Hindoo Indian invasion and occupation of Junagarh was wrong.
Hindoo Indian invasion and occupation of Manavader was wrong.
Hindoo Indian invasion and occupation of Hyderabad Deccan was wrong.
Hindoo Indian invasion and occupation of Kashmir was wrong.
Hindoo Indian invasion and occupation of East Pakistan was wrong.
Hindoo Indian fomenting separatist movements in NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan were and still are wrong.
Hindoo Indian building of dams on rivers flowing through Pakistan is wrong.
If I had the Jew Israeli or Hindoo Indian mindset, as depicted above, I would say let the Pakistan Air Force just bomb the Indian dams on rivers that flow through Pakistan.
But a re-negotiated Indus Waters Treaty is the more sensible option.
One can't trust anything the Hindoo Baniya says. He confirms his stereotype everyday. Just read the comments above.
Aurangzeb Khan
lalqila.wordpress.com
A new approach to the Indus Treaty is possible
(My column as it appeared in Pakistan's The News last month)
Indo-Pakistani water relations are bound, limited and defined by the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. The treaty divides the resources of the Indus Basin, one of the largest and oldest basins on the planet, and states that India will have control over the waters of the three eastern rivers of the basin (the Ravi, the Sutlej and the Beas) and that Pakistan will have control over the waters of the three western rivers (the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum). The treaty then goes on to set out the rights and obligations of the riparians and, importantly, allows India to avail itself of the waters of the western rivers for domestic consumption, non-consumptive functions, limited agricultural use and for hydroelectric purposes.
So far, the treaty has held strong. However, because of a variety of factors, some voices are accusing India of stealing Pakistan’s water and violating the treaty. I will not dwell upon these voices in this article because they are incorrect and, as I will try to show, they can be made irrelevant. However, some factors providing these voices their motives and reasons must be acknowledged: the mistrust that characterises Indo-Pakistani relations, gross mismanagement of water resources within Pakistan, outdated irrigation practices, poorly planned agricultural zoning, a rising population and resultant water scarcity.
What these voices are doing is choosing to ignore Pakistan’s most pressing political, economic, social and environmental issues, and instead are looking for solace in the age-old chestnut: India is to blame. What else explains the reason given for having more troops deployed on its eastern border than its western, when the trouble so clearly is: to ensure water security?
One of the problems in Indo-Pakistani water relations, as far as Pakistan is concerned, is that, thanks to Sir Cyril Radcliff and the outcome of English colonialism in India, Pakistan is a lower riparian. What the treaty does is set up a riparian hegemony by dividing the resources of the Indus Basin, creating an asymmetrical relationship between the two riparians and cementing India’s position as the riparian hegemon. In other words, the treaty stacks the cards against Pakistan and makes it close to impossible for it to rationalise the disproportionate relative bargaining positions the treaty allocates. This is because, in practice, the more powerful riparian is loath to give up the benefits it has.
There are some who suggest that, for this very reason, the treaty should be scrapped and another negotiated. To these gifted geniuses, I ask this: Very well, then, but what brilliant strategy do you have hidden away that will outmanoeuvre the riparian hegemon and get the lower riparian more than it already has under the treaty? This question is met with silence.
How can Pakistan get itself out of this situation? The answer is simple: Don’t look at the Indus Water Treaty for solutions. The treaty is based on a sort of divide-the-resource-of-the-Indus-Basin theory, which will always result in a zero-sum game for Pakistan. What we need is to look outside the “divide the resource” paradigm and look towards the opportunities afforded by the “sharing the resource” paradigm. What we need to do is see whether it is in the economic, social or political interest of both riparians to cooperate on water, rather than be antagonistic over it. What we need is a trans-boundary water opportunity analysis.
Trans-boundary analysis looks at the positive sum outcomes of sharing the resources of a water basin. The approach is unique, in that it allows the weaker riparian to offer the hegemon some additional benefit.
The idea would be to conduct a full-spectrum trans-boundary water opportunity analysis that will identify the areas where cooperation between India and Pakistan over the waters of the Indus Basin will yield in economic, social or other benefits. For example, if India is building run-of-the-river dams on the western rivers, this need not be a cause of alarm in Pakistan. After all, what keeps Pakistan from purchasing the electricity from India? We are more than willing to pay an extortionately high cost for electricity from diesel-powered rental power projects when everyone knows hydroelectric power is a fraction of the cost.
Selling electricity to Pakistan would also be in the economic interests of India because of the premiums it could charge. Similarly, there could be economic benefit to India if it allowed Pakistan to expand, say, its fisheries along the eastern rivers. The purpose of the trans-boundary water opportunity analysis would be to identify and quantify the all the possible positive sum outcomes of a “sharing the resource” strategy. The wider the scope of such an analysis, the more chances of identifying more and more areas of cooperation.
The analysis would involve other issues as well. One would be the identification of what sort of “green water” resources exist (as in water that falls from the sky, and distinct from “blue water” which is, essentially surface water) and how such resources could be harnessed for the benefit of either India or Pakistan. (The study of “green water” is rare, as most hydrologists tend to ignore something they can’t pipe, and government doesn’t care about stuff it can’t tax.) The inclusion of such things could widen the overall opportunities, at least in Pakistan, of harnessing the water resources of the country.
The economic science of sharing resources is also cutting-edge. Elinor Ostrom was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize for Economic Sciences this year for her study of shared resources. I had the opportunity of meeting Ms Ostrum last month and to speak to her about Indo-Pakistani water relations. She hadn’t studied the Indus Basin (she has studied others), but told me that, should the two countries ever decide to go down such a path, the only problems they would encounter would be working out the right profit-sharing formulas.
And, finally, in the Pakistani context again, if Pakistan could be seen sitting down with India and doing something large-scale, without the rhetoric of Kashmir or terrorism clouding the way, it would create enormous international goodwill that, surely, Pakistan could leverage to its advantage.
On almost all counts, it is impossible to deny how attractive a proposition a trans-boundary water opportunity analysis is. It’s difficult to judge how the governments of these countries would respond to the call for such an analysis. Perhaps this is not the time for such a call and perhaps it isn’t for the governments of the countries to conduct such an analysis. At this stage, the opportunities of sharing the resource of the Indus Basin are the perfect place for players in Track-II diplomacy to pick up the gauntlet and show their respective governments the way forward.
Not one drop more than required by the IWT, period.
If Pakistanis want India to be magnanimous, then first shut down the jihad machine and then we'll talk. If not, India should use every available lever, including water.
Looking at the floods that are inundating Pakistan now, it appears that they cannot manage the 70% of the water they were allocated under the treaty. Perhaps these floods would not have happened if India was allocated 70% of the water. It is time to renegotiate the treaty.
I think this is a great idea. If one country does not like a legally bound agreement with another, it is a great idea not only to renegotiate the agreement but more importantly bring in all the neighbors and the USA to the table to make sure it is fair for the grieving party.
More than the Indus treaty, I think the bigger issue is the immigration problem in the US. Mexico is the grieving party and it believes its citizens are treated unfairly by the US just because they cross illegally in to a neighboring country. So let us solve this issue by forming a committee consisting of Mexico, USA, Canada, Cuba, Bermuda, Russia, Argentina, India and China, each of whom would have an equal vote to decide if the US has any right to stop illegals from entering the country.
Since Mexico is the grieving party and since they are so vocal about it, they must be right and we need to resolve this problem immediately so justice is done to the poor Mexicans who are denied their right to US citizenship, social security benefits, Medicare as well as food stamps, etc.
And since the Mexican President is going to be in the US anyway next month, why waste the opportunity? Let us have a meeting next month with all the concerned parties and make a decision right away so the Mexican's right to US citizenship is not unduly delayed.
David Rothkopf is the CEO and Editor-at-Large of Foreign Policy. His new book, "Power, Inc.: The Epic Rivalry Between Big Business and Government and the Reckoning that Lies Ahead" is due out from Farrar, Straus & Giroux on March 1.
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