With the statement of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asserting that his country would not support sanctions against Iran and his dismissal of U.S. calls for a negotiating timetable with that country, several important questions are raised. They are:

First, how do you like your Iranian nukes? Fried or over-easy?

In other words, without sanctions Iran's program progresses. That leaves two choices: Israel steps up and takes military action to set back the program or second, we simply roll-over and get used to the world's largest state-sponsor of terror producing the nuclear weapons the U.S. intel community now believes they are capable of making.

My sense is that the risk of Israeli military moves just went up dramatically ... and it was pretty high to begin with. But they will only set back the Iranian program briefly if they do intervene and the resulting turmoil on the international scene is likely to produce plenty of blowback for an Israel that is already more isolated than it has been in forty years.

But on the question at hand, let's be absolutely clear: Russia has just essentially unilaterally given the green light to Tehran to join the nuclear weapons club. Russia can block action in the Security Council and no effort to, for example, halt oil and gas flows to Iran could work without Russian cooperation. The last chance of stopping the Iranians over the long-term has probably therefore been undercut. As disturbingly, the Russian message is clearly that this is something they actually support. Otherwise, they could have kept their own counsel while negotiations continued. They didn't have to tip their hand now unless they wanted to scuttle the entire negotiation process. They are saying they believe their approach is the one most likely to work with Tehran. Tehran may even find ways to pretend it is working. But without any effective international levers against the Iranians, they have been given the go-ahead to pursue whatever agenda they choose.

Second, in a related vein, what was Bibi doing in Moscow?

If he was there, as current speculation suggests, to press the Russians to stop shipments of S300 missiles to Iran, that didn't turn out so well, with Russia standing by its right to engage in arms sales with the Iranians...and then adding a threat of severe consequences if Israel or another state used military measures to stop the Iranian nuclear program. At this point, with the Russians providing so much diplomatic, political and military cover for the Iranian efforts, it is almost tempting to start referring to Tehran's initiative as a joint Russian-Iranian nuclear program.

Third, will it be NPT 2.0, NPT 1.1 or N2PT?

Once it is recognized that Iran's entrance into the nuclear club proves (yet again) the impotence of the non-proliferation treaty do we go for an entirely new agreement, a variation on what we have now or just accept that what we have is really the N2PT, which is to say the non-nonproliferation treaty (this is one case where a double negative definitely does not equal a positive.) A completely new deal is, in reality, a non-starter because it would be impossible to get agreement from many nations to opt in. The U.S. view is to renovate the sagging framework of the existing agreement with a much more robust international mechanism for dealing with the creation and disposal of nuclear fuel. But the real question is whether or not there will ever be an enforcement mechanism strong enough to enable multilateral inspections and to ensure multilateral action in the face of proven violations. Actually, Russia has gone quite a long way toward answering that ... which in turn raises another question: Just what is the best way to safely dispose of spent nuclear agreements?

Finally, just how much does Russia have to do before they go from being a contentious partner to actually once again being an enemy?

Ok, this is rhetorical. Given that this week Russia became the world's largest petroleum exporter, we're not going to be outright enemies with them. After all, we've long proven that if you give us a nice meal and pump enough oil into us, we're easy ... or at least flexible. Still, after a rough visit to Moscow by Obama, differences on missile defense, Russia's calls for a new global currency, Russian efforts to place itself at the center of every emerging global alliance to counterbalance the United States, provocative weapons deals with among others Tehran and Caracas, possible missile shipments on board ships that disappear and reappear, aggression in the near-abroad and torpedoing our efforts to stop Iran short of gaining nuclear weapons, you've got to start wondering when we're going to get the message. They'll take whatever we have to give but their agenda diverges from ours on a wide array of critical issues and on some, they conflict with us directly and, one might almost say, exultantly.

Oh, we'll try to put a good face on it. But note: they have given us every incentive to start working hard on our new BIC strategy ... which is to say trying to isolate Russia among the leaders of the emerging world by forging stronger ties with China, India and Brazil (among others). This in turn raises the final question in this litany: which is how much do you think we can get on eBay for one virtually new, unused reset button? Perhaps there is a museum somewhere that would like to put it in a display alongside Neville Chamberlain's umbrella.

 
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ZJIN

9:00 PM ET

September 11, 2009

When you talk about Reset

When you talk about Reset button, I am afraid that nobody seemed to be sure that US had ever pressed it. You want to cut Russia into several pieces and take a seat in its backyard, then it is only natural that Russia will go out its way to make you life uneasy. Tit for tat.

 

ZATHRAS

10:52 PM ET

September 11, 2009

Iran and Russia

It would be unwise to get carried away by Russia's attitude at the moment. Yes, its position toward the Iranian nuclear program certainly is unhelpful, and the program itself cause for great concern given Iran's current government. However, the evidence that an Iranian bomb is imminent is not as yet persuasive; we have more time than some people believe, and opportunities to influence internal Iranian politics that didn't exist before last June 12.

I understand and share Israeli worries about a nuclear Iran, though I'm aware also that the Israeli government is anxious to have the United States focusing on Iran rather than on Israeli settlements on the West Bank and in Jerusalem. I just don't think an attitude of black pessimism with respect to Iran is justified at the moment. As for Russia, well, Russia will be a problem for the forseeable future, something that should not surprise people who rolled their eyes at the "reset button" stunt. Absolutely we should cultivate stronger ties with major potential Russian allies than Russia has, and expect that the Russian government will look for ways to act as if it were still the Soviet superpower, but we should do these things anyway.

 

LACINDC

11:20 PM ET

September 11, 2009

What's behind Russia's move?

I understand Russia gains economically from trade and friendly relations with Iran, but have they decided it's really in Russia's strategic interest to have a new nuclear-armed state 150 miles from their border? They should keep in mind that Khamenei won't live forever and, if I recall correctly, a whole bunch of young Iranians have been shouting "death to Russia" recently.

Are they trying to increase the chances of war between Israel (or the US) and Iran because the resulting oil price spike would make Russian oil exports more valuable in the short term? In the medium to long term, if Iran does gain nuclear weapons and the US accepts the situation, I see one of two responses: 1) greater US involvement in the middle east and extension of its nuclear umbrella to threatened Sunni states; or 2) crash nuclear programs in those threatened Sunni states. Is either of these situations in Russia's interest?

 

GRANT

12:37 AM ET

September 13, 2009

Normally I would say that

Normally I would say that only an idiot would try to increase the chances for a war because they are inherently unpredictable and dangerous, but this time I really find it hard to read the logic in Russia's actions. My best guess is that the Russian leadership is A. foolishly focusing on short term good relations with Iran while relying on Iran's need for regional allies in the long term to keep the opposition quiet and B. assuming that Iran doesn't intend to produce or keep nuclear weapons as much as use them to throw the U.S off-balance.
If I'm correct then we can assume from this that Russia wants the United States much weaker than it is today, though not destroyed, and that we can predict friction and chaos in the near future.
On a related note, though I will admit that Rothkopf has a point about Russian oil; it is still just a matter of time until we have a president that actually is committed to alternative energy and can get it through business interests and Congress. Once that happens it should herald the slow death of oil-money across the world, probably creating new wars and chaos throughout South America, the Middle East, and Russia.

 

LACINDC

3:01 PM ET

September 13, 2009

Could you explain what you

Could you explain what you mean by part B? Are you saying Russia thinks Iran is just using their nuclear program as a bargaining chip? I wish they were correct but haven't seen any such indication.

I do think we have a president who is committed to alternative energy. The stimulus package and budget he got through Congress earlier this year included unprecedented funding for alternative energy, and the climate bill (which has already passed the House) will be his #1 priority once the Senate has had its way with the healthcare reform bill. But if we pass the climate bill, I don't think the reductions in US demand for oil from baseline will outweigh increases from the developing world over the next couple of decades. If anyone is harmed, it will be local coal producers, which is why they are fighting the bill with every other lobbyist in DC and deluging Congress with fake letters from veterans and minorities.

 

GRANT

7:56 PM ET

September 13, 2009

On B. I meant that I presume

On B. I meant that I presume that Russia sees it as a way to force the United States to take a less unipolar position when in the Middle East and that Russia doesn't think that Iran really intends to keep those weapons as an arsenal. So long as the United States faces challenges like this there are opportunities to wear down the United States from its current position.

On energy its true that the bill did include quite a bit of money for alternatives, but I haven't heard much on it since then. A president has a limited amount of political capital to spend on many different issues, and Obama seems to have chosen Health Care as his primary issue with Afghanistan being the second issue.
Presuming he does manage to get a bill passed before the 2010 elections he might shift effort to more on energy, but he would have very little time to do so before the midterm elections when Republicans will probably manage to reduce the Democratic supermajority into a simple majority. With economics and oil prices as they are now I doubt we'll see great political pressure brought for more action before 2012. Of course if Democrats do buck the trend and keep their supermajority they might start sooner, but I don't bet on something so unlikely.

On the outside world, you are right that even when the developed nations manage to switch from fossil fuels to alternative energy the developing world will still keep them for a while. I'm betting that there will be approximately a ten year gap between developed and developing, but that still should send oil prices spiraling down and sparking chaos in nations where oil money was the means by which leaders kept welfare plentiful and the populace quiet.

We've already seen a preview in Iran when the government was forced to reverse a decision to balance its budget by taxing merchants (the first time since 1979 that the merchants had protested so widely). Most of the Middle East nations aren't prepared to have a budget without oil providing the majority of it.

 

ITONLYSTANDSTOREASON

12:55 AM ET

September 13, 2009

Is Biden wearing a new suit?

If someone has sold of the reset button, it would be Joe Biden, who's remarks on Russia's inevitable decline seem the icing on the cake of continuing the NATO encirclement. Is he showing any signs of new wealth?

 

BRETT

7:03 AM ET

September 13, 2009

With the statement of Russian

With the statement of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asserting that his country would not support sanctions against Iran and his dismissal of U.S. calls for a negotiating timetable with that country, several important questions are raised. They are

That's not really surprising. One of the reason why I was extremely skeptical of the so-called "reset" (aside from the fact that I support Missile Defense) was that the Russians have never said they'll support potential action against Iran in exchange for removing the system and drawing down on nukes - their position has always been "these things are separate, and we should do them separately."

Looks like Obama's grand gesture - in which he canceled the system, no doubt hoping for a Russian response - failed.

In other words, without sanctions Iran's program progresses. That leaves two choices: Israel steps up and takes military action to set back the program or second

Israel can't pull the operation off for two reasons. First, because its current arsenal of weaponry (including the deep-penetration bombs necessary) is not sufficient to destroy all the sites associated with the program short of using penetrator nuke strikes. Second, because to pull off the Iranian bomb strike would require almost its entire fleet of bombers that have the necessary range, and even then would require multiple in-air re-fuelings - over potentially hostile air space (and almost certainly Iraqi airspace, which even Bush never gave them permission to use).

And that's assuming the Iranians simply take it sitting down. They won't; they've been purchasing all manner of anti-air weaponry (particularly SAMS) from countries like the Russians, and a lot of that is sited around the sites that would be on the target list. Israel would be basically taking a massive risk for a very low chance of actually pulling the mission off.

If he was there, as current speculation suggests, to press the Russians to stop shipments of S300 missiles to Iran, that didn't turn out so well, with Russia standing by its right to engage in arms sales with the Iranians...and then adding a threat of severe consequences if Israel or another state used military measures to stop the Iranian nuclear program.

Never let a potential military conflict get in the way of good business. By the way, those are the time of missiles that Israel can expect to be used against a hypothetical bombing strike on the Iranian nuclear complex.

Actually, Russia has gone quite a long way toward answering that ... which in turn raises another question: Just what is the best way to safely dispose of spent nuclear agreements?

I say forget about them. Better they have nukes as their "don't mess with me" weapon rather than biological weaponry.

One point not to forget - it is not a guarantee that the Iranians are moving rapidly towards actually having nuclear weapons as opposed to simply having the capacity to have them on short notice (like what the South Koreans, Taiwanese, and Japanese have). The latter is actually more advantageous for them, since it prevents an arms race in which their opponents in the Middle East might start getting nukes themselves, and it still allows them to throw around the "I've got nukes" card to avoid potential retaliation.

 

ZATHRAS

5:10 PM ET

September 13, 2009

Capacity But Not Production

The idea advanced here, that Iran wants the capacity to produce nuclear weapons but is not committed to actually do so yet, is plausible. It may be correct. Our knowledge as to how decisions of this magnitude are made within the Iranian government is very limited, and a "capacity but not production" position does have theoretical advantages for Iran in its relations with some neighboring states.

The theoretical downside of "capacity but not production" for Iran would be acceptance of an indefinite period of risk, during which Iranian nuclear facilities could be attacked in the absence of a Iranian nuclear deterrent. I question, in addition to this, whether senior figures in the Iranian government are cool and collected enough to play geopolitics over several years with the subtlety the "capacity but not production" theory assumes. Their reaction to domestic political developments since June 12 suggests they may not be.

Having said that, the strongest argument against this theory may involve more elemental considerations like national pride and the identification of that pride with the security services now evidently ascendant within the Iranian regime. This is what their Pakistani counterparts got out of their own nuclear program -- that, and a permanent claim on resources to maintain and expand it. My guess, which is only that, is that most Iranians with a say in the matter do want to weaponize the uranium they have enriched as such cost over so many years; either they haven't completely worked out how to do it, or haven't settled internally questions as to who will control it afterwards, or both.

As I indicated upthread, this isn't cause for panic or undue pessimism on our part. We still have, I think, more time to influence how this situation develops than many people believe. I just think it unlikely that we have time because of what the Iranian regime has decided. It is more likely we have it because of what the regime has not decided, or is not yet able to do.

 

JONESHENRY

5:57 AM ET

September 14, 2009

Not reset!

It doesent say "Reset" but overcharge!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0GdLClHAMB0

 

RKKA

10:43 AM ET

September 16, 2009

"Finally, just how much does

"Finally, just how much does Russia have to do before they go from being a contentious partner to actually once again being an enemy?"

Well, has a client state of theirs unleashed massed multiple rocket and cannon artillery on US troops anywhere? And has the leader of that Russian client state been given unequivocal political and financial support as well as free access to Moscow's media as a platform to push his version of events he caused while the Olympics were going last year? No?

Then I'd have to say that the US has been more of an enemy to Russia than Russia has been to the US.

The fact is, the US foreign policy elite still see "Okay Boris, here's what you've got to do next. Here's some more sh*t for your face." as the ideal basis for US-Russian relations, and haven't quite grasped that not only do the Russian government refuse to accept that approach any more, but that they have abundant alternatives.

 

David Rothkopf is the CEO and Editor-at-Large of Foreign Policy. His new book, "Power, Inc.: The Epic Rivalry Between Big Business and Government and the Reckoning that Lies Ahead" is due out from Farrar, Straus & Giroux on March 1.

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