Tuesday, April 28, 2009 - 5:48 PM

Swine flu! World Health Organization at alert level 4! Markets rocked by sell-offs! Howie Mandel was right! Never shake hands! Bathe in Purell! See if you can borrow a face mask from Michael Jackson! Or hold your breath whenever you are near a ham sandwich! Armies of pigs in uniform marching on Washington! Orwell was right: the animals have turned on us, become more dangerous than us! Four legs bad, two legs good! Head for the hills!
Once again, the media is reacting to a potential threat with its usual calm, responsibly recognizing that sensational coverage of diseases can have far worse consequences than the diseases themselves. Or not.
Remember SARS? Fewer people died of SARS than choked to death in the United States on small objects that year. But estimates of global economic losses exceeded $40 billion. Back then, I wrote an article called "The Buzz Bites Back" for the Washington Post about this phenomenon dubbing it an "infodemic." And it was clear at the time that the progress of the information revolution was amplifying the impact of these information epidemics and accelerating their spread. Yet, still hysteria reigns again.
This is not to say that the WHO response has not been appropriate. It has. It is not to say that there isn't a vital public health role to be played by the media. It is critical that the media offer information about symptoms, precautions, and the spread of potential epidemics. But whereas health officials practice how to manage these crises, not only do the vast majority of media never think such matters through, newer "viral" media are all emotion all the time.
One particularly fascinating element of the infodemic phenomenon is that the spread of rumors or news throughout society looks exactly like the spread of diseases; they are communicated in the same ways and patterns. (You'll note that in both the SARS case and the current instance, it was the infection of Americans that kicked mainstream media into gear and elevated the story into a code-one frenzy.)
The nature of the spread of such infodemics also, by the way, offers useful tools to epidemiologists trying to use modern media to identify potential medical risks and contain them. I know this was discussed in the Net Effects blog here at FP the other day and I would just like to offer one anecdotal insight that suggests to me that perhaps the skepticism about the value of using such tools expressed in the post has been overtaken by events. Back in the months before the SARS outbreak became public, I ran a company called Intellibridge which tracked "open source" intelligence for a variety of clients. In other words, we looked at what was available on the Net in many languages to see what it might offer government or business clients in the way of insights.
One of our analysts spotted a small item in a newspaper in Guangdong province stating roughly that people should not panic due to rumors of an outbreak of a disease. When the Chinese government says do not panic, our analysts were trained to be skeptical and indeed, when we dug into the issue we found that word was spreading throughout southern China, largely by means of cell phone messaging, concerning this new outbreak of disease. In fact, we became so concerned that we called the Center for Disease Control...who proceeded to brush us off saying that they did not accept information of this source from the public. Ten weeks or so later the World Health Organization acknowledged the outbreak of the disease.
The punch line: modern information technologies offer important tools for both containing and amplifying threats such as those posed by the global spread of epidemics. Considerable work remains to be done however, in understanding how to use these tools and to limit their abuse...and new media like Twitter and social networking sites do not make this task any easier. (Although figuring out how to manage this in the context of a free society is an especially important challenge for governments worldwide, arguably much more important than popular media-policy intersections like "public diplomacy.")
ANWAR AMRO/AFP/Getty Images
I'm not at the mask-wearing stage yet, but I have begun holding my breath when among crowds.
I have been longtime reader of Marc Lynch's Abu Aardvark and when he decamped to FP I came with him. I am also a moderator on a forum that follows infectious disease (FluTrackers) which, amongst other things, translates and posts news from around the world. We have been following this outbreak for about 2 weeks, initially as an unexplained atypical pneumonia. One of my colleagues has written an interesting 'history' of the evolution of the story from odd snippets in Mexican local papers up to the point where it was taken seriously. I particularly like the role of a new member new had on the 20th - known only as 'Alert' - who who made over 200 posts until the 24th at which point he/she posted
"OK guys, the professionals have picked up the story, and I am outta here. This will be my last post.
I'd like to thank everyone who helped spread word and alert the authorities.
I turned out to be wrong about a novel virus, and fortunately the CFR for this disease, while higher than seasonal flu, probably is not as high as SARS or H5N1.
In a bit of irony, what set me off was the detection of coronavirus in the Oaxaca woman, which is now obviously wrong. This is a new flu."
P.S. SARS is a coronavirus
A longer and more general Timeline of events can be found here - shows how slow the WHO, CDC etc were to pick up on events relative to the internet communities.
http://biosurveillance.typepad.com/biosurveillance/2009/04/swine-flu-in-mexico-timeline-of-events.html
If you are interested in keeping upto date try http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/forumdisplay.php?f=1517
I have also written a short background post to help lay readers understand main stream media reports called 'Swine flu - basic information' http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/showthread.php?t=100175
AllenGreen
Our response to SARS was poor, although we have learnt a lot from it and the Canadian report was damning. The main saving grace was that patients had fairly sudden severe symptom onset and only then became infectious. The problem with flu is that it typically has a day or two in which the patient is infectious prior to symptom onset which makes containment almost impossible. Note the use of 'typically' we do not know if H1N1(2009) is going to behave like seasonal flu yet and the mortality age group profile is 1918, like although it does not seem to be that virulent at this stage. Expect changes in transmission rate, and possibly clinical symptoms, as the virus adjusts to its new host species.
David Rothkopf is the CEO and Editor-at-Large of Foreign Policy. His new book, "Power, Inc.: The Epic Rivalry Between Big Business and Government and the Reckoning that Lies Ahead" is due out from Farrar, Straus & Giroux on March 1.
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