Thursday, November 3, 2011 - 4:22 PM

The Phantom War will be different from all the others that came before it. There will be no triggering incidents, no frantic diplomatic efforts to stave off conflict, no declaration of war, no battles, and there will be no end to it. It will certainly, however, take a huge toll, destroy lives, shake great nations, and, ultimately, almost certainly result in death and mayhem. It may even result in more traditional forms of conflict.
And make no mistake about it, the Phantom War will touch you personally and, in all likelihood, it will rock your world ... and I don' t mean that in a good way.
Indeed, you will understand just how different Phantom warfare from the fact that it has already begun and most people don't even know it.
Some dimensions of the war have made headlines, such as the successful Stuxnet attack on Iran's nuclear program. Others are hinted at in reports, such as the just released report from the U.S. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX). The 2011 report, produced in compliance with an act of Congress, details the degree to which foreign powers are actively invading U.S. cyberspace and conducting thousands upon thousands of operations that in a more traditional sense might be called reconnaissance, spying or sabotage.
The report is particularly striking in that it calls out Russia and China as particularly egregious violators who pose "significant and growing threats" to America's security and economic vitality. Calling them "the most aggressive collectors of U.S. economic information and technology," the ONCIX report goes on to predict that the two rival powers "will almost certainly continue to deploy significant resources and a wide array of tactics" in support of their efforts to level the playing field between themselves and the United States. But of course, the implication is clear, particularly in the wake of Stuxnet, cyber-reconnaissance and spying are just the tip of the iceberg. They test our defenses, test our borders and prepare for the days ahead of deeper engagement.
Said one experienced U.S. diplomat with whom I spoke this week, "the war is already under way and we are ill prepared for it. We know it is going to happen but we don't have the doctrines or the strategic awareness we need to manage the growing threat." Said one investor with whom I spoke this week, "This is the black swan I worry about. One day...one day soon, in the next couple of years...I expect a power grid to go down or a stock market to be penetrated in a way that will cause a massive disruption, even a panic."
There are signs everywhere that the issue is growing in importance and being viewed with a sense of urgency by those who are aware of it. Take this week's cybersecurity forum in London designed to address a problem that Britain alone estimates already costs it 27 billion pounds per year. Or look to the story that stirred some notoriety earlier this week when it was revealed the international group of online hackers known as Anonymous were challenging Mexico's brutal Zetas, a cartel that has been reaping havoc near the U.S. border for years. (See the New York Times: "After a Kidnapping, Hackers Take On a Ruthless Mexican Crime Syndicate.") The latter story indicates that just as modern conflicts are often between state and non-state actors, so too will this new form of conflict involve a plethora of groups all with very different objectives, often very difficult to trace or tell apart.
JIM WATSON/AFP/Getty Images
Friday, March 25, 2011 - 3:15 PM

It would be too easy to say that Barack Obama has been a big loser so far since the onset of operations against the Qaddafi regime in Libya. It would also be wrong. The Obama administration has mishandled many elements of the crisis, but nothing they have done wrong thus far is irreversible and in terms of the simple objectives of imposing a no-fly zone and containing Qaddafi, the effort has been effective.
Further, whatever the criticism of Obama may be, his intentions have been both defensible and sound: The desire to forestall a humanitarian disaster and to do so through multilateral mechanisms were worthy and responsible goals. The challenge thus far has been in the execution ... although clearly, the risks going forward remain high and were this to result in a protracted U.S. involvement, unacceptable costs, a stalemate on the ground that left Qaddafi in power or the installation of a new government that ultimately proved to be as bad or worse for U.S. interests than its predecessors, then we would have to revisit our list.
Meanwhile, at this stage of the game, the five biggest losers associate with the whadeveryacallit (see Jay Carney's convolocution above) are:
5. Qaddafi
Much as the Libyan people were only the number five beneficiary of events so far in our winners list because the outcome is so uncertain, Qaddafi is only the number five loser of the major international military onslaught targeting his regime because it is not certain how this will all end up for him. With the UN's promise not to put boots on the ground, Qaddafi's tenure in office could be a long one and absent a "lucky" missile strike or a major increase in the effectiveness of opposition forces, a stalemate in which he retains considerable power over important chunks of Libya seems a strong possibility. Another alternative which might not be so bad is exile and the prospect of living with billions of dollars and all the Ukrainian nurses that can buy (which is a lot). So, while the most advanced military forces in the world are working against him, right now Muammar still is clinging to hope of a better tomorrow ... or any tomorrow ... which could prove to be a very unsatisfactory outcome from the political perspective of some of his leading international adversaries. That said, my money is on him not surviving as Libya's leader and in any event all his attempts at remaking his image over the past half decade have been undone and he has been permanently restored to his much deserved lunatic pariah status.
4. NATO
While the forces in the field have been performing admirably, the early days of this operation in terms of the alliance's political operations haven't been pretty. The world's most important, powerful, experienced, best-equipped military alliance has all the toys a middle-aged coalition could want but someone seems to have misplaced the instruction manual for smooth establishment of a command structure. From the minute they committed to this there have been arguments about who is in charge, about goals, about tactics, about basing, about burden-sharing, about virtually everything that alleged friends could possibly fight about. While the attacks NATO has carried out have apparently been effective, it is still unclear whether in the long-term they will be making the region any safer. Further, and more damagingly, they have revealed real problems in the ability of the alliance to work together on the kinds of conflicts with which they are most likely to be confronted in the near future. The apparent decision, a week into the crisis, to put a clear NATO command structure to be in charge helps matters considerably ... but the delays in getting there also underscore the kind of fault-line issues bedeviling the participating countries. This will all be papered over once this draws to a close but going forward, resistance of countries like Germany and Turkey to participation in undertakings like this could remain high for some time to come.
3. Arab League
Not that they had much credibility to begin with and not that many people expected much of them when it came to championing either democracy or even the basic human rights of the people of their region, but the Arab League at least during the early days of this operation did the near impossible and reduced the value of their role as a force of good within their region by their inability to follow up on their welcome promise of playing a key role in containing Qaddafi. Again, it's possible that they could undo the damage that has been done by stepping up their commitment of men and materiel to the mission -- and today's welcome announcement of substantial air support from the UAE buttresses the commitment of the Qataris in important ways -- but there are plenty in the coalition who acted in response to their promises who are absolutely furious at how so many members of the League have proven to be all keffiyeh and no camel on this issue. (A reference to the old Texas slam about posturing would-be ranchers who were "all hat and no cattle" for those of you wondering where I was going with that.)
2. Multilateralism
Viewing points 3 and 4 above, one can't help but worry that at the dawn of what could be a new era in international affairs, an essential idea has been set back by messy execution. In the wake of the Iraq debacle, America and the world both were motivated to move away from the ugly inequities of a one superpower world dominated by a we-can-do-it-all-ourselves USA. The only alternative was better sharing of responsibilities for decision-making and problem-solving when it came to global problems. Barack Obama's willingness to embrace that new approach in the face of this first real 3 a.m. phone call type crisis of his presidency was welcome and the right thing to do but it could produce more damage than good if critics ultimately feel we did the right thing in the wrong way. If the message about multilateralism is that it is slow or messy or costly or politically damaging, it will not only become harder to rally allies in the future but in the U.S. unilateralists will have a case in point to use when next they want to drop the hammer on someone without benefit of the blessing of the international community.
1. Coherence
It is a good thing that William Safire, the New York Times redoubtable lover of words and their meanings is dead because if he weren't the White House press statements on this crisis would have killed him. We don't have to start with the good and capable Jay Carney's ill-considered coherence-limited characterization of the Libya conflict cited in the title of this post. We can turn to Ben Rhodes' clarity-challenged clarification of whether or not the U.S. was seeking regime change cited in an earlier post this week. Or we can go to Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough's appearance on the PBS NewsHour which was described by the Washington Post's Jennifer Rubin as "He was asked questions. He answered them. And in the end you had no idea what he said." (For our international readers let me note that the Washington Post is not seen as a crazy right wing mouthpiece of the Republican Party.) Speaking however of crazy Republicans, they are not immune from the disease currently affecting Washington, either. Take Newt Gingrich who may have finally stuck a stake through the heart of his already slim chances of being a credible candidate for president when he offered two completely contradictory positions on intervention in Libya within the course of a couple of weeks. (Although his creative "patriotism excuses infidelity" stance -- also known as the flag-made-me-do-it excuse for cheating on your cancer-stricken wife -- is likely to ensure him a few male votes should he ever run.) It is almost as if the underlying foundation of the United States's current foreign policy is Newton's Third Law of Motion, paraphrased to suggest that for each guiding principle of our actions there is an equal and opposite principle to which we also adhere. We're leading and we're not. We're for regime change and we're against. We're for democracy in some places but not in others. For those seeking comfort, there are always the words of F. Scott Fitzgerald that "the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function." For those worried by the trend outbreak of double-talk there is however the fact that Fitzgerald offered that observation in an essay called "The Crack-Up."
JEWEL SAMAD/AFP/Getty Images
Monday, October 11, 2010 - 5:14 PM

I spent a lot of time this weekend stewing over my appraisal of Gen. Jim Jones as national security advisor. I stick by my conclusion that he was a highly unsuccessful national security advisor. But I don't think my assessment was nuanced enough. Because Jones was a good man who had an extraordinary career before serving in the Obama administration and who has contributed a great deal to his country.
Sometimes when one is in the instant-opinion business, as many of us are in Washington, nuance is the first casualty. A premium is placed on finding the pithy quote or sound-bite. Speak first, think later would be a way to describe the standard operating procedure if in fact, most people thought later.
The main reason Jones faltered as national security advisor was not his aloofness nor was it his unwillingness to roll up his sleeves and manage the policy process. The main reason Jones faltered was he served a president who did not empower him, did not embrace him and worse, allowed other members of his team to upstage him, circumvent him, and undercut him.
There is much Jones could have done to have been more successful. But he could never achieve much without the support and collaboration of an experienced commander in chief who knew something about national security policy.
Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
Friday, September 10, 2010 - 4:12 PM
Update, 9/12/10: In the following post due to a mistake regarding which draft I submitted to be posted, a couple of key words were dropped that have been noted by several commenters. They refer to the paragraph regarding the mosque project in Lower Manhattan. What I intended to write (and had actually written in the draft that I mistakenly did not submit) was not "It is odious..." but instead "It may seem odious to some, but if our freedoms..." I appreciate those who noted the incongruity of the remark given that I was early and strongly on the record supporting the right of those supporting the Islamic Cultural Center to build it wherever they wanted to. As should be clear to anyone who reads this blog, I find the objections and efforts to block the cultural center to be what is really odious and that is the point that I would have made here were it not for my typo. Apologies.
A week ago, Fareed Zakaria wrote a piece for Newsweek entitled "What America Has Lost." It was subtitled "It's clear we overreacted to 9/11." As is typical for Zakaria, it is exceptionally thoughtful and well-argued. Its timely focus is on the enormous costs associated with building up the massive U.S. security apparatus that targeted a terrorist threat that was and is clearly overstated. Zakaria makes reference to the landmark Washington Post "Top Secret America" series that outlined how, in the wake of the World Trade Center attacks, the United States has "created or reconfigured at least 263 organizations to tackle some aspect of the war on terror. The amount of money spent on intelligence has risen by 250 percent to $75 billion (and that's the public number, which is a gross underestimate.) That's more than the rest of the world spends put together."
Even today, nine years after 9/11, it took considerable courage for Zakaria to argue that we overreacted to the horrific events of that day. Given their scope and visceral impact on every American, it seemed in the days after the blows were struck that overreaction was impossible. But in the years that followed, the feelings seem hardly to have ebbed at all, and critiques of our national reaction are, with the exception of the near consensus that invading Iraq was wrong, considered almost unpatriotic -- nearly sacrilegious, in fact.
Yet I believe that Zakaria's column understates the problem. I attribute this to its appropriately limited focus rather than any narrowness of his perspective. It was, after all, just a single column in which he focused on making an important point about America's security priorities and the opportunity costs associated with our strategic overreaction. That said, the damage done by letting emotion and adrenaline get the best of us in the months and years after the attacks extends far beyond the distortion of foreign policy priorities or the impact on the U.S. federal budget.
Mario Tama/Gettty Images
EXPLORE:CENTRAL ASIA, MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AMERICA, AFGHANISTAN, AL QAEDA, BUSH ADMINISTRATION, BUSH'S LEGACY, DEMOCRACY, DISASTERS, HISTORY, HUMAN RIGHTS, INTELLIGENCE, IRAQ, ISLAM, JUSTICE, LAW, MIGRATION/IMMIGRATION, MILITARY, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, POLITICS, SECURITY, TALIBAN, TERRORISM, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Wednesday, September 8, 2010 - 4:22 PM
Think tanks being what they are -- large meat lockers in which future government bureaucrats are stored until needed -- the reports they produce tend to be little more than exercises in reputation management. They state the obvious, then slather it in a bland, nutrient-free sauce of quasi-academic qualifications that seek to explain why they are really not saying anything new or practical. The best of them offer course corrections that are minuscule at best, and new ideas are as hard to find as honest politicians in the Karzai administration.
Which brings us to the latest such report to be issued, one that proves to be the exception to the rule. That report is "A New Way Forward: Rethinking U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan" from the New America Foundation. It is one of the very few such documents that I have recently read and found myself nodding at almost every turn of the page. It is so good that it almost restores my youthful belief in the potential benefits of putting smart people around a table and letting them cogitate and argue and bullshit and grapple with tough problems. Produced by a glittering group of wonks, it contains real thoughtful insights into America's situation in Afghanistan and comes to sound, generally implementable conclusions about what the United States should do to avoid making a very bad situation even worse.
The report is well summarized in an article by Steve Clemons, one of its architects, that appears in Politico. In short, it makes the case that spending $100 billion a year to fight a war we can't win in Afghanistan is just one of several reasons that America's policies are misguided and demand immediate correction. He writes, "Though Obama is more likeable, and often more inspiring, than the fictional captain in the Melville novel, Afghanistan has now become the Moby Dick to Obama's Ahab."
The report begins by revisiting the forgotten territory of America's initial reasons to be involved in the region in the first place. It correctly notes there are only two: preventing Afghanistan from being a staging ground for further terrorist attacks against the United States, and doing what we can to reduce the threat that Pakistani weapons of mass destruction might fall into the wrong hands. It argues correctly that if we focus on these two goals, then our mission, military and diplomatic presence in the region would and should look very different.
It makes five key recommendations. The first is promoting power sharing and political inclusion in a more decentralized Afghanistan: In other words, trying to work with rather than against the historical and cultural tides in the country. Second is downsizing and ending military operations in southern Afghanistan and reducing the military presence there. Third is focusing the military's attention on Al Qaeda, which is no longer really present in Afghanistan but remains an issue in Pakistan. (Notably, the New America group suggests using the cost-savings the drawdown would produce to bolster U.S. domestic security and contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction worldwide.) Fourth is encouraging the promotion of economic development, while emphasizing that this should be an internationally rather than U.S. led effort. (Hallelujah to that.) Finally, it recommends collaborating with influential states in the region to ensure Afghanistan is not dominated by "any single power or being permanently a failed state that exports instability." The report notes that those states -- Pakistan, India, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia -- aren't the best of pals, but suggests correctly that there are ways to work with each or even small clusters of them to promote these outcomes that are, for the most part, in their interests.
Point five is a bit of a stretch. Point four is more or less boilerplate, though worthy of emphasizing. The reality is that Afghanistan will become a strongman dominated quasi-failed state, but that as long as our core goals in the region -- the two mentioned above -- are met, then we should be less concerned with whatever structure produces an outcome supportive of them.
Personally, I think the international community needs to be involved actively in ensuring that whatever successor state emerges, the rights of all Afghans -- and notably women and tribal minorities -- are respected and protected. It is also true that Pakistan is the real problem and appropriate subject of U.S. attention in this region, and that this requires forthrightly addressing what diplomatic and force structure is required to promote stability and contain threats within that country.
But this report is clear-eyed, direct, well-argued and in its tone even more than its substance sends a message that the only door we should head for in that country is the one with the exit sign over it. In Clemons article he notes that the United States spends seven times Afghanistan's own GDP on our involvement there -- an amount equal to the cost of the recent U.S. health care legislation, and one that if saved could pay down the U.S. deficit in 14 years. The recklessness and irresponsibility of such a costly involvement, given America's other urgent priorities and the true nature of the threats within Afghanistan, makes the blood boil.
It does no dishonor to our military to wish their lives and services were available for other missions. Reports like this raise the hope that opinion is shifting in ways that may lead us to just such a desirable outcome.
PATRICK BAZ/AFP/Getty Images
Thursday, June 10, 2010 - 11:48 AM

I've recently laid my hands on the Obama administration's super secret Iran plan. Because it is highly classified, I can't offer all the details here. (Also, because there are very few details to begin with.)
The plan begins with the sanctions program that was approved Wednesday by the U.N. Security Council. It should be noted however, that after the description of the sanctions are a few hand-written notations. The deadlines, for example, have been struck through ... repeatedly. In fact, there are almost more deleted deadlines than there are deleted proposed sanctions. Almost. But there are actually scores of proposed elements that were one after one cut out of the program ranging from "petroleum products" to "anything that might negatively impact trade or relationships with China or Russia." In fact, the only original item in the sanctions program that remains intact is prohibiting Iranian television from airing episodes of the first season of Glee until early next year.
However, the sanctions are followed by the following note: "It is very unlikely that the sanctions program will work even if it is not eviscerated by our "partners" in the diplomatic process." (Here there are just a bunch of exclamation marks and the letters "LOL" in the margin.) It goes on to say: "We know this because a.) Sanctions programs rarely work; b.) When they do work they never work quickly enough to actually achieve our prime purpose here which is stopping the Iranian nuclear program; and c.) Because this will be the fourth set of sanctions, weaker than prior sets and therefore will be seen as a nothing more than a "used handkerchief" by the Iranians. Or anyone else."
And from there it goes on to say: "Nonetheless, these are our damn sanctions and even if they are an empty sham we cannot allow them to be upstaged by even the naïve and equally unlikely to succeed programs of others. Because such programs will both marginalize us and at the same time underscore the pointlessness of our efforts. Thus, even if we don't take forceful action to stop the Iranian nuclear program we must take forceful action to stomp out other programs that might seek to stop the Iranian nuclear program."
Next something is written about the necessity of having a forceful and credible military response in the event the sanctions don't work but this too is scribbled out. In the margin: "If we're backing toward the exit in Iraq and Afghanistan, who's going to believe any of this mouthwash? Just parrot the old "reserve all our options" formulas and hope people are too busy following whatever Charlie Sheen's latest scandal may be to notice how transparently impotent this all is."
Next the main body of the memo consists of a number of possible steps listed under "Program of Escalation." These are only to be implemented if the sanctions fail to markedly slow down Iranian nuclear progress. They include: "U.S. U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice pointedly eats at a different table from the Iranian delegation in the United Nations cafeteria," then "Rice starts eating with the Turks to demonstrate we have friends in the Islamic world" (this has however, been crossed out), then "Robert Gibbs to complain that cable media have empowered the Iranians and cancels appearance on Morning Joe," then "Criminalization of possession of Iranian pistachios and spontaneous display of pouring pistachio ice cream into the street in front of SEIU headquarters," then "Public display of affection with Bibi Netanyahu" (also crossed out), then "President Obama tells touching story about how Malia tugged on his PJs and asked whether he had stopped that nasty Mahmoud from getting the bomb," then finally "President Obama delivers very tough speech employing soaring rhetoric declaring the success of our engagement program, punctuated with threats about 'kicking ass' and announcing the appointment of a bipartisan committee to explore 'forceful next steps' -- end with tight shot of clenched jaw."
After these there is a concluding paragraph which reads: If none of the above initiatives work see next memo (NSC document code redacted) entitled "Learning to Live with a Nuclear Iran."
ROBERT ATANASOVSKI/AFP/Getty Images
Tuesday, April 27, 2010 - 2:58 PM

As you may have read, General Jim Jones, the U.S. National Security Advisor, seeking to turn that Middle Eastern frown upside down, cracked wise at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy the other day. In so doing he showed the kind of sensitivity toward Jews that some have concluded will be sure to have him opening for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at the Laff Factory in Tehran in no time. Having specifically gone to the think tank to reiterate America's commitment to Israel in no uncertain terms, Jones cannily opened with a joke that turned on the reliably funny topic of Jewish business acumen.
No wonder they call him the funniest Jim Jones this side of Guyana.
Not surprisingly, the comment offended a few people. We can only imagine that first and foremost among them was America's self-appointed first line of defense against the Israel Lobby, Steve Walt, who we have to assume was outraged that Jones even went to the Institute in the first place -- given what Walt has asserted is the allegedly pro-Israel stance of some of its experts. (Walt is recently on the record as suggesting that the folks who work at the Institute be denied any opportunity to ever work in the U.S. government because of their alleged "conflicts of interest" -- which he twists himself into Mary Lou Retton-worthy contortions to attempt rather unsuccessfully to distinguish from the more inflammatory "dual loyalty" which we all know means "you can't celebrate both Flag Day and Shavuos.")
Actually on the record as being offended was Anti-Defamation League National Director Abe Foxman who called the Jones joke "inappropriate." Personally, I found the joke funny -- what's funnier after all than a story like Jones's about a thirsty Taliban being denied a drink unless he buys a necktie from a Jewish merchant? That's the kind of thing we call a laff riot in Gaza -- where they know something about riots. But other Jews, you know, they're more sensitive than I am about these things -- not because they don't have a sense of humor (think Jerry Seinfeld, George Burns, Grouch Marx, Lloyd Blankfein, half of Chelsea Handler), but because after 5,000 years the same punch lines get a little old.
Fortunately for Jones, Jews aren't as sensitive about these things as other groups. As others have noted, imagine if the joke had turned on the stereotypes of different ethnic groups, African Americans, for example, or gays, or on a clichés about boneheaded military officers. Jones would be enjoying the same kind of career prospects as Michael Richards, considering shifting to a posting in Silvio Berlusconi's cabinet or be left cruising the Pacific Coast Highway with Mel Gibson. (It's a good thing he didn't call Ehud Barak "sugar tits.") Some groups you can't make fun of in America. But Jews, they don't mind a good ribbing from the Obama administration. Ask Bibi Netanyahu.
Since it looks like Jones won't be fired any time soon, however, he's probably going to have to give some more speeches. Given this, it'd probably be a good idea to learn some distinctly non-stereotypical new jokes about Jews with which he can open his speeches. Here are a few ideas:
A Jew walks into a bar. He says, "who's buying?" When no one else offers, he takes out his credit card and says, "this round's on me."
Of course, Jones's biggest on-going problem is hardly his lack of a sense of humor. It's that despite his best efforts, he is still dogged by criticism from some of his own colleagues within the administration -- despite periodic efforts at rehabilitating his aloof image -- that he is the disconnected, remote chief of a system that has thus far seemingly favored lengthy (some might say dithering) process over the production of good, clear policies, a process that cuts out key officials, and one that has been too dominated by the circle of pols that are close to the president.
All of which may, if you believe the buzz, foreshadow yet another joke, perhaps one paraphrasing the Dorothy Parker classic which dates to the Coolidge years. It might -- later this year, say the chattering classes--go like this: At a cocktail party full of Washington whisperers one says to the other, "I hear Jim Jones just resigned." Says the other: "How can you tell?"
There is, however, an important last irony here ... which is not quite the same thing as humor: There are some people I respect enormously who very resolutely resist the preceding critique of Jones and have been steadfast in their admiration for him. High among this group of Jones supporters? Well, as it happens, the Israelis -- who have no hesitation about offering genuine appreciation for his directness, experience and intelligence. Which is saying something. Because in Washington, when someone ... particularly someone you have been tough with ... is willing to praise you behind your back and in private, that typically means much more than most of the kerfuffles that actually make their way into the news. (Even if those kerfuffles are so amusing that nearly all including the most circumspect bloggers can't resist them.)
SAUL LOEB/AFP/Getty Images
Wednesday, December 30, 2009 - 7:03 PM

So, here we are at last, the big ones, my choices for winners and losers of the decade on the global stage.
While these selections are slightly less subjective than, say, the Golden Globe nominations (which are, I believe, selected by three drunken expat Latvian critics in a bar in West Hollywood), they do represent just the views of one man. If you agree with those views, please post your congratulations below ... or go ahead and add a few other names. If you disagree, just remember, there will be other lists -- only I decide whether to include you among the global losers of tomorrow (alongside, say, the Tiger Woods of 10 years from now when he is running Tiger's "Just Do It" Mini-Golf Course in Melanoma City, Florida) or the global winners of the future (alongside, say, President Timberlake in 2030 or so).
The Losers
The People of Iraq: George W. Bush was our Washington loser of the decade, but all he lost was his reputation such as it was. He's still rich and will probably never pay for a round of golf again. But somewhere between 100,000 and 800,000 Iraqis are dead as a consequence of the war, the country is shattered, its government held together with chewing gum and bailing wire and the random killing continues. Oh, and there was absolutely no justification for going in and breaking up the place from the get-go. This isn't a tragedy ... it's a crime, as I suspect international courts will conclude in the years to come.
The People of Afghanistan and Pakistan: These countries are no playgrounds, they are home to plenty of bad actors and, as Barack Obama has demonstrated, no U.S. president, regardless of party, could stay disengaged from the festering political sore on the planet that is AfPak. But while the pursuit of al Qaeda and the Taliban is justified, the wars that continue to percolate here will kill countless thousands, impoverish hundreds of thousands more and at the same time, support for terrorists and other enemies of civilization will grow. That there are no good choices here is a cliché ... that there are going to be no winners is a related tragic reality.
The British Government (Lifetime Achievement Award): Well, let's book at the worst problems the world has faced during the past decade -- Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel-Palestine...what do these diverse countries have in common? They were all cooked up or stirred up by those fertile minds at the British Foreign Office and their colleagues elsewhere up and down Whitehall, either as they were dismantling their empire or fiddling with the region after one war or another. Thanks guys for your creativity...and for the foresight you showed by actually bequeathing your handwork to yet another remnant of your empire as you shuffled off the world stage so you could focus on counterbalancing your past contributions to global culture by producing Simon Cowell and the likes of Susan Boyle.
The U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Dollar, and American Capitalism: It was a tough decade for the pillars of U.S. society. We should have seen it coming when the decade began with the Supreme Court fiddling with an election and when a central theme of the Bush years became undercutting the Constitution. Thanks to the U.S. government's similar callous disregard for the laws of economics and fiscal responsibility the dollar began a downward spiral that many experts see as a semi-permanent feature of our future.
Democracy: Oh, yes, we know that Churchill called it the "worst form of government except for all the others that have been tried"... but as my grandma would have said, "there's democracy and then there's democracy." In other words, some forms of democracy are worse than others, and among those that that have flourished during the past decade are Russia, Venezuela, Iran, Zimbabwe, and, yes folks, Honduras -- where leaders took advantage of the common misperception that voting equals democracy.
ADEK BERRY/AFP/Getty Images)
Tuesday, August 11, 2009 - 7:05 PM
Yesterday Steve Walt offered a post on this site called "National Security Heats Up" in which he took on a recent CNA Corporation study that suggested that climate change was an important new national security issue for the United States, Walt argues that this study overstates the threat for the United States.
His basic thesis is that because some of the biggest potential problems cited are far away they are not U.S. problems. Migratory pressures in Bangladesh that might be caused by rising sea levels are offered as one example. Walt makes the point that this is really a problem for India to handle, that we should beware the trap of inserting ourselves into every problem (which he associates with a Madeleine Albright "indispensable nation" worldview), and that most DoD studies inflate risks anyway ('cause that's the self-serving thing to do.)
While I can't argue with any of these points -- India should take these threats more seriously than they have to date, we shouldn't insert ourselves into every problem, and DoD funded risk assessments tend to have a "sky is falling" tone to them. But the central thrust of Walt's piece -- that global warming is not a major national security threat to the United States, is just wrong.
First, there are the immediate consequences associated with potential sea level changes in our neighborhood. As one Bahamanian minister once said to me, "For you, a shift of a foot or two or three is something you can adjust to. For us, it is a matter of life and death. If some of the estimates are to be believed, we won't exist as a country." Well, don't take the most dramatic estimates. A modest shift in sea-level will have new waves of immigrants pounding at our doors too ... from the Caribbean, from Mexico, from Central America.
Next, we will have our own issues in states like Florida where much of the population lives very close to sea-level. Permanently inundating coastal regions aside, spotting every incoming hurricane a foot or two of sea-level is going to have big costs whether it is in retaining walls, levies or post-disaster relief.
Third, global warming will produce major consequences for agriculture as climatic conditions change, droughts increase, etc. Food shortages and increases in the cost of food are another likely consequence that we will feel here at home, in our neighborhood and in volatile regions where we have vital interests.
Similarly, if glaciers melt, much of the power capacity of regions like Latin America dwindles. If warming produces reductions in the availability of water, an already critical situation, -- perhaps two-thirds of the world's people are already predicted to live in water-stressed environments in the next several decades -- will get worse. Competition for water is already an issue in parts of the Middle East that don't need any more fuel doused on their flames ... and this is going to be an issue in critical regions first.
The list goes on. Food shortages. Economic setbacks. Water competition. Refugee movements. Resulting tensions between states. High costs of mitigation. Walt is right to approach the report and even the motivations for it with some skepticism. And he is right to suggest the United States cannot and should not assume burdens that are rightfully those of other countries.
But he goes too far when he when he suggests that the primary consequences will be humanitarian and thus this is not really a security issue but a "philanthropic" one. If there were some other threat that was likely to increase tension in the Middle East or South Asia, likely to cause massive immigration in coastal regions worldwide, likely to have a major impact on the vulnerability of the world's poorest (thus creating unrest and opportunities for populists to exploit instability), and to do so while stressing our own resources and testing our own borders, it would definitely be considered a significant national security threat.
I think there is a bit of a bias among "serious" national security scholars against "soft" issues like global warming. But count the wars that have started over food shortages, resource competition, migration, and related issues and you will see there is nothing soft about threats of this nature and there have been very few threats of this scope. For these reasons, it is in my view dangerously short-sighted to dismiss the concerns the CNA Corporation report rightfully highlights.
MARCEL MOCHET/AFP/Getty Images
Monday, May 4, 2009 - 5:01 PM

Every so often, I find time to write for other publications. I am not sure how I actually do this given my day job, periodic need for food, sleep requirements, and other constraints. (Perhaps like Mighty Manfred the Wonder Dog from the cartoons of my youth, I have learned to eat while I sleep and sleep while I eat. Certainly, I have been working in that direction my entire life.)
In any event, when those wonderful folks over at The National Interest asked if I would write a few words about the current state of the Obama national security team and what we might glean from it, I could hardly resist. (Perhaps there is a vaccine that will help build up resistance in this respect. I suspect that my wife is currently working with the National Institutes of Health to develop one.) The result is an article in the current issue called "A Thousand Envoys Bloom."
I commend it to you...because if I don't, who will? And they actually do make an effort to run a thought-provoking journal over there at The National Interest which is no small feat given just what is entailed by successfully provoking thoughts here in Washington. (To be honest, I am not even in Washington as I write this. I am in Boston to give a speech. Here they are concerned with the fact that their newspaper, the Globe, is hanging by a thread having missed a negotiating deadline last night. Oddly, the Federal government does not seem as concerned with stepping in to save journalism as they are automobile production. Go figure.)
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David Rothkopf is the CEO and Editor-at-Large of Foreign Policy. His new book, "Power, Inc.: The Epic Rivalry Between Big Business and Government and the Reckoning that Lies Ahead" is due out from Farrar, Straus & Giroux on March 1.
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