Tuesday, April 7, 2009 - 4:14 PM

Bob Gates is Tyler Hansbrough...only shorter and better at what he does than the basketball all-American. Our secretary of defense could have left his job last year and although he wouldn't have ended up in the NBA making millions as Hansbrough would've done, surely his life would have been much easier than it is today dealing with Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and managing our massive defense apparatus in a Democratic administration. Like Hansbrough, however, Gates saw a higher purpose. And while the papers today are full of paens to the North Carolina power forward for coming back for one more season all in the name of team in the wake of the Tar Heels' NCAA basketball championship last night (predicted here first...and by first, I mean before it was predicted by Barack Obama), Gates actually has the much higher, higher purpose. Furthermore, like Hansbrough, Gates proved his own value and his toughness yesterday...although the former Aggie did it by unveiling substantial military budget reprioritizations that will certainly have him facing a vastly tougher, more seasoned defense than Michigan State could manage last night. In fact, the defense Gates will have to overcome is the world's number one defense, the U.S. military-industrial complex.
Here in D.C. you can already hear the chants starting off in the distance, off in the direction of the Beltway, the habitat in which Beltway bandits live and breed, feeding off of giant defense subsidies and the rotting carcasses of public servants who have tried to stop them in the past. Hear it? Lockheed, Lockheed, F-2-2, If You Won't Fund It, Let's See What Congress Will Do!
Gates's announcement of major cuts to marquee defense projects like the F-22, the insanely expensive presidential helicopter effort, the Army's classic let's-throw-our-checkbook-at-the enemy Future Combat Systems and some of the more bloated, even-less-successful than the norm missile defense programs (and that's saying something), needs to be embraced for two reasons. One is that we can easily do without the programs and that as Gates noted:
The perennial procurement and contracting cycle, going back many decades, of adding layer and layer of cost and complexity onto fewer and fewer platforms that take longer and longer to build, must come to an end. There is broad agreement on the need for acquisition and contracting reform in the Department of Defense. There have been enough studies, enough hand-wringing, enough rhetoric. Now is the time for action."
The other reason we need to get with the spirit of what Gates is proposing is that while the U.S. Congress and the defense contractors who make them dance complain that Gates is putting their programs at risk (House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton has already said "the buck stops with Congress"...which is actually perhaps the wrongest statement uttered by a Member of Congress since either "I don't know how that money got in my freezer" or "I didn't know he was a page."), a new reality will be creeping into view. The problem, in fact, with the Gates cuts is not that they are too sweeping, it is that they are far, far too small. As I will argue at greater length in an article appearing in the May/June issue of The National Interest, the United States can no longer afford the "permanent war economy" that was first described by "Engine" Charlie Wilson in 1944. We can no longer afford to spend as much as every other country in the world added up. Given current deficits, current and future debt levels, and the looming aspiration crushing deficits associated with retirement health care, we will soon look back on the Gates proposals to swap spending here for spending there as the idle chatter of luxurious by-gone days. The cuts will have to be in the hundred billion dollar or more range and we will have to dispose of and move beyond not just old think, but traditional ways of even organizing, deploying and determining missions and strategies for our armed forces. We will have to come to recognize...and this won't be easy...that we actually make ourselves weaker with overspending, that we undercut our strength by creating high tech military programs while we let rust rot away the guts of the U.S. economy. More on this in a couple weeks, when the magazine hits the stands. For the meantime, let's give Gates and Obama credit for starting to stand up to the unbridled lunacy of the U.S. defense spending culture.
Speaking of executive branch sacrifice, one more point: What's up with the attacks on Larry Summers for making a good living the last couple years? The guy was Treasury secretary and president of Harvard for goodness sake. Where did you expect him to work, White Castle? As those who know him and love him will tell you, he probably doesn't have the interpersonal skills for that type of work. Rather, what he does have is very special knowledge, the company he worked for feels he offered (apparently very considerable) value for money, and doing the work gave him better understanding of the markets he is currently supposed to be helping to fix. What's most important, he could still be making the big bucks right now. But he has chosen to take what amounts to a 98 percent pay cut to re-enter public service, to work insane hours and to get beaten up in the press every day. Isn't that something we should be praising? Go after his policies if you want -- I have done so myself from time to time, but this is a highly ethical, principled, dedicated public servant who is actually helping the country address an unprecedented crisis. So, those of you playing up this non-story, in the words of another great public servant, Doctor Evil, "zip it."
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Secretary Gates's defense budget proposal
Although the need to cut costs is imperative, there is unacceptable risk in cancelling current production lines of complex weapons systems like the F22. This is not in one big shed! It is a multiplex production and assembly process for the world's best fighter plane. It may not be needed to fight al quaeda , the Taliban, or Mindanao rebels, but it is certainly needed to meet and defeat the latest generation Russian or other advanced fighter in a big league war. What big league war? Do we really believe that is not a possibility, given the lessons of history? Mr Gates is a good, capable civilian leader, but he is not a military professional. The military professionals have the sworn obligation to be prepared for all possible adversaries. We need all five services at peak preparedness in all of their functions, The Secretary properly should address the shamefully inefficient and sometimes corrupt cost and procurement system of the Pentagon. Trust the professionals over than the civilians to prepare for war. We have the finest Army and Air Force in the world. Give them what they need today, not tomorrow.
some of the more bloated, even-less-successful than the norm missile defense programs (and that's saying something),
Try doing some actual research before spouting off this type of thing. Many of the ABM systems have tested well (yes, the source of the testing results is often the MDA, but there's others), and even Gates isn't cutting them across the board. He's hammering the theater-defense ABM while keeping funding for the sea-based ABM (the SM-3, for example).
The problem, in fact, with the Gates cuts is not that they are too sweeping, it is that they are far, far too small.
Where do you want the cuts to come from? Iraq operations (which are already winding down)? Afghanistan? Personnel costs (aka "shorting the troops")? R & D plus Procurement (commonly called "eating the seed corn" in other venues)?
This is the problem with this idiotic obsession with the budget number on the liberal spectrum. As I argued with Walt on his blog, the actual number is just an end-result of the various perceived strategic and tactical needs of the US government. If you want to make cuts, go after those needs.
In fact, if you really wanted to cut expenses in the long-term (and I'm not saying I support this approach), you should drastically cut the number of active Army and Marines troops, or shift them to Reserve. Build-up ABM and a Nuclear Striking Force, plus an air-force to provide protection against missiles and overflights over CONUS and North America. You may have to make some capital investments, but the biggest costs in the US military are Personnel and Operations, so cutting those would be far wiser if you wanted to reduce the amount.
Doing the above would put you a permanent defensive posture, with lower costs per year than the current situation (and that's assuming you keep a strong bluewater navy, which may decide not to do if your air force drifts towards strategic bombing). Of course, there's a downside to that - we couldn't do a bunch of interventions and operations like Iraq or Afghanistan.
What Gates is doing certainly won't lead to a lower budget in the long-run. He's hiring more troops, while escalating operations.
We will have to come to recognize...and this won't be easy...that we actually make ourselves weaker with overspending, that we undercut our strength by creating high tech military programs while we let rust rot away the guts of the U.S. economy.
Again, despite all the idiotic rhetoric from the "OMG US spends more than the rest of the World combined!" crowd, the greatest costs don't come from "high-tech military programs". Then you need to take into account the fact that we do a lot of the defense spending that other countries (particularly the NATO countries and Japan) don't need to do, because they're under our defense wing. Without that guarantee, their defense spending would be considerably higher.
Why don't you suggest a strategic model for the US to aim for? There are some out there, like the Eisenhower "New Look" strategy.
An additional comment about Secretary Gates's defense budget proposal. The lead paragraph for this new proposal states that he wants to cancel the F22 fighter production, while eliminating the new Presidential helicopter, Marine One. This is a very disproportionate tradeoff, to say the best if it! The Presidential helicopter is tiny potatoes compared to the F22, which is the nonpareil new generation fighter plane of the US Air Force. Obviously the President's personal helicopter should not be mentioned in the same breath with any weapons system as important as the F22. Why is this worth commenting on? Because it reveals clearly the assumption of the Secretary and his information staff that the American people are literally stupid enough not to detect such a blatant insult to their intelligence. Millions of Americans are smart enough to see through this kind of selling job. Forget the helicopter; it's small change. But if he wants to save money on the F22, don't cancel it; just slow the production down. He knows, and the taxpayers know, that the production line for anything as revolutionary and superior as the F22 must be maintained. To shut it down means that it will take years to start up again, and at the pace of modern warfare, that is sure to be way too late. He also is certain to know that several other nations are working on fighter planes competitive with the F22. Mr Gates notwithstanding, we cannot afford to lose our air superiority over any possible adversary. The same goes for the Army's cancelled new system, and he Navy's new littoral capability destroyer. The salient fact about Mr Gates's proposal is that he reveals a distressing shortsightedness about this nation's need to be prepared for major adversaries. Of course we need irregular forces and armaments, but we need state of the art, big league capabilities also.
I think Gates would probably prefer to simply kill off the F-22s than finish the order, but there's no way he'd get away with it (and he probably won't get away with it with regards to the F-22, considering how widespread political support is for it).
It's pretty much quintessential Gates desk. He's been trying to kill off a bunch of these weapons programs since the day he took office back in 2006, because he's a leading light of the "small wars" crowd. You know, those people who seriously think that a failing state is the greatest future security threat to the US, and who think that American military superiority in the conventional realm will just sit there for them for decades to come, without the investments necessary to keep it that way. Add in Gates being short-sighted (he has more or less said things like "Why are we spending money on this stuff to deal with future threats when we have problems today?" which is incredibly stupid because many of these purchases are planned on the long-term (15-20 years particularly with the planes).
He's keeping the F-35, because he really has no choice (the Air Force would be giving him endless grief if he cut the order, and the state of our aging fighters can't really be ignored anymore). He's also keeping that craptacular LCS ship, whose only advantage is that it is better than the ships that preceded it in terms of design proposal.
"We can no longer afford to spend as much as every other country in the world added up. Given current deficits, current and future debt levels, and the looming aspiration crushing deficits associated with retirement health care, we will soon look back on the Gates proposals to swap spending here for spending there as the idle chatter of luxurious by-gone days."
As a percentage of GDP, defense spending levels are actually quite low and very sustainable. Anyone with 5 minutes of research could check this out. It is foolish and irresponsible on the author's part to claim that we are currently engaged in a "permanent war economy" when we couldn't be farther away from something of the sort. It is hard to take serious the arguments of someone who gets something this easy so wrong.
The percentage of GDP argument is an old stalwart and I expected it to come up. Here's the problem: it's a meaningless argument because it doesn't address the other factors in the equation. For example, we have a looming healthcare deficit that is, according to some estimates, 700 percent of GDP. We have a national debt that is headed for the high teens of trillions of dollars. Keeping defense at pre-Iraq war levels and meeting our entitlement obligations has us left with zero dollars for anything else by 2017 at projected revenue levels. Something's gotta give. It won't be the healthcare costs of an aging nation. Further...beyond the fact that we are facing unprecedented budget constraints (and that is assuming normal rates of growth...a protracted flat period a la Japan would be a killer)...there is the other issue: we don't need to spend what we are spending. The military uses old models, divides budgets among services by habit, is full of redundant systems, has doctrines based on antiquated worldviews and has an absurdly wasteful procurement system...even if we were the rich country we once were. Which, in case you missed the point, we are not.
The percentage of GDP argument is an old stalwart and I expected it to come up. Here's the problem: it's a meaningless argument because it doesn't address the other factors in the equation.
So is the "US spends more than the rest of the world combined" argument for budget cuts.
Keeping defense at pre-Iraq war levels and meeting our entitlement obligations has us left with zero dollars for anything else by 2017 at projected revenue levels.
So we raise taxes, either in terms of income taxes across the board, or by instituting a new tax (national sales tax, carbon tax, etc). Or, we change the Social Security requirements, which we've done before in the 1980s, to shift the minimum age to receive benefits to a higher age. These are all things that have been done before, and they all fix the problem without chopping benefits or other vital spending.
there is the other issue: we don't need to spend what we are spending. The military uses old models, divides budgets among services by habit, is full of redundant systems, has doctrines based on antiquated worldviews and has an absurdly wasteful procurement system...even if we were the rich country we once were.
Nobody is arguing that the procurement system isn't fucked up (although I would argue that we should aim for something different than you would probably want). At the same time, do you have any actual specific examples of these "old models" and "antiquated worldviews"? Are you talking about the fact that the US military continues to prepare for conventional conflict? More importantly, what do you suggest as an alternative? A COIN-centered version of the current strategy?
For example, the US military has, for decades, been based around the idea of "Flexible Response", meaning that we maintain a large conventional military that can then apply different levels of force to different levels of problems, up to multiple conflicts at once. If you don't like that system, then you need to make an argument as to what should replace it, particularly since every other arrangement will have some unpleasant costs as well as benefits. And no, "more multinational coalitions" is not a replacement strategy; we've all seen how well they work in places where the conflict is anything other than low-level police work when there isn't an overwhelming strategic threat (like the case of NATO, where the threat was the Soviet Union).
As I pointed out, one alternative would be to scale back the conventional army and marines (and even the Navy, if you want to go that far), turn the Air Force into a bomber fleet, and then cover ourselves with Continental Air Defense, ABM, and fighters like the F-22 to stop any air incursions. You'd have to spend some upfront money in R & D costs, but your Operations and Personnel costs (the most expensive part of the military) would plummet, and you'd avoid involvements like Iraq and Afghanistan simply because you wouldn't be able to do those operations in a realistic time frame. You simply sit back, take advantage of American geography and its resulting near invulnerability to conventional invasion, and then nuke anyone who does something that severely compromises a non-negotiable American strategic interest.
Of course, that would have some costs - which brings me back to the point about switching to a different strategy. It's very inflexible, would offer little in the way of "nation-building" support, and would probably be difficult to maintain in an era where the free flow of information means that the US would be portrayed by our own citizens and citizens abroad as "callous". Things like the Rwandan genocide and the conflict in Bosnia would just have to be ignored unless they get to a certain point, or you would have to promote regional partners to do that for you (in the Middle East, that probably means more support for Israel). But that's the point; any strategy is going to have severe downsides and upsides. Flexible Response is extremely useful, but very costly.
A COIN-centered version of that won't change the costliness, at least not in the long-term; you might save some upfront money on R & D and Procurement, but since these aren't the primary expenses in the US military, any gains you might have will be eaten up if you have any outstanding Operations and a larger military in terms of personnel. And if you aren't doing Outstanding Operations - what is the point of having such an army?
More importantly, what do you suggest as an alternative?
As I pointed out, one alternative would be to scale back the conventional army and marines (and even the Navy, if you want to go that far), turn the Air Force into a bomber fleet, and then cover ourselves with Continental Air Defense, ABM, and fighters like the F-22 to stop any air incursions. You'd have to spend some upfront money in R & D costs, but your Operations and Personnel costs (the most expensive part of the military) would plummet, and you'd avoid involvements like Iraq and Afghanistan simply because you wouldn't be able to do those operations in a realistic time frame.
Good choice.
So in the short run we pull in our horns and go defensive. We cut our expenses a whole lot, during the time that we absolutely can't afford them.
Then assuming at some later time we can afford to increase military spending, we set whatever goals we can afford at that time and we build a military that can meet those goals.
To the extent that we find ourselves needing new technology quickly, we will use the traditional US military genius for adaptation. We will adapt civilian technology, and buy up large amounts of stuff quickly. The result will be in some ways far superior to our traditional 15-year development cycle, because we'll be actually getting the innovations to the troops while they need them rather than creating something technically better that might be ready when the current soldiers retire.
In theory it sounds like it would be good for us. Unfortunately I suspect it wouldn't work that way in practice. Consider Parkinson's Law. Parkinson pointed out that the british colonial service bureaucracy increased its staffing at the same rate even while the colonial system was being dismantled. Parkinson gave a number of examples of that sort of thing. The US bureaucracy has a tactic where they split up functions and put them together in different ways with different names so that such statistics are harder to do, but the overall federal bureaucracy did keep growing even while Reagan and two Bushes talked about smaller government. If we were to cut military spending and particularly personnel costs, would we find ourselves with a military that was entirely bureaucrats with no fighting men? Would they keep their same old bureaucratic procedures going through the lean times, and keep those as the most important military traditions remaining when we rebuilt the military?
It isn't as unlikely as I'd want....
The percentage of GDP argument is an old stalwart and I expected it to come up.
Yes. Also note that GDP doesn't mean what it used to. How much of the contribution to GDP from finance should actually count as GDP as opposed to, say, fraud? Every time an american bank sold a CDS it counted as part of america's GDP.... But it takes a stretch of imagination to figure there was actually any production involved.
I'm going to split GDP into two parts, real GDP and fake GDP. I don't know for sure which is which in specific cases, so this is kind of a thought experiment. It's clear some things that count as GDP are not real production. Like, when the government makes the tax code unnecessarily complicated to the point that you have to hire a tax expert to help you do it, the money you pay him counts as part of GDP. But the IRS could increase GDP just by adding more rulings that make tax accountants do more work? No, it isn't real. We could argue about what's real and what isn't, but surely we agree that there's some of each.
I say that our military mostly consumes real GDP and not fake GDP. The people who join the military tend to be people who would otherwise have gotten productive civilian jobs, and not people who would be homeless bums. The military tends to buy real stuff and real services -- not casinos and liability litigation lawyers. They don't do frivolous intellectual property lawsuits or buy stock market "research". The opportunity cost for our military comes almost entirely from the real as opposed to the fake GDP.
So I estimate that in 2000 probably about 80% of GDP was real, with about 20% fake. Back then, if somebody said that it was only 4% of GDP, the real figure would be more like 5%. But now more like 40% of GDP is fake, and if it was only 4% of nominal GDP that would come out to more like 6 or 7 percent of real GDP.
But it isn't 4% even against nominal GDP. It's about 4.7% this year assuming nominal GDP will be $15 trillion this year, and ignoring the black budget. Military spending has been increasing at 7%/year, that's enough to double in not so many years. And real GDP has been stagnating, and now it's dropping.
The argument about 4% of GDP has become a historical one. It isn't one to look forward with at all. Our military budget guys would scream if they thought they'd be restricted to 4% of GDP in the next few years.
I don't have a lot to say at the moment to those who insist that American national security can be protected in no other way than by fighter planes that take longer to move from the drawing board to active duty than it took the United States to fight World War II and Korea combined, each of which cost more than the yearly budget of entire federal agencies. I suppose if you fly the planes, build the planes, or work for the people who build the planes this is a defensible, nay an attractive proposition, but this isn't the point I wanted to make here.
Instead, I'd ask Mr. Rothkopf if he really sees no connection at all between a former Treasury Secretary cashing in on his public office in the way Larry Summers did and the ethic of the financial services industry that did so much to send the American economy into the power dive it's in now. I'm sure Summers is very ethical, in the sense that he only tried to get away with what everyone else tries to get away with.
But that's a bankrupt standard, if I may be forgiven for using that expression. And no, people who take advantage of the revolving door between big government and big money don't seem in line for any kind of special praise -- not when experience with the kind of company that helped cause the current crisis is being called an asset in the effort to fix it.
Of course, if Summers were to give away most of the money he earned from speeches and things of that nature I would have nothing to say. Why wouldn't he? It's only money, after all.
I don't have a lot to say at the moment to those who insist that American national security can be protected in no other way than by fighter planes that take longer to move from the drawing board to active duty than it took the United States to fight World War II and Korea combined, each of which cost more than the yearly budget of entire federal agencies. I suppose if you fly the planes, build the planes, or work for the people who build the planes this is a defensible, nay an attractive proposition, but this isn't the point I wanted to make here.
Military hardware (and the production of said hardware) has just gotten vastly more expensive and complex since World War 2. If you want to actually have air superiority (and usually you do in combat), then you have to pay the price for that.
What's also made the production process so long and drawn out is the infamous cycle of cutting the production order, then using the increased unit-cost and time necessary to re-tool the production line as an excuse to cut the production order further.
That's a sucker's argument, I'm sorry to say. It's the same one that has dominated the debate over health care costs -- health care, unlike everything else in our lives, is just so important that it costs whatever it costs, and incidentally the thing that will raise costs fastest is any effort to cut them.
This isn't a sucker's argument when surgeons, insurance companies or defense contractors make it. They're the ones being paid. The suckers are the ones paying them, while taking their word for it that they need to spend whatever the people they are paying tell them to and never, ever try to pay them less.
That's a sucker's argument, I'm sorry to say. It's the same one that has dominated the debate over health care costs -- health care, unlike everything else in our lives, is just so important that it costs whatever it costs, and incidentally the thing that will raise costs fastest is any effort to cut them.
No, it's the truth. Planes have simply gotten much, much more expensive than they were back in World War 2, due to the advent of more advanced weapons systems (particularly surface-to-air missiles and the weapons the planes themselves are carrying), more advanced electronics, more advanced plane bodies, and so forth. You just can't really get around these expenses, although economies of scale from making large purchases of them can really help on a per-unit basis.
And the "cycle" I pointed out is rooted in economies of scale - the more of these planes we make, the quicker the unit cost drops. Unfortunately, this seems to slip the understanding of many congressmen, so they slash an initial order drastically, then act shocked when the unit cost skyrockets so that the manufacturer can actually make money with the economies of scale factor suddenly weakened.
While you obviously don't want a number of planes bigger than what you need, you do need to actually decide on a number of planes and stick with it for the order.
While you obviously don't want a number of planes bigger than what you need, you do need to actually decide on a number of planes and stick with it for the order.
Are you some kind of oracle, that you know how many planes we'll need? How could you possibly know that? You don't even know how often they'll fall out of the air due to mechanical difficulties, until you've been flying them awhile. You won't find out what kind of attrition rate they get in battle until they've spent time in a serious war. (And how long has it been since our planes were in that kind of war? Korea, maybe? Or WWII, depending on how you count.)
The fundamental reason we get into this kind of stupid attempt at cost-cutting is that we actually haven't needed the planes. We *might* need them someday. We *might* get into a conventional war with russia, or china, or india, or the EU where we'd need them. We want to have them in case that happens. But in the short run, it hasn't been a problem.
So here we are, we need this new plane because we might get into a conventional war with russia. We say need 242 of them. And one of them costs as much as an entire school district. Can we get by with 241? For what we pay for one of them, we could put 120 new books in every school library in the country. Can we get by with 240? For one plane we could put MRI machines in 300 hospitals. Maybe just get 239?
And if we do get into a war with russia, we'll wish we had a thousand of those special planes and not just 242, and we'll wish we could keep cranking out new ones, and we'll hope with all our hearts that it doesn't turn nuclear and those planes can do us some good....
Seriously. If we were serious about needing those planes we wouldn't settle for demo quantities of them. The reason we settle for token numbers of new planes is that we don't believe we actually need them so it doesn't really matter how many we have.
Military hardware (and the production of said hardware) has just gotten vastly more expensive and complex since World War 2. If you want to actually have air superiority (and usually you do in combat), then you have to pay the price for that.
We can't afford it.
If that means we can't afford air superiority, then so be it.
Somehow we spend a whole lot more than anybody else so we can have air superiority, and then sometimes decades pass before we get the chance to prove that we actually do have air superiority. What gives with that?
What's also made the production process so long and drawn out is the infamous cycle of cutting the production order, then using the increased unit-cost and time necessary to re-tool the production line as an excuse to cut the production order further.
Bad contracts.
We'd do better to pay for an assembly line, than to pay for X number of planes. Pay for the assembly line and *also* for X number of planes. Cut the number of planes and it doesn't cut the cost much at all. If possible, pay to keep the assembly line sitting in the desert or something with such clear instructions that you could get a small core of people who know what they're doing plus a lot of new guys, and start it up again at short notice. That's worth money too. Every now and then actually start it up and crank out 50 or 100 planes, just to keep them honest.
Paying by the plane distorts the economics of it out of all recognition. It encourages bad decisions.
Provided one takes for granted that the only people qualified to judge the kind of fighter plane (or other weapons system) and how much it should cost we need are those who build them, and the military officers preparing for post-service careers working for the people who build them, the logic above makes perfect sense.
It does require one to exclude the possibility that the qualified authorities here may have motivations apart from the national interest -- the enormous amount of money called for in defense contracts, the minimal oversight such contracts usually receive, the attraction of each additional increment of technology (whether it is related to a likely threat or not), the career security provided by a weapons program designed to last many years before the system in question even enters service.
It requires, in a word, faith. Given faith that the qualified authorities are the only people who can understand the business they are in, and that they are immune to the kind of motivations that appeal to everyone else, all things are possible. Sucker's logic that a fighter plane must cost $175 million each after spending a decade or more in development because this is not World War II anymore and this is the only way for the Air Force to go can sound like strategic thinking. Sucker's logic that only some fool Congressman (or Defense Secretary) would shrink from spending tens of billions of dollars more so this same fighter plane can be bought for only $150 million apiece can sound like the very pith of fiscal discipline. All it takes is faith.
Provided one takes for granted that the only people qualified to judge the kind of fighter plane (or other weapons system) and how much it should cost we need are those who build them, and the military officers preparing for post-service careers working for the people who build them, the logic above makes perfect sense.
Do I need to spell it out for you, again? It's called economies of scale. Look it up.
It does require one to exclude the possibility that the qualified authorities here may have motivations apart from the national interest -- the enormous amount of money called for in defense contracts, the minimal oversight such contracts usually receive, the attraction of each additional increment of technology (whether it is related to a likely threat or not), the career security provided by a weapons program designed to last many years before the system in question even enters service.
Those are factors in the process of development, but they don't fundamentally change the reality that there are economies of scale in the production of things like F-22s, meaning that the more we produce, the lower the unit cost will be.
Sucker's logic that a fighter plane must cost $175 million each after spending a decade or more in development because this is not World War II anymore and this is the only way for the Air Force to go can sound like strategic thinking.
As I must repeat, for the third time, it is based in economies of scale, and the fact that planes have gotten vastly more complex than they were in World War II, meaning that they need specialized production lines, a helluva lot of various advanced components (all of which need their own production lines, which takes time, and if the parts aren't there they just aren't available, and other such things. I've already pointed out some of the technological reasons why, and I'm not going to go over them again just because you lack reading comprehension skills.
As for "strategic thinking", the question is, do you or do you not want a competitive air-superiority fighter for the 21st century? As is, there are alternatives (like Su-27s by Sukhoi) that are nearly a match for our current air superiority fighter, the F-15. If you want that (air superiority, and control of the skies in a battlefield), then you have to pay the price in terms of developing these craft.
Sucker's logic that only some fool Congressman (or Defense Secretary) would shrink from spending tens of billions of dollars more so this same fighter plane can be bought for only $150 million apiece can sound like the very pith of fiscal discipline. All it takes is faith.
That's economics, not faith - and the point was that it is a self-perpetuating cycle. As I pointed out, what they do is slash the order quantity. Then, when the economies of scale disappear, requiring a higher unit price, those same congressmen say, "Gosh, these planes sure are expensive - $175 million a piece!" and cut the order quantity again, which drives the per unit cost up again, and the cycle perpetuates itself into Cost Overrun Heaven. This isn't helped by the fact that they have to re-tool the bloody production line every single time they drastically cut an order, which takes additional time.
As I must repeat, for the third time, it is based in economies of scale, and the fact that planes have gotten vastly more complex than they were in World War II, meaning that they need specialized production lines, a helluva lot of various advanced components (all of which need their own production lines, which takes time, and if the parts aren't there they just aren't available, and other such things. I've already pointed out some of the technological reasons why,
The problem here is that we haven't actually had a war where we need these planes, so we don't actually know what works. We do computer simulations, we do mock combat under restrictive assumptions, we pretend. So we assume that these vast complexities are useful and needed. Based on the flimsiest of evidence and large amounts of faith.
As for "strategic thinking", the question is, do you or do you not want a competitive air-superiority fighter for the 21st century?
We can't afford it. Chances are nobody else can afford it either. The time will come when an advanced air-superiority fighter will not be worth its weight in aviation fuel.
And if we weren't so committed to being the best at air superiority we might put more effort into things that could beat planes without needing air superiority. For example, a pound of thin diamond flakes would spread very nicely in air and wouldn't settle particularly fast, and it wouldn't take a tremendous number of them in an engine air intake before they start doing damage. If your plane's engine needs a lot of repair after each mission you might almost as well use cruise missiles instead....
Maybe we'd do better to let somebody else win the air-superiority fighter contest, and then show them they get the booby prize.
To add-
I'm not saying that all the cost overruns are from Congressional interference. One of the reasons why I despise the FCS and wanted the "vehicle component" canceled is because the Army had no real fucking clue as to what they actually wanted from the system other than to usher in the Next Age of Warfare, so they kept changing everything fifty thousand times a minute, producing major cost overruns.
The F-22, at least, is a plane with a purpose (or several of them); it's a better air-superiority fighter.
David Rothkopf is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and President and CEO of Garten Rothkopf.
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