The Middle East without solutions, part II

First, we need to determine what the American strategic interests in the region are. If they are, as I believe them to be, maintaining access to energy supplies and containing potential threats to us and our allies from extremist groups and governments, then this should drive our region-wide planning. If long-term stability for the region seems unlikely and the energy supplies from the region are also of a form that is destroying the global environment, it stands to reason that the central foundation of our Middle East strategy must be to reduce our dependence on the region's oil as aggressively and rapidly as possible. This removes our potential enemies' leverage and our vulnerability in ways no other strategic approach can. Secondly, it is clear that the threats in the region take three forms-hostile governments, hostile non-state actors and weak governments that are vulnerable and influenced by non-state actors. In the first category the primary actor is Iran. Our overarching goal in Iran should be to promote the rise of an alternative government that reflects the comparatively cosmopolitan and progressive character of its people. This can be done covertly but it must coincide with making every effort to resolutely contain the hegemonic ambitions of the government and its agents like Hezbollah.  This means ensuring that the country never has a military nuclear capability (the contagion effect of a nuclear arms race in the region would be as dangerous as the capacity developed by Tehran). It also means direct opposition to Hezbollah-sponsored political actors, be they in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories or elsewhere. If engagement with Iran can advance these goals, great. If not, beware of engagement that lends legitimacy to the illegitimate or buys time for the Iranian regime's nuclear and other destructive plans.

As for non-state actors, we need to continue to protect the homeland and we need to focus on ensuring that they do not get weapons of mass destruction. We can play whack-a-mole all we like with guerrilla groups...but we need to keep focused on the fact that our goal here is containment not "victory," which is an elusive and probably unachievable "solution."

Finally, as for weak states, which is to say Pakistan (and by extension Afghanistan), we need again to realize that military success for us above all is in securing Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and secondarily is in supporting regimes that can achieve enough stability to make the case they offer more than the extremists to their people.

But again, above all, the answer is containment. In every case, we will need to do this with a big a group of allies as possible. Europe will be helpful but not courageous. Russia will not be helpful. China may prove to be the surprise lynchpin, whether it pertains to cutting a deal on Iranian nukes or containing the threat of instability in Pakistan. India will certainly be key when it comes to ensuring that the eastward spread of the region's problems stops at their border. These are new alliances and will require a new, re-energized diplomacy. The proposed special envoys for the Middle East and South Asia will be key here (and the bruited-about names, Richard Holbrooke for South Asia and either Dennis Ross or Martin Indyk for the Middle East, are among the very best we have). But it is important they report to both the Secretary of State and the President to ensure they can effectively mobilize inter-agency support (otherwise we are just adding redundant assistant secretaries of state to the bureaucracy.) Still, the heavy lifting here is going to fall to President Obama and Secretary Clinton. 

So the key is a re-energized multilateral effort by an administration with a renewed commitment to international law and diplomacy, a regional strategy and adjusted expectations. Containment and engagement are the tactical formulas with almost every sub-regional issue. This will require an energy and a commitment of resources that may be difficult for a nation suffering a serious case of Iraq fatigue (and a very rough recession). Maintaining and recognizing the value of allies on the ground like Israel (and potentially moderate states, or the Kurds or even the regime in Iraq) is key. 

But we need to remember the strategic high ground in the Middle East is right now held by our adversaries. It is our dependence on the region's oil.  And unless we retake that high ground, we consign ourselves to repeating the bloody cycles of the past 50 years. So if you want to know how serious Barack Obama is about the Middle East, watch whether or not he actually has the political courage to set a price for carbon either through imposing a gas tax or establishing an effective cap and trade system. The formula is simple. If gas is cheap in the United States, we are losing in the Middle East and in the war on terror.

My old roommate is right to remind us that some of the issues of the Middle East don't have solutions that we can readily achieve. But that does not mean there are not solutions, just that we might not be able to see them.