Thursday, November 3, 2011 - 4:22 PM

The Phantom War will be different from all the others that came before it. There will be no triggering incidents, no frantic diplomatic efforts to stave off conflict, no declaration of war, no battles, and there will be no end to it. It will certainly, however, take a huge toll, destroy lives, shake great nations, and, ultimately, almost certainly result in death and mayhem. It may even result in more traditional forms of conflict.
And make no mistake about it, the Phantom War will touch you personally and, in all likelihood, it will rock your world ... and I don' t mean that in a good way.
Indeed, you will understand just how different Phantom warfare from the fact that it has already begun and most people don't even know it.
Some dimensions of the war have made headlines, such as the successful Stuxnet attack on Iran's nuclear program. Others are hinted at in reports, such as the just released report from the U.S. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX). The 2011 report, produced in compliance with an act of Congress, details the degree to which foreign powers are actively invading U.S. cyberspace and conducting thousands upon thousands of operations that in a more traditional sense might be called reconnaissance, spying or sabotage.
The report is particularly striking in that it calls out Russia and China as particularly egregious violators who pose "significant and growing threats" to America's security and economic vitality. Calling them "the most aggressive collectors of U.S. economic information and technology," the ONCIX report goes on to predict that the two rival powers "will almost certainly continue to deploy significant resources and a wide array of tactics" in support of their efforts to level the playing field between themselves and the United States. But of course, the implication is clear, particularly in the wake of Stuxnet, cyber-reconnaissance and spying are just the tip of the iceberg. They test our defenses, test our borders and prepare for the days ahead of deeper engagement.
Said one experienced U.S. diplomat with whom I spoke this week, "the war is already under way and we are ill prepared for it. We know it is going to happen but we don't have the doctrines or the strategic awareness we need to manage the growing threat." Said one investor with whom I spoke this week, "This is the black swan I worry about. One day...one day soon, in the next couple of years...I expect a power grid to go down or a stock market to be penetrated in a way that will cause a massive disruption, even a panic."
There are signs everywhere that the issue is growing in importance and being viewed with a sense of urgency by those who are aware of it. Take this week's cybersecurity forum in London designed to address a problem that Britain alone estimates already costs it 27 billion pounds per year. Or look to the story that stirred some notoriety earlier this week when it was revealed the international group of online hackers known as Anonymous were challenging Mexico's brutal Zetas, a cartel that has been reaping havoc near the U.S. border for years. (See the New York Times: "After a Kidnapping, Hackers Take On a Ruthless Mexican Crime Syndicate.") The latter story indicates that just as modern conflicts are often between state and non-state actors, so too will this new form of conflict involve a plethora of groups all with very different objectives, often very difficult to trace or tell apart.
JIM WATSON/AFP/Getty Images
Thursday, October 6, 2011 - 4:41 PM

The mantra in Washington these days is "jobs, jobs, jobs." Then, today, for a brief moment, the focus shifted -- to Jobs.
The reaction to the death of Steve Jobs has been remarkable for both what it says about the man and our times. But it is also resonant because of a message it has sent that has yet to be received, it seems.
It has already been observed that it is stunning to see such a seemingly heartfelt, widespread sense of loss and emotion for the death of an American CEO at a moment when Americans are finally and understandably taking to the streets to protest what is seen by demonstrators to be the hostile take-over of the U.S. economy by big business interests.
Somehow, Steve Jobs transcended his role as a business man in much the same way that for many the products his company produces have transcended being seen as mere devices, workaday slabs of technology. Some of that was due to great marketing, of course. But there's nothing inherently wrong with that. Marketing does not work if it doesn't ring true or if the promises made to consumers are not kept by manufacturers. And some of the Steve Jobs difference was due to a willingness to set aside knowledge of the company and its founder's missteps or hard-ball, sometimes, arrogant business tactics. But again, such facts are not easily set aside unless they are overshadowed by other factors.
In the case of Jobs, what set him apart was not just that he was a visionary or that he was successful. There are plenty of other tech titans who made billions who could drop dead tomorrow with nary a notice in the paper or a teardrop being shed outside their immediate families. In some cases, you might even hear the faint sound of cheering within their immediate vicinity.
It was not just that he was a good-looking, thoughtful, articulate spokesperson who combined just the right elements of geek and master of the universe, of everyman and of being the Willy Wonka of the digital era. Because good spokespeople for industries come and go, yet how many of even the very best would have prompted local television stations to pre-empt programming to run announcements of their demise as did my local station in DC, last night?
No, part of what set Steve Jobs apart was that he delivered on a promise that was bigger than any he or Apple or his industry could have made. He delivered on the promise of the future.
Among the most unsettling aspects for this particular observer of Jobs obituaries are the line that reads "1955-2011." Because 1955 doesn't seem that long ago to me. It is, in fact, the year I was born and I for one, am resolutely convinced that I am not old enough for an obituary. But that shared birth year also lets me understand a bit of where Jobs was coming from. It came from a childhood marked by grand promises associated not just with living in the richest and most powerful country in the world at the time of seemingly never-ending ascendancy but with serial technological breakthroughs. There were spaceflights and satellites and color televisions and 8-track tapes and polyester and TV dinners and Tang and oral polio vaccines and computers the size of your high school auditorium. And when there was a lull in innovation there was the Jetsons or "Time Tunnel" or "Star Trek" to double down on the promises.
And then we grew up and we waited for the flying cars to come.
Kevork Djansezian/Getty Images
Thursday, July 7, 2011 - 5:39 PM

The media is the central nervous system of the body politic. It carries information, emotions, pain, feedback from voter to voter, voter to leader, leader to voter, from extremity to extremity. Theoretically, as far as biology textbooks are concerned anyway, the central nervous system includes the brain but many modern media seem to be bypassing that altogether. Or instead, they are just heading for its lower bits where reflexive reactions, fear, greed, lust, and everything else connected to ratings lurk.
As we have seen this week, while the information revolution has brought much good to the world -- Angry Birds and Wii Tennis come to mind -- it really hasn't done that much for the information business. (FP's slammin' new iPad app notwithstanding.)
In just the course of a few days, we have seen several more examples about the nature of the changes brought on by that revolution. Few have been that encouraging. While the openness and transparency and inclusiveness that have been celebrated by-products of new technologies are still fresh in our minds from the days of the Twitter revolution in Tahrir Square and the positive elements (and there are some) of grassroots journalism and wikilytics (collaborative massaging of information to produce new insights), this week has also reminded us of the darker consequences of the onset of the Info Age and the ethical and political challenges associated with a world of rapidly proliferating, intersecting, instantaneous, hard-to-police, massive, information flows.
The News of the World scandal is not only the most odious of this week's cases, it is also the most ironic. The notion that a scandal rag goes down in scandal is too elegant for an enterprise that has been devoid of elegance throughout most of its century and a half long history. That this irony is compounded by having the crusading so-called journalists and media mongrels at the helm of this slimy outfit now claiming the same "I was clueless" defense they have throughout their careers so derided in so many political leaders would be droll were the offenses in this instance not so repulsive.
But this scandal -- about illegal phone taps and using new technologies to snoop around to grab juicy story bits wherever they could be found, legally or otherwise --doesn't really introduce anything new to the media. Rather, it just underscores that one of the key characteristics of the information revolution is that it primarily takes what was previously there and amplifies and accelerates it. In this respect, it's like cocaine, really. Sleazy journalists become more sleazy. The impact of their sleazy journalism is broader. It happens faster. There are fewer effective filters.
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Thursday, March 17, 2011 - 2:03 PM

The Japanese nuclear crisis, though still unfolding, may, in a way, already be yesterday's news. For a peek at tomorrow's, review the testimony of General Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command. Testifying before Congress this week and seeking support to pump up his agency budget, the general argued that all future conflicts would involve cyber warfare tactics and that the U.S. was ill-equipped to defend itself against them.
Alexander said, "We are finding that we do not have the capacity to do everything we need to accomplish. To put it bluntly, we are very thin, and a crisis would quickly stress our cyber forces. ... This is not a hypothetical danger."
The way to look at this story is to link in your mind the Stuxnet revelations about the reportedly U.S. and Israeli-led cyber attacks on the Iranian nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz and the calamities at the Fukushima power facilities over the past week. While seemingly unconnected, the stories together speak to the before and after of what cyber conflict may look like. Enemies will be able to target one another's critical infrastructure as was done by the U.S. and Israeli team (likely working with British and German assistance) targeting the Iranian program and burrowing into their operating systems, they will seek to produce malfunctions that bring economies to their knees, put societies in the dark, or undercut national defenses.
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Thursday, February 24, 2011 - 1:33 PM

This morning's New York Times contains an article quoting various "regional experts" as saying that the current upheaval in the region is playing into the hands of Iran. This is a flawed analysis on several levels.
First, we are so early in this process that it is premature to say who will benefit from or be damaged by it. It is still too early to know how many states will be affected or what the effects of the revolutions will be. Several scenarios are plausible. In one, prolonged upheaval, Iran may benefit as the alliance that existed against it is compromised. In another, a shift to democracy, Iran may or may not benefit depending on the orientation of the government, but in all likelihood it would be damaged as more democratic governments are likely to be both more open to the rest of the world and an inspiration to the repressed people of Iran. In a third, a new generation of strongmen emerges, you could theoretically have pro-Iranian Islamic states take hold, but the reality is, given the long-term history of Iran within the region, old anti-Iranian alliances would recoalesce. This is especially true because new regimes would likely have large military components comprising experienced officers who have been in anti-Iranian stance throughout their careers.
Iran is certainly working to take advantage of the current uncertainty, using Hezbollah, Hamas, and related networks to promote both the instability it seeks and voices that it considers friendly. But Iran is not, and cannot ever be, "of" the Arab world. The cultural and historic barriers are too great. And therefore, the notion of it somehow creating an enduring network of states aligned to it is far-fetched.
This point about Iran however, does bring into focus a bigger point about the nature and future of the remarkable wave of revolutions currently sweeping across the region. Just as Iran is in the Middle East without being, in the minds of its Arab neighbors, a real part of their world, so too has the great problem of the Middle East at large been that for a variety of historical, political, and cultural reasons it has been in the world without having been of it.
The cultural disposition of the region has been to set itself apart, to create barriers to integration to the rest of the world, and in fact, to view integration with the rest of the world as a threat. This is a generalization, of course. There are hugely sophisticated global business leaders from the region, and there are cosmopolitan pockets within each of the countries of the Middle East. But for intentional and unintentional reasons -- education, religious views, political ideologies, social stratification, deliberate policy choices made by ruling regimes -- the benefits of integrating into the global economy have not been as available to people from the region as they have been to others in the Americas, Europe, or Asia.
The regional experts assessing the situation in the New York Times article are viewing what is happening purely in terms of old paradigms and politics. But one of the most important questions raised by the current situation is whether we are not seeing merely the latest round of political musical chairs, but rather we are seeing something deeper and more profound that could alter historical patterns. This is not, by the way, just an abstract question. It has very practical strategic implications for how the world outside the region handles the remainder of this period of change.
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Wednesday, February 16, 2011 - 4:55 PM

While it is too early to assess the long-term outcomes of the uprising in Egypt, there are nonetheless a number of important conclusions to which we can reasonably come.
First, something profound has changed. It did not change because of the uprising in Tahrir Square. It changed and the uprising was the result; the power has shifted in the region. We have passed a generational and technological tipping point. While the dinosaurs cling to the levers of power in virtually every country in the greater Middle East, the under 30 majority is now the great force to be reckoned with. While the establishment has done almost everything conceivable to keep them down from denying them education to curtailing the spread of information technologies to gutting the economies, nonetheless, new information sources and technologies and ways of connecting and collaborating seeped in to these societies through every one of the cracks spreading across the Ozymandian edifices of the elite.
These changes are irreversible. They are seen in the cell phones that even the poorest carry with them, in the broadcasts of Al Jazeera, in the burgeoning Twitter feeds, the apps young Arabs create to provide work-arounds every time a government tries to curtail Internet access, and even in the technological use of some of the region's worst players.
These changes have remade the social and political fabric of the region. What they have yet to do is what they have done everywhere else in the world and that is to fuel economic change.
That is the second inescapable conclusion we need to consider. The great challenges before this under-30 majority are economic, they are about opportunity. They are not about Israel or battles between Shiites and Sunnis or tribal divisions. Those problems still fester, but the unifying challenge for this generation is even more basic: They need jobs. They crave opportunity. And the failure of their leaders to provide them with these basic sources of sustenance and dignity is what has fueled the revolutions of 2011.
A corollary to this conclusion is that we in the United States have been sending the wrong people with the wrong approaches to solve the wrong problems in this region for decades. The problems of this region will not be solved by negotiators or generals. They require investors and entrepreneurs and educators. To the extent that we can contribute, we must do so by supporting the creation of economic opportunity. It is a massive undertaking but it is the only true peacemaker.
A third conclusion is related to the second, however. The role for the U.S. government in all this is very, very limited. We would do well to redirect what aid we provide to address this core challenge of creating jobs for the under-30s. We would do well to put our best economic minds in charge, perhaps even appointing a special economic envoy of real stature. But the only people who can ultimately solve this problem are in the Middle East. In fact, in the hierarchy of those who can help, if the people of the Middle East are first and by far foremost, it is the people of Europe, not the United States who must be second. They are the natural economic neighbors of the region and they must answer the question whether they want those under-30s employed in the Middle East or seeking employment in Europe. After the Europeans, it may even be the Chinese or Indians and others dependent on oil in the region and closer to its problems who should take more prominent roles in helping to solve the problem than the United States, which is a lightening rod and has problems of our own at home.
A fourth conclusion is that the hardest part is clearly still ahead of us. Egypt must make the transition to democracy and that means the military must really step aside after six months. Friends of mine who have met with them believe they understand the implications of the political earthquake that has taken place during the past month and that they will do so. But there are dinosaurs among their leaders so it is by no means a sure thing. Even beyond establishing a democracy is actually keeping one, and beyond that is addressing successfully the economic challenges alluded to above. Further, there are the problems of all the other countries of the region. They will be difficult to handle but we in the United States need to be confident enough in our core beliefs to let them work them out among themselves. There will be fights and setbacks and people we don't like will periodically gain the upper hand. But give me a duel between two guys armed with the Internet, Facebook, and Twitter feeds and let one offer the people the 11th Century and another offer the 21th and I know who I will bet on.
Finally, my fifth conclusion is that of all the big challenges ahead for U.S. foreign policy associated with this period of upheaval, the greatest by far lies with Israel and the Palestinians. Personally, I am not sure why the Palestinians have not yet unilaterally declared independence. The world would surely support them. But imagine what would happen if, perhaps on the road to such a declaration perhaps following it, a hundred thousand Palestinians took to the streets peacefully demanding real self-determination. With memories of Tahrir Square fresh in the minds of the world, how could the Israelis respond as they might have in the past? On what side of history would they appear to be as President Obama might put it? And in that vein, on what side of that history would President Obama and the United States want to be?
Until now, the fact that Israel was the region's only democracy was its "get out of jail free" card. It was used to excuse ... or attempt to excuse ... a multitude of sins. For this reason, no Arab military offensive could be as effective in undermining Israel's strategic advantages as real democracy taking root elsewhere in the region. The Netanyahu administration would be flummoxed if people power came to the West Bank and Gaza. They would be cast involuntarily with the dinosaurs. They would have no pages in their playbook indicating how to handle this. They would have very few good choices.
Actually, they would have only one. They would have to get out of the way. They would have to do what Mubarak did. They would have to step within the 1967 borders and let the Palestinians begin the job of building Palestine. And they would have to hope that the United States, Europe, and the rest of the world helped the Palestinians do it because once that happens, it will be of the utmost importance for Israel that its new neighbor produce real opportunity for its people ... because we have seen the alternative and it, for this generation who have both nothing and nothing to lose will not be contained by the tactics or the rhetoric of the past.
Chris Hondros/Getty Images
Thursday, July 30, 2009 - 4:49 PM

I'm not sure what bugs me more-that Congressman Eric Cantor's Washington Post op-ed today "Obama's 32 Czars" plagiarizes a piece I wrote months ago or that it was a bozo like Cantor who felt compelled to plagiarize me.
No. I know. It's the latter.
OK, I'll admit it, whenever I see an article that picks up on something that I've written here days, weeks, or months before, I glow with a kind of smug self-satisfaction that would be odious in anyone else. (The smugness of others is repellant. One's own smugness is just like a warm hug that we deserved but never got.) For example, this week's New York Times ran an op-ed discussing deteriorating Israeli attitudes toward Barack Obama and citing a June Jerusalem Post poll, I was quietly pleased that I got there almost two weeks before. It happens every so often. It makes up for the ridiculously low stipends ... it's more like a transit allowance or beer money actually ... that FP pays its bloggers.
But Cantor's piece crossed a line. Not only did he rehash an idea that was first broached in my April 16th post "It's official: Obama creates more czars than the Romanovs" but he did something worse: he stole the punch line. Lift an idea from one of my pieces and I feel influential. Zei gesund, I say, which is Yiddish for "It's OK, I know that in the policy community imitation is often the sincerest form of thinking." But snatch a joke and you've crossed a line.
Now if my post was only on some backwater Web site, I'd just write it up to a misunderstanding. But first of all, FP is no backwater site. Why just yesterday a guy in an elevator mentioned it to me ... and ... and um, and then there's my mother, who every few days sends an email saying "nice blog...but stop beating up on that nice Joe Biden..." But more importantly, the "More czars than the Romanovs" piece got picked up widely across the web and even led to an appearance by yours truly on the Fox Television -- which is known to be the main intellectual teat at which Eric Cantor suckles.
So he … or rather the 22-year-old staffer who actually wrote the piece … should have known better. I mean yes, in my post which is now apparently so classic that it has passed out of copyright protection, I said that Obama had "passed the Romanov dynasty in the production of czars" and Cantor built his entire piece around the line "the administration has more czars than imperial Russia." While this is not a verbatim lift, the DNA is mine. I'm the father. And while Cantor may use the "sampling" defense that was pioneered by his intellectual predecessor Vanilla Ice during his precedent-setting "Ice, Ice Baby" controversy, let's call a spade a fucking shovel here folks. Dude stole my wry worldview.
Worse still, Cantor stole the idea and then misinterpreted it. He used the now practically immortal concept ... which will be soon be known in literature as the Romanov gambit or better, the Rothkopf gambit, which would be a nice twist given how the Romanov's treated my shtetl-dwelling relatives a few decades back ... to argue that by having so many czars, Obama was pre-empting the power of Congress. While given their current shenanigans the term "power of Congress" seems destined to join the long list of Washington oxymorons (also covered here in an earlier blog posting... but when I cite myself it's not plagiarism, it's just narcissism), Cantor fails to recognize that having lots of czars actually diminishes the power of Obama. It makes it hard to get things done and it inevitably creates turf wars between officials who once had the mandate to do what the czars are supposed to and the czars themselves. Sometimes it even creates jealousy between czars who seek greater territory.
Cantor argues that putting authority in the hands of people who aren't vetted by Congress undercuts vital checks and balances. First, there is the small fact that there are roughly 4,000 political appointees in the executive branch and "only" 1,100 of these require Senate approval. Second, there is the fact that this number of 1,100 would almost certainly be seen by the framers of the Constitution as grotesquely bloated and evidence of a congressional power grab. Third, many of the most influential positions in the U.S. government do not require congressional approval (the national security advisor and the head of the National Economic Council come to mind but there are scores of other such vital positions) precisely because the chief executive is entitled to some prerogative in choosing his advisors. And finally, look how screwed up the congressional approval process is. As noted earlier this week in my post on Senator Grassley, the right individual senators have arrogated to block approval of presidential nominees is regularly abused for wholly self-serving, shallow, special-interest driven (which is to say, typical for Congress) reasons.
Given that he is this wrong on so many levels, you have to ask where does Cantor's sense of entitlement to appropriate my joke come from? Well, first of course, if you spent all your time standing next to John Boehner, you'd feel pretty special too. (Listen to Boehner. He makes George W. Bush sound like Blaise Pascal by comparison.) But at a more basic level, appropriating ... recklessly, without regard for right or consequence ... is what members of Congress do. And when they don't have the resources they need, their natural impulse is to borrow them.
So, perhaps he can't help himself. As a result, I forgive you Eric Cantor. If you need more ideas, feel free to graze here. In fact, I encourage it. It'll almost certainly contribute to your political evolution and help you fulfill your destiny to be the bottom half of the Romney for president ticket in 2012. But please, give credit where it's due ... and even if you can't do that, try to get your analysis right. Plagiarism is one thing ... but making me feel partially responsible for your tortured misinterpretations of the facts is just too much to bear.
Update: Glenn Thrush of Politico has followed up on this story. He says he has found evidence that David Brooks said something about Obama and czars and Russia on the Charlie Rose Show a couple of months before my FP post on the subject. In my defense, I don't watch Charlie Rose because a.) I have no trouble falling asleep and don't require outside assistance and b.) I prefer Chelsea Handler.
Also, there is a big distinction between Brooks comment and mine because while he said "there are more czars than in the history of Russia", this was just a wild assertion. And at the time he made it was not actually true. I counted. My piece was based on a careful review of Romanov family tree. In fact, I limited myself to Romanovs. So while he made a colorful statement, I was reporting real (or at least amusingly contrived) news: the Obama administration had actually moved into the lead. And while this is no place to debate whether or not to include Grand Princes of Moscow or the Rurik Dynasty in our list, there is a bigger point: Cantor lifted the line. And I at least deserve a thank-you note. And if he wants to send one to David Brooks too, that's fine with me.
Update No. 2:
Glenn Thrush, doing some really good leg work for Politico, has discovered that prior even to my article noting the appointment that nudged Obama into the lead in the czarist league tables over the Romanovs … and prior to David Brooks apparently even earlier observation that Obama had more czars than Russia…other people had also made the connection between Russia and czars. In fact, rather improbably, he has someone making the observation even prior to Obama taking office as president which, I would argue, undermines the point somewhat. In fact, the article he is citing was from the Winter Palace Daily Dictat and is dated 1915. In it, a reporter with the unlikely name of Thrushovsky wrote, "You hear a lot of whining these days about Nicholas II this and Alexandra that and how little Anastasia beat up a serf on her elementary school playground. There's all this talk about how we have had so many czars and that's the root of the current blini shortage. Well, it’s very easy for me to imagine a time when even in America they will appoint czars to take care of every little problem in that backwards wasteland and they'll end up with more than us and we’ll look back on all our wonderful Faberge eggs and infrequent yet colorful pogroms and say, 'those were the days.'"
I'm unable to read the original Russian so I can't vouch for the authenticity of the quote. But I get the point. I was not the first person to make the connection between czars and Russia. However, I was the person to officially note the moment Obama moved ahead of the Romanovs. (No hyperbole for me, boys and girls. Not ever. I'm the least hyperbolic man America has ever seen.) And secondly, while I cling to that slim distinction to maintain my contribution to this important … if apparently beaten to death … metaphor, I think it can safely be said that Eric Cantor is way at the end of the line. And, as was the more important point of my playful little diatribe yesterday, Cantor came to all the wrong conclusions about the problems caused by Obama's czarism. (Although one has to note his press secretary, commenting on this major issue in Politico, handled it with considerable grace and humor … as did Thrush.) So I say zei gesund to all of them.
Mark Wilson/Getty Images
Monday, June 22, 2009 - 9:54 PM

Too much voting, not enough free press. As we have seen in Iran, that's the problem bedeviling many would-be democracies worldwide. The people vote with their ballots, the governments vote when the tallies are taking place or later in the streets, and throughout the open flow of information is impeded or neglected as a priority. It's also the problem with many of the democracy promotion programs that have been offered up by the United States and the international community during the recent past. It's the formula for what Fareed Zakaria has dubbed "illiberal democracy" and for what citizens in ill-served countries know is sham.
From Russia to China to Venezuela, you have voting and claims that some form of democracy is operating. But in each case, as in Iran, such claims are undercut by the reality that free speech is being quashed. In just the past few days alone we have seen stories of the Chinese government's regulations requiring that computers sold in that country contain software enabling the government to censor Internet access. The alleged target is pornography but the software also enables the government to block access to sites they deem politically objectionable. Also, today's Wall Street Journal contained a story talking about the sophistication of the Iranian government when it comes to the tools it uses to control Internet access in that country. And we have seen that they are equally comfortable with the blunt instruments of press suppression from expelling journalists to floating bogus stories to beating the opposition to death.
The U.S. State Department made a demarche to the Chinese protesting the censorship. That's an encouraging and important step. But we need to go further. Not only do governments need to ratchet up their emphasis on the centrality of a free press to any democracy -- and take a stronger stand against those who pretend at representative government -- they also need to find a better way to collaborate with and if necessary regulate or impede those companies who provide Internet and other media censors with the technologies and tools they need to do their jobs. It is absolutely appalling that supposedly "enlightened" companies like Google trumpet their saintly behavior on the environment and other PC issues and then work behind the scenes to enable censorship and thus the evisceration of the fundamental human right to access to the truth about their lives.
Outreach and achieving common standards and an agreement to adhere to them would be a good first step. But because ultimately, some businesses will need stronger disincentives not to do business with government censors, we should reflect the centrality of a free press in programs that deny U.S. government contracts to technology, software or consulting companies that enable such suppression. In fact, better still would be an agreement among all democracies to do so. We can start with Europe and NATO and work out from there. Perhaps other forms of international agreements may also be possible. Certainly, we should attempt to advance the idea of the Internet as a free global commons. For those with concerns about pornography, let families rather than governments wield the tools to make those value judgments about content.
What is clear is that while modern technologies make it much harder for authoritarian regimes control access to information as they once did, they also provide new tools which can corrode and choke off important avenues of expression and information flows. With its diplomatic challenge to China, the Obama administration has indicated a willingness to grapple with this problem. But they and all governments who are supposedly committed to free societies can go much further.
For over two centuries we have believed that the legitimacy of governments derived from the consent of the governed. But, of course, that famous concept does not go far enough. The legitimacy can only be derived from informed consent. Anything less is less than true democracy.
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David Rothkopf is the CEO and Editor-at-Large of Foreign Policy. His new book, "Power, Inc.: The Epic Rivalry Between Big Business and Government and the Reckoning that Lies Ahead" is due out from Farrar, Straus & Giroux on March 1.
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