Why "Guards Gone Wild" are a symptom of a much bigger challenge for policymakers...

Fri, 09/04/2009 - 3:36pm

The revelations of out of control behavior among the guards assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul no doubt brought to mind the images of out of control behavior by guards at Abu Ghraib. But there is an important distinction. The guards at Abu Ghraib were U.S. military personnel. The embassy guards were hired guns, part of the outsourcing explosion that is transforming the way the United States conducts its foreign policy.

The embassy guards were not employees of the U.S. government, did not report up a chain of command to senior U.S. military officers who could make career-ending decisions for them, were not subject to the same rules as U.S. military personnel and, perhaps most importantly, blurred important lines about the nature and role of government.

As most people now know, they also allegedly engaged in "lewd and deviant behavior" featuring nudity, drunkenness, hookers, and other behavior more suited for the cast of a Joe Francis video than U.S. embassy security forces, particularly those in a dangerous environment or a country in which strict Islamic values played such a central role. Why it took a report from the Project on Government Oversight to call out these Guards-Gone-Wild and their employers at ArmorGroup, a subsidiary of Miami-based Wackenhut Services, Inc. is a question worth asking.

But the bigger question in the wake of this behavior and other examples of out of control contractors, most notably the cowboys from Blackwater, who allegedly killed as many as 17 Iraqi civilians while providing an escort for State Department personnel in Baghdad's Nissour Square, is about the centrality of outsourcing in the conduct of sensitive U.S. operations worldwide. 

The Congressional Research Service reported that well over half of America's manpower in Afghanistan, for example, is comprised of contractors -- almost 70,000 of them. They cited it as the "highest recorded percentage of DoD contractors in any conflict in the history of the United States." 

How did we get here? Well, some of it was clearly expediency ... beneath which investigation will reveal another level of expediency. The first level is the one cited by government officials hiring the contractors: they provide skill sets needed by the government and the ability to deploy human resources quickly in difficult circumstances. The second level is that by using contractors, the Bush Administration was able to field twice as many people in Afghanistan with half the political exposure. Headlines report troop deployments. They ignore the ArmorGroups and Blackwaters until they screw up, misbehave or start making obscene amounts of money ... all of which are part of the story of the Bush War on Terror.

But at another level, not only do they put America's goals at risk, they also raise important questions about fairly fundamental questions like "who has the right to legitimately use force?" Traditionally that's a prerogative reserved for states, notes Allison Stanger, professor of international politics and economics and director of the Rohatyn Center for International Affairs, and author of  the much anticipated One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy, to be published by Yale University Press next month. But by handing over a license to kill to big American companies, that line is blurred observes Stanger, which plays directly into the hands of America's enemies.

Stanger is not, it should be noted, an adversary of using outsourcing to leverage American government resources. Indeed, her much-needed upcoming book considers how broadly outsourcing has transformed the way government works in a wide range of issues including areas such as development where NGOs and other private sector players add a great deal of value. But she is a sharp critic of what she sees as outsourcing approaches that undercut America's foreign policy interests either by compromising values or raising risks. (See her recent U.S. News column "How the CIA Became Dangerously Dependent on Foreign Contractors" which addresses similar problems associated with the agency's use of contractors in covert programs to hunt down and kill al Qaeda members.)

Her point is simply that while it makes sense to leverage government resources with private sector capabilities in many instances, we need clearer rules and guidelines about how and when to do it. Her book could not be coming at a more auspicious time and one hopes that her work will get a close reading at State, the Pentagon, and from the leaders of the Intelligence Community.

AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP/Getty Images



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Contractors

I would like to clarify one point, you state...

"The Congressional Research Service reported that well over half of America's manpower in Afghanistan, for example, is comprised of contractors -- almost 70,000 of them. They cited it as the "highest recorded percentage of DoD contractors in any conflict in the history of the United States."

While true, this is misleading. Why? Because the same report states that approximately 75 percent of contractors in Afghanistan are local nationals. Only 14 percent are Americans. This is an important point, because I suspect many people who are not in the military, not contractors, or not entirely up-to-date on security studies are aware that a vast majority of the contractors operating in support of OEF and OIF are local nationals or third country nationals.

Let me add a little fuel to the fire. I am a member of the armed services and I deployed to Iraq as a member of an intelligence collection team for 15 months between August 2007 and November 2008. I worked out of several forward operating bases (FOBs), joint security stations (JSSs), and combat outposts (COPs). In my job we have civilian counterparts who do the same thing we do. Now it might have been my own bad luck, but EVERY civilian contracting team I worked with or around were an absolute waste of tax payer dollars. Whereas the military side (i.e. me and my team) worked every day for 15 months (with the exception of an 18 day rest and relaxation period and a half-day off whenever we were hit by an IED). What really upsets me is not that these contractors work only 6 days a week, 10 hour shifts, and take 1 to 2 hour lunches every day. No, what really kills me is their complete lack of interest in supporting the mission. They were more interested in knocking off early to go to their single-person contained housing unit (CHU) and play world of warcraft or go hit on the female local national interpreters. By focusing on nearly everything but the mission, I have no doubt they indirectly lead to the deaths of American soldiers. Let me end with a short anecdote. I was on a team that fluctuated between 5 and 8 collectors. Our mission was hard, we got off the FOB nearly every day, sometimes twice. I had several missions where I would go out for 24 to 36 hours or more with the mission of meeting up with a source for a short meeting. The information from these meetings are then put into reports and pushed upward and outward for all to use. Our civilian counterparts actually get it written into their contracts that they don't have to leave the FOB and if they do it is by helicopter or in an emergency in and mine resistant ambush protected vehicle (MRAP). But let me refocus. In one fiscal year, my team produced over 1,000 reports that lead to the capture of dozens of operatives from Al-Qa'ida in Iraq, Jaysh Al-Mahdi, Islamic State of Iraq and others. Untold numbers of weapons caches, locations of several IEDs, and other information of intelligence value. In that same fiscal year, the team of five contractors produced 12 reports. Where is the cost-benefit to this? The military is getting away with paying us our salary tax free, combat pay, and other small incentives, and these contractors are pulling down $15,000 or more per month! For what?! I would have no problem with these clowns if they actually worked and cared about the mission and followed the basic tenets found in FM 2-22.3.

Abroad AND at home -- the risk to security and freedom

First, thank you to HCT408 for his comments above. The real truth of these two fiascos in Iraq and Afghanistan lies in the mouths and pens of honest soldiers who, if they tell their stories fully and honestly, will expose these illegal invasions and occupations for what they are. These same out of control "Guards Gone Wild" are coming home to the U.S. and taking positions in police forces and security companies. Their predatory behavior (both in terms of violence and in terms of sexuality) and their anti-democratic arrogance with which they put themselves above law and authority are a risk to our communities and citizens in the U.S. We will live to regret this "privatization" of warfare even more than we already should. The presence of these mercenaries around the world further deepens the absolutely correct conception of the American cowboy in international relations. It is an image which is increasingly hated around world. Regarding the "clown" in the photo above (using HCT408's word), which of the behaviors described by HCT408 and in the article abouve was he involved in the night before and the night after the picture was taken? Two hour lunches, helicopter rides out of the field of battle, conduct causing deaths of U.S. soldiers, nudity, drunkenness, hookers, and other behavior more suited for the cast of a Joe Francis video? And to include other reports on the conduct of these Blackwater, Wackenhut, CACI, Dyncorp yahoos, what about the rapes, murders, and kidnappings?

What's so wrong about

What's so wrong about two-hour lunches?

I used to take them all the time and go for a swim at the Y when I worked on Wall St.