Afghanistan

Nu is a great Yiddish word that doesn't actually mean anything at all and therefore can mean almost anything you want it to mean. Even if I weren't Jewish, as a writer I would therefore love the word. It offers so much freedom without any of the limitations that actual definitions impose. In this respect it is kind of like modern art. 

Most of the time that I hear it used in conversation it means "so?" This can be what one on-line dictionary describes as the Yiddish equivalent of "whassup?" Or it can be more penetrating, not just a question about what's going on but one about what it all means, something covering all the territory between "huh?" and "WTF?"

Consequently, for most inquiring minds, it can play an absolutely key role, especially for those minds trying to make sense of what's going on in the world. Because the problem with most so-called journalistic coverage of what's happening on the international stage is that it covers the news without actually addressing the nus.

Fortunately however, you have me. At least once a week anyway, while I am writing my book. (Which you could pre-order just like you did Sarah Palin's book if a.) My book had a title and b.) You had actually ordered Sarah Palin's book which I am absolutely certain you did not. Because if you were so inclined I am sure I would have lost you up there at the top somewhere between the word "Yiddish" and the word "whassup?")

This week was particularly rich with nus. And therefore, I thought I would take a moment or two and review some of them with you. You know, to help you grok it all.

So, here goes:

• You've got to admire Eric Holder's intentions with regard to bringing Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to trial in New York City. We are a nation of laws and our system of laws ought to be up to any test, even one this onerous. Personally, I believe it is. That said, this decision could haunt not just Holder but the country. If defense attorneys argue, as they will, that Mohammed was tortured repeatedly, it could create a profound moral and legal conundrum. Because by some definitions (including my own) he actually was tortured. And if it is concluded that this constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of U.S. constitutional precepts and international law, how will a judge handle it? How will the nation handle it? What do we value more, the law or justice? This is troubling territory and I believe it is politically treacherous ... but it is an opportunity to demonstrate to the world that we are once again committed to holding ourselves accountable to the highest standards in all circumstances. Were we to do this, for all his wrong-doing, Mohammed will be providing the United States with an opportunity of incalculable value.
• When we look back on this past week, there will be a temptation to say it's the week that Barack Obama's Afghan policy deliberations jumped the shark. The fact that he had what was billed as a final discussion regarding four policy options that then produced his apparent rejection of the four and his call for a new set of ideas based on new parameters is being described as proof that his national security decision-making process is flawed. The fact that shortly afterwards two cables from the U.S. envoy in Kabul were leaked indicating his discomfort with sending in more troops so long as the Afghan government remains so unreliable didn't help the picture. But let's go beneath the surface a little...
• Ok, the policy process is clearly flawed. But while we focus on what's broken now, it seems indisputable that the bigger breakdown was actually earlier this year when the administration originally defined its Afghan goals. While the process may be moving too slowly, fitfully and indecisively now, the greater problem is it moved too quickly with too little analysis back then. The Spring's policy was too based on campaign rhetoric and not sufficiently based on a careful assessment of the situation on the ground. It led McChrystal to his conclusions.  It put them in the box they are in now. 
• The reality is that the outcome of Wednesday's meeting was actually the best one we could hope for. Because the president saw the options he had as flawed and shifted the emphasis...underscored later by press secretary Robert Gibbs ... to the exit strategy. He moved the discussion from "what we should do in Afghanistan" to where it should be: "what we can do in Afghanistan." And the only goal we can unquestionably meet is leaving. Think about it: to succeed in transforming the political situation on the ground we would need a commitment of many years, tens of thousands of more troops, tens of billions more dollars, a strong and cooperative ally in Kabul, committed international partners and an enemy that wasn't willing to wait us out. Of those conditions, none are likely to be met.  So figuring out how to exit while remaining positioned to deal with acute regional threats makes great sense. 
• Which brings us to Washington's favorite parlor game of the week: figuring out who leaked the Eikenberry cables. The smart money is on the White House which sees these memos (which conveniently come from an ambassador who is a former on-the-ground commander in Afghanistan) as a way to justify its shift to new goals and to offset the orchestrated leaks from the McChrystal side. For those of you who bought in to the notion of the unprecedented discipline of the Obama team, sorry for the rude awakening.  While the focus should be on the ground war, Washington is once again engaged in a war of leaks.  This is not a weaknesses of the Obama Administration per se...it is more a fact of life given the culture of Washington.
• On other fronts, the White House responded to 10.2 percent unemployment by calling for a jobs summit in December. This is one of the classic responses of a government that doesn't yet have a substantive plan for what to do. It is troubling that another such classic response is to appoint a czar. In both cases the focus is on creating the illusion of action.  Even the president seemed to recognize this when he tried to temper expectations for outcomes from the summit he announced.
• The third in the great trinity of kabuki policy outcomes is to follow a meeting with the call for another meeting. According to recent statements from Secretary of State Clinton and Climate Negotiator Todd Stern, this seems to be where we are headed with the global climate talks despite their tireless efforts to the contrary. We'll try to hammer out something as a temporary face-saver for Copenhagen and then we'll resume doing what we're doing now ... trying to bridge the gap between the developed and the developing world with regard to setting emissions targets and figuring out who is going to pay for fixing what's broke.
• On that front, read the provocative piece in Rolling Stone by Naomi Klein about the issue of "climate debt." Here's my partial solution. The developed world really does have to foot a goodly part of the bill for changes in the developing world related to climate...since we created the problem they did not. We also have limited resources and need to create jobs. Why don't countries like the United States create Green Trade Banks that provide cheap, long-term financing for green energy and climate related projects in the developing world ... provided that the projects involve content from the United States. We generate jobs. They get the capital and the technology we need.
• Think the Chinese are going to lag the U.S. on adapting to climate? See this article on a new study from the government support CCICED arguing that China should cut its emissions 4 to 5 percent per year from now through 2050.
• While college football still can't get its act together for a playoff system to pick a national champion...even with President Obama's strong endorsement of a change...we here at FP hear what the people want. That's why I will soon unveil the brackets for the year 2009 Chutzpah Bowl, pairing off category champions to see who deserves the title of world chutzpah champion. Among the contenders this week: Lloyd Blankfein for his "doing God's work" comment, Eliot Spitzer for going to Harvard this week to give a speech on ethics, Harvard for producing graduates like Eliot Spitzer and then hosting a conference on ethics, and CNN's lost but unlamented Lou Dobbs ... another Harvard grad ... for his years of Mexican-bashing despite the well-known fact that his wife is Mexican-American.  Unlike Lou, we're not xenophobic though so don't worry, the complete brackets will include plenty of non-American contenders. 
• Finally, it tells you everything you need to know about American television that the guy Comcast is reportedly picking to head up NBC/Universal should its acquisition of the media company from GE go through is none other than Jeff Zucker, whose most recent stroke of genius was moving Jay Leno to prime time, a brainstorm that will rank right up with there with "New Coke" among the most bone-headed moves in American business history. 

Well, that's all the insight I can muster this week. Must get back to my book. If only I could figure out as Sarah Palin did how to sell hundreds of thousands of books to an audience primarily comprised of people who can't or won't read. It would take so much pressure off me...

NICHOLAS KAMM/AFP/Getty Images

For all the debate of Afghanistan and troop levels and strategies and the views of Generals McChrystal and Petraeus, there are two vital facts that have been ignored. First, we are missing the one general who is probably most essential to our ability to ultimately achieve our goals in Afghanistan (including leaving) and we are ignoring the army that will not only be most useful to that general, but also the army that happens to be the largest in both of our Middle Eastern theaters of war.

More troubling still is that the general could have and should have been appointed by the president and approved by the Congress many months ago, but the position has been allowed to remain open throughout a critical period. And the army is more or less entirely within the control of the U.S. government and yet we lack the proper mechanisms to command or control it.

Whether our goal in Afghanistan is counterinsurgency or counterterrorism, whether we are "all in" or "all out" (or something in between), whether we are there for the long haul or the short term, there are nonetheless a few things all can agree upon. We need a stronger central government in Kabul and to become stronger the government will need to better provide services, strengthen existing institutions and win the support of the Afghan people. Infrastructure and economic growth will be key elements of this success formula. As it happens, they are also key elements of the counterinsurgency strategy argued for by General McChrystal as they are essential to both winning hearts and minds and to sending a message that the option we support has more to offer each individual Afghan than do the options offered by the Taliban or by the war lords who favor the kind of perpetual tribalism that has left the country vulnerable and dissolute for centuries. In addition, without creating the conditions conducive to a strong Afghan government, we will have no one capable of Afghanizing ... which is to say, we can't leave without handing the baton to someone else.

Central to our ability to achieve these goals are the people in the U.S. government who are specifically organized to handle post-crisis intervention and reconstruction functions. Unfortunately, despite our regular need for such capabilities, we don't actually have a department or agency that is specifically built and sufficiently supported to achieve these goals. This despite the fact that such interventions have been among the most regular and crucial functions of the U.S. government for decades. Hopefully, Secretary Clinton's QDDR process will produce some recommendations to remedy this.

In the meantime, the next best thing we have is the U.S. Agency for International Development, a worthy but inefficient and often lumbering entity. Nonetheless, it is going to play a critical role in what we do in Afghanistan ... or it can and should play such a role. It also has related and vital roles to play in Pakistan, Iraq and other regions where state failure or state weakening create security as well as humanitarian risks. 

These are the things it has. What it doesn't have is a leader. It is now almost November and the new administration has failed to arrive at a candidate for the job everyone can agree on and who can pass the muster of the absurd vetting processes that now dog would-be senior officials and impede this government's ability to function. We came close a while back but the candidate withdrew his name. There is behind the scenes scuffling over this one, partially because there is a sense the agency needs to change and there is a division of opinion as to whether it should be more independent or more closely integrated into the State Department. (The correct answer is "b." The work of A.I.D. is a critical component of American statecraft and the levers of its function need to be controlled by America's chief diplomat.)

Whenever this missing general is brought on board however -- and one can only hope that it is very, very soon -- he or she is going to have to cope with another reality that is not fully understood by most Americans and which is vital to the function of the U.S. government and to our success or failure in Iraq and Afghanistan. And that is how we get to the phantom army I mentioned earlier.

That army represents the majority of people currently on the ground in those two countries on behalf of the U.S. government and is therefore the largest single force on the ground in our Middle Eastern theaters. It is the army of contractors that have become the Hamburger Helper of American military and diplomatic initiatives in our two current wars. 

One person who does understand this evolving reality is Middlebury College Professor Allison Stanger, author of One Nation, Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy. The book, now out from the Yale University Press, is a must read for anyone interested in how foreign policy really works in the 21st Century. And it reveals a reality that is radically different from what many expect. Stanger calls Iraq and Afghanistan America's first two "contractor wars" because so much of the work done in each country is being done by cadres of workers reporting not to the U.S. government but to the lowest bidder. She points that the lion's share of AID's budget actually goes to contractors -- that in effect, AID is essentially a contracting agency.

Stanger sees benefits to this approach -- getting the right people for the job, creating efficiencies -- and she sees weaknesses -- Blackwater, anyone? But the vital message of the book is that the system has undergone a massive change but our views of it and the strategies and tactics we apply have not. Nothing makes this point more clearly than the fact that the largest army on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan does not actually report up the chain of command ... or, for that matter, any coherent chain of command. Single capable individuals, like Richard Holbrooke, help mitigate this with energetic management of non-military operations ... but the Holbrookes of this world are few and far between and throwing czars at problems is no way to provide lasting solutions.

To achieve whatever success is possible in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and ultimately the Palestinian Territories and elsewhere is going to require that we address these two problems. First, find that missing general. Then, let's get down to the business of understanding what business we are really in ... and create the strategies and structures we need to make the most of what we've got.

DAVID FURST/AFP/Getty Images

Like many people in the foreign policy community, I've been spending an inordinate amount of time grappling with the issues associated with Afghanistan. I have been reading newspaper reports, listening to interviews and testimony, weighing the assessments of experts. It is a tiny microcosm of the process that is taking place within the highest levels of the U.S. government right now with a couple differences. First, I don't have access to classified reports (although for the most part my experience has taught me to approach these with great caution.) Second, I don't have to worry about the politics of the decision I reach -- internal or external. And third, and most importantly, my opinion really doesn't matter. I'm up here in the cheap seats -- the blogosphere being the "noisebleed section" of the political arena -- and we all know that a stadium full of people shouting their opinions just sounds like cheering or booing and isn't much more nuanced than that.

Still, as with any discussions concerning whether or not and how to conduct a war, this is a debate that has a strong sense of urgency about it. It also involves a host of really interesting questions about what our real objectives are, about whether this is a counter-insurgency or a counter-terrorism operation, about how victory can be measured, about who our real allies and enemies are, about how much cost we are willing to bear, about what the role for NATO should be, about how to deal with a corrupt, dysfunctional partner in Kabul, even about more fundamental issues such as how do we ultimately keep ourselves safe from terror, whether we can ever be successful at nation-building, and whether there is even truly a nation to build in a country like Afghanistan that is really (much as Iraq is) a confection of the minds of British imperialists that overlooks ancient tribal realities.

To those who say that the Obama administration should not be reconsidering a strategy it announced only last spring, my reaction is that's nonsense. We should constantly be reviewing our strategy based on the changing situation on the ground and the ebb and flow of other external priorities and factors. To those who say that the process has gone on too long, I also say, that's ridiculous given the human stakes involved.

But I am among the group concerned that the final decision may be tainted by factors that should not come into play when forging a strategy. One factor is campaign rhetoric: The president should not be locked into a course of action because of what he said as a candidate. Another factor is momentum: It is hard to reverse any enterprise as massive as this operation in Afghanistan. Another factor is fear of perceptions of an internal rift: I am on the record as feeling that General McChrystal went too far in publicly arguing his case and I feel the President should not be cowed into nudging the needle one jot in the direction of escalation of our involvement because he is unsettled by the political consequences of subordinates who didn't get their way. I also fear the impulse some have to seek an answer that will make everyone happy. In this case, it's just not there.

But the more I grapple with this problem in my own head, the more I feel like we are collectively falling victim to a fatal heuristic trap. After 9/11 nothing was more important that getting the terrorists that committed the act or making America safe from future attacks. This turned Bush as it would have turned any president toward Afghanistan. When he made his weird wrong turn toward Iraq, it led some among his opponents to argue even more vigorously that Afghanistan should have remained our top priority. This had two advantages: It immunized them from critiques they were "soft on terror" or "weak" and it was supported by a certain logic. Barack Obama and most Democrats were among this group.

When Obama came into office therefore, his mandate was to switch from Iraq to Afghanistan and we began to ramp up our involvement there. It became "his" war. It was the "war of necessity." The more involved we got there, the more "important" the debate about our strategy there became. The issue grew to the point that it is common to see reference to Obama's decision on whether or not to increase our troop presence there as the most important foreign policy decision he will make this year.

It might be. But that is different from saying that Afghanistan is actually important itself and different from saying it is really important to the interests of the United States. In fact, the reality is that there are few measures indeed by which it can be honestly argued that Afghanistan warrants the attention it is getting or the resources we are devoting to it.

National Security Advisor Jim Jones was quoted as saying there may be only 100 Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The terror threat has moved elsewhere. Almost every country in Afghanistan's immediate neighborhood can be argued to pose a bigger terrorist threat. It can be argued that we don't want the Taliban to come back into power in Afghanistan. First, of all, that our departure would produce their return is by no means a certainty and it is a view shared by many in Afghanistan. Next, again, they are actively sponsored by elements in Pakistan and their fate is really driven from there.

For sure the biggest security threat in the region is not Afghanistan but Pakistan, a country careening toward the possibility of being divided by civil conflict. The core of the threat is Pakistan's nuclear arsenals and anyone tells you the U.S. knows where the weapons are and is confident in their security is just outright lying to you. Pakistan is the home to terror. Pakistan is the 170 million person nation on the verge of chaos. Pakistan is the nuclear threat. Afghanistan is only relevant relative to Pakistan.

Does that make Afghanistan important? Only if we can use it as a base from which we can contain the threats posed from within Pakistan. But the reality is given the terrain in the mountains on the border, we have spent eight years proving that we can't really do that. And our friends in Kabul are running such a bogus government that it is unlikely they will prove to be a useful aid in such matters anytime in the foreseeable future. Thus, if Afghanistan is only relevant as far as it can help deal with threats in Pakistan and it can't really help very much with those, it is actually not that important.

What's the conclusion? View all our actions in Afghanistan relative to our real interests in the region, which are for the most part in Pakistan. To the extent we can position ourselves in Afghanistan in ways supporting cross-border activities into Pakistan and that gives a rapid deployment capability should the worst happen there, fine. Give them aid. Encourage them to stabilize. But recognize that we shouldn't have an extended military presence in a place that is not actually that important to us -- especially if most experts think our likelihood of success with regard to military objectives in the country is in the slim to none range.

As periodically happens in American life, we are engaged in a furious debate about the wrong issue ... and our failure to recognize this is certain to have negative implications for our ability to deal with what should be our real priorities.

MICHAEL KAPPELER/AFP

Secretary of State Clinton went to Russia to discuss the possibility of putting sanctions on Iran. The Russians pushed back hard and publicly. The State Department weakly responded that they hadn't come to Moscow looking for anything in the first place.

The Iranians taunt us with their open nuclear ambitions and we don't have much to credibly offer in the way of sanctions (see above) and so we find ourselves grasping at straws in terms of an international dialogue with them. We are forced to take proven liars at their word because there is no realistic Plan B.

The North Koreans do as the Iranians do. They taunt knowing there will be no meaningful retaliation, especially if they dangle the possibility of progress with negotiations even as they flaunt the spirit of those negotiations.

Our ally in Afghanistan bald-facedly steals an election because he knows he has us over a barrel, believing we need him more than he needs us and that in any event, we won't punish him for his indiscretions. Our reaction is grumbling and strong language and planning for him to remain in his misappropriated office.

On Afghan policy there is an all-in, all-out debate and it increasingly looks like the president will split the difference between both sides. David Ignatius writes in today's Washington Post:

Obama's deliberative pace is either heartening or maddening, depending on your perspective. Personally, I think he's wise to take his time on an issue in which it's so hard to know the right answer. But I worry that the White House approach will soften the edges so much that the policy itself will be fuzzy and doomed to failure.

On the Hill, again the difference is split on health care and the Baucus plan backed by the administration doesn't meaningfully address the core concerns that triggered the debate about health care reform in the first place -- issues like universal coverage or the need to substantially reduce health care spending or the need to get the books to balance.

During the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh, at a lunch as the meeting drew to a close, the Chinese walked in and demanded that a paragraph in the final statement on climate change be cut. Everyone in the room was gobsmacked and stopped eating while the Chinese representative blithely consumed his lunch. One of those present asked, "Where were the Americans? Why was there no pushback? The Europeans were furious."

Peter Feaver wrote for FP an article chiding Hillary Clinton for not having taken a bold stance, making an issue her own thus far. Quite apart from the fact that I think his analysis was faulty, the reality is that the tough stances come from above, the president is the one who draws the lines in the sand. As far as decisive administration's policies are concerned, the title of her book on the subject might read, It Takes a President.

Right now, even his strongest supporters -- and I count myself among them -- are worried that much as Abe Lincoln was the great rail splitter, Barack Obama may become known as the great difference splitter. A former senior official, active on the president's campaign sat in my office just yesterday worrying aloud about whether this is just learning curve behavior or whether we are drifting toward Jimmy II. There is a place for deliberation and compromise in the quivers of wise leaders, he argued, but there is also a need to be decisive and sometimes to push to fulfill a vision or defend an ideal or an interest.

There are real merits to being the no-drama Obama of campaign fame. But in a world in which the Chinese or the Iranians or the North Koreans or Republicans or wings of the Democratic Party are inclined to push as hard as they can until they meet real resistance, it's fast coming time for the president to show he is willing to lose some friends and even some battles to defend his principles or the national interest. It can be a fist of steel in a velvet glove, resolve born of reflection, but there are a lot of supporters of Obama worry that he is a man who sending a message that there are no consequences for crossing him. On Afghanistan, on health care reconciliation, on his upcoming trip to China, on climate, there are chances looming for him to show that he knows what he wants and that he is willing to fight for it. I'm hopeful this is the moment he really will start to come into his own as president.

It was recently reported that Obama's favorite phrase is "Let me be clear." I think the response to that of his concerned supporters would be, "Please do." It's the path that is most likely to have them once again singing, "Mild thing, I think I love you."

JEWEL SAMAD/AFP/Getty Images

Foreign policy is a fast-paced business. Despite the fact that at least someone in the Obama Administration is actually celebrating the art of indecision, you can save the world with snap judgments if you know what you're doing.  I know what I'm doing. 

To demonstrate I will now solve some of the biggest foreign policy problems confronting some of the world's most important newsmakers in a matter of just a few seconds each. (I will also solve a few lower-grade domestic problems as well.) If you are an important figure on the international stage, just look for your name below. Next to it will be the advice you need in a couple of quick sentences. If you are not a world leader but know one, please feel free to forward this to them.

To Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan of the Pakistani Muslim League: If you don't like the provisions of the U.S. aid package, keep it to yourself. Your complaints are precisely how we know the deal has been constructed properly. (Hint: Turn back the Americans who are offering aid and you'll end up with those who want to make all future deliveries by drone.)

To President Barack Obama: If you think that George's war (that'd be Iraq) is likely to look better than yours (Afghanistan) in five years -- and that'd be my bet right now -- then you really do need to listen to the people calling for a change in strategy.

To Manuel Zelaya: Fair or not, your five minutes are just about up...unless you choose to start dating Kate Gosselin. (And if that is Plan B, I have to say, I'd stay locked in the basement of the Brazilian Embassy, too.)

To Kim Jong-Il: You tell Wen Jiabao you want one-on-one talks with the United States to establish peaceful ties as a prelude to returning to the nuclear arms negotiating table? No problem. Two steps: First, ask for them. Second, realize Michael Jackson wrote "The Man(iac) in the Mirror" for you. As in the "how many shrinks does it take to change a lightbulb?" joke, the punchline is that it's you who've really got to want to change.

To Jon Corzine: You don't get re-elected governor of New Jersey by attacking fat people. I have a two word clue for you on this front: Tony Soprano.

To Silvio Berlusconi:  Are you the one that's tanned now or is that just a red face? The ruling by the Italian Supreme Court stripping you of immunity from prosecution just because you are Prime Minister certainly seems likely to put a hitch in your mambo Italiano. With three trials going on that involve you or your holdings, you might want to start planning your post government career. (I know your wife has some interesting ideas for what to do with you ... or parts of you.)

To Donald Tusk: As Poland's Prime Minister dealing with a corruption scandal, you have learned some important truths: gambling always produces losers (in your case, the three ministers who have been forced out of your government for corruption) and you can't beat the house (even if you try by suggesting you'll fire the anti-corruption official who blew the whistle on your cabinet) ... especially if the house is run by the two who stole that stole the moon and you don't fit in with their plans. 

To Robert Mugabe: You say you want better ties with the U.S.? Well, you're going to need a long rope... Kim Jong-Il has a better shot at restored relations with the United States ... by a lot. Frankly, so does Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Frankly, so too does Rufus T. Firefly. Dictator, purge thyself.

To David Letterman: Ok, so far there's no rumors of foreign affairs in this story. But my advice to you is: continue doing just what you're doing. The openness is working...on the ratings...and on what's left of your image.  Silvio, you randy slimebag you, pay attention. Old men apparently can screw around with younger women if they are charmingly self-deprecating about it, not political leaders and not you. 

To Mazen Abdul Jawad:  You may have been condemned to 1,000 lashes in Saudi Arabia for discussing your (kinda gross) sex life on a tv talk show.   Here in America (see above), the same thing would actually get you your own talk show.  Time to consider relocating...almost anyplace else.  And speaking of Saudi outrages...

To Mohammed S. Al Sabban: If, as head of the Saudi delegation to the global climate talks, you are actually as reported going around saying if measures are taken to reduce world dependency on oil that the planet should offer aid to Saudi Arabia ... then get used to the idea that you are going to replace the woman who buried her husband in a rented suit as the living embodiment of laughable chutzpah.

To David Axelrod: Stay out of camera shot in photos about major foreign policy decisions. You're the president's right hand guy. He needs you: You have the "mind-meld" thing going, offer invaluable advice and by all reports are actually a good guy. Which is why what neither the president nor you need are the uncharitable whispers that you are out-Roving Rove in terms of day-to-day influence over administration operations. (Oh and to Karl Rove, re: your WSJ article that the GOP is winning the health care debate: There's a reason you guys are out. Wrong again. See the CBO report. The Obama-Baucus bill is getting closer and closer to being a done deal.)

AFP/Getty Images

The one blog I read every week is Peter King's "Monday Morning Quarterback" at Sports Illustrated. King aficionados might recognize my weak (if unattributed) shout-outs to him which come in the form of not really worrying so much about the length of any post, covering a variety of subjects, and liberally blending in the pop culture references. They will also recognize that I am not in his league and that the subject about which he writes, football, is significantly more interesting than most of the subjects about which I write.

One of the things he does frequently is offer lists of rapid fire opinions which often come under the rubric of "Ten Things I Think I Think." Consider the following yet another tribute to him ... because that is a much nicer way of thinking of it than concluding I simply stole his title and format. 

1. Jim Jones is coming into his own. He was just what Obama needed this weekend: Solid, thoughtful, and immune to Republican taunts that this administration doesn't get the military.
2. Good as Jones was, frankly, I am surprised General McChrystal has gotten off so easy for his comments last week about why narrowing our objectives in Afghanistan wasn't a good idea. It was totally out of bounds and bordering on insubordination. He is trying to play political hardball with his Commander-in-Chief ... a game he is always going to lose. Jones put it to rest elegantly however, with his pointed comment that gracefully reminded everyone where McChrystal sits in the chain of command.
3. As good and skeptical as the administration seems to be about the advice they are getting on Afghanistan, we seem to be on the verge of once again allowing ourselves to be played on Iran's nuclear program. Teheran creates the illusion of dialogue and simulated openness ... but they are proven liars who have every incentive to have a long-process and with each passing day, less to ultimately play by international rules. (They are Lucy with the football. We are Charlie Brown. When will we learn?)
4. This kerfuffle about Chicago is nonsense. The president went and promoted his home city for a few hours. It's not like he was out of touch. It's not like he didn't use the time to achieve other things.  Imagine the press if he hadn't gone and the results were what they were. A non-story.
5. I am from New Jersey. I hate the Washington Redskins. I love that they are condemned to wander aimlessly through the Swamps of Snyder testing the limits of their own mediocrity. But their lousiness only makes it a greater insult to Native Americans that the team continues to cling to a name that is a repulsive relic, an ethnic slur that would not be tolerated if the group being insulted were more politically powerful. Enough. Change the name.
6. Rumor has it the administration is -- at the highest levels -- trying to figure out a way to get the Panama and Colombia trade deals done. That's good news. To the extent it is the only trade liberalization that gets done on Ron Kirk's watch, that would be a bad thing. Remember folks, these are measly little deals.  Do them...but let's not buy into some twisted logic that argues that if you do them it will excuse a raft of protectionist measures (Chinese tires, anyone?) as counterpoint in a "balanced" policy.
7. Speaking of balance: The problem with U.S. foreign policy is that more often than not the true Secretary of State of the United States is yesterday's newspaper. That's what determines what today's policy will be. We achieve balance in complex relationships through cyclical inconsistency. Slam China on tires ... tiptoe around them on Tibet ... hope that gives you some room to make nice with Taiwan on arms transfers. Too often the countervailing measures are out of whack in terms of real importance to us or to them. 
8. The Times has a piece today headlined "The G.O.P. Campaign Message in a Word: Jobs, Jobs, Jobs." While it might be argued that's three words, it's right on point. This is what campaign 2010 will be about, especially with growing certainty that the unemployment rate will pass 10 percent. But I worry we are missing a bigger problem: the jobless recovery. Who's to say the six million jobs we lost come back or come back fast enough to keep up with demand for work? Look at the auto industry: rapid shift of well known brands to China, India and Korea. New brands rising. Same story elsewhere. I think we need to prepare for a future that is actually rather different from the past.
9. The Pew Research Center releases a study today saying that most of coverage of the economic downturn focused on problems on Wall Street and government issues and that how average folks were hit got short shrift. Hope they didn't spend too much money on the study ... because as worthy as the intent may be and as important as the message is, we already knew that, right?
10. I can't tell whether the picture of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Mohammed El Baradei on the cover of today's Wall Street Journal struck me because it reminded me of Wallace Shawn and Andre the Giant in The Princess Bride or because I think it may end up being used as a model for the little plastic statuettes to be used on wedding cakes for gay men of a certain age, but it brought welcome absurdity to the front page of the Wall Street Journal (as opposed to the editorial page where it is usually found).

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I've got some real serious advice for my friends in the Obama administration: act quickly or the "dithering thing" is about to become this president's "vision thing."

For those of you who are too young to remember -- and I know this blog skews toward a younger, hipper crowd than the rest of FP's more staid, respectable, and credible offerings -- the "vision thing" became the brutal short-hand describing George H.W. Bush's supposed lack of vision. It was one of those terms that was so memorable that it slipped into those every day water cooler conversations and became an unshakable part of the conventional wisdom that helped make Bush 41 a one-term president.

We've seen the phenomenon many times before. Sometimes, the phrase is self-inflicted as was "vision thing" or "I am not a crook." Sometimes it is an image: John Kerry windsurfing, Michael Dukakis with silly helmet on. And as Gerald Ford and all these others discovered, the truth is not a defense. You can be, as Ford was, the best athlete ever to be president of the United States, a football All-American, and stumble down a flight of stairs or two and you are a clumsy doofus for the rest of your life.

Sticky phrases tied to potent concepts can undo a president or public figure as much as any action they take. Whether it's a reputation for micro-management or skirt-chasing, once one of these nutshell descriptions sticks, it never goes away.

The alarms started going off in my head regarding this when I saw Tom Ricks's post on the FP site earlier this week which was headlined "The Ditherer in Chief." In it, Ricks laid out with typical economy and insight, why Obama's "dithering" on settling on a strategy in Afghanistan or really moving forward in Iraq is a kind of unsettling counterpoint to George Bush's "panic" in the wake of 9/11. Ricks, who I believe readers should take very seriously on matters such as this, said that as a result of the president's seeming lack of decisiveness on these critical issues, he (Ricks) had become, for the first time, worried about Obama's foreign policy.

Ricks concluded by saying that if he were forced to choose, he'd take dithering over panic. But it was clear, he has become a member of an ever growing group, many of whom are extremely pro-Obama Democrats, that have grown impatient with the president's handling of those aspects of his presidency that have life and death implications for U.S. troops.

I should note, I am not personally of the same view. Provided the administration reaches a decision on its going forward strategy in Afghanistan in the next several weeks as Secretary Gates indicated this weekend that it would, I welcome the systematic assessment and reassessment of our situation, the reaching out for multiple views including those of our allies (as reflected in the comments of NATO Secretary General Rasmussen yesterday), and the recognition that it is worth the delay to come to the best possible solution. We've seen where impulse and dogma-driven reflex will get us. We should welcome the impulse to interject thought into the process as we should the apparent willingness to puncture groupthink by seeking divergent perspectives.

To me the issue is whether the decision is the right one or not. Which, as readers of this blog know, in my view is a much narrower mission in Afghanistan, a focus on getting a tolerable, semi-effective government in place in Kabul, and then moving more toward a counter-terror strategy that involves fewer locally-based forces and more over-the-horizon interventions be they drones or ship-based special forces operations as recently took place in Somalia.

But as mentioned above, the facts won't matter to opponents of the president or to the average voter who has bandwidth for little more than a twitter-length description of the president, a string of bits of conventional wisdom that constitute what passes for the total persona of the commander-in-chief.

Professor Obama and community-organizer-in-chief Obama are both compelling identities to many Democrats (and in many ways welcome ones). But they simply don't cut it on pressing national security issues.  The expectations of the public and the defense community which people like Tom Ricks knows so well may be conventional but they are unshakable. Leaders must lead. Decisions must be crisp. The human stakes are in fact undeniably high. Days and weeks do matter...and commanders need to show they "get it." And over all, you need to convey a sense that you have that "vision thing", a sense of where you want to go and that it doesn't take a seminar to reach every decision.

Part of the problem for Obama is that he started out headed in the wrong direction in Afghanistan and he needs to change course. There is no easy way to do it. And it may sting politically. But ultimately, courage carries a lot of weight and is one of the antidotes to the dithering argument.  Another potential antidote is offering up different, better stories and images. I am not sure why the Somalia operation did not get more play. It seems to have been a great example of good leadership and the U.S. military effectively doing their very tough job. Identifying the president more closely with the successes of the military will help (assuming they are real and he is truly behind them ... "Mission Accomplished" moments are precisely the kind this president ... and all presidents ... need to avoid.) And of course, the best potential antidote is more decisiveness whenever it is responsible.

It is not too late to keep this label from sticking. But it's getting there. 

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One can only hope that George Packer's nearly book-length profile of Richard Holbrooke actually ends up being a book.  Because I really want to see what happens next.

The must-read article in the September 28 issue of The New Yorker ends a few weeks back. "The election on August 20th," writes Packer of Afghanistan as he starts to wrap up the piece, "was a disaster that could change the course of the war." No kidding. But how? The article, which brilliantly describes the complex and extraordinarily talented Holbrooke at work as America's latest viceroy in the region (a very big step up indeed from the last one, Jerry of Baghdad, also known as Ambassador L. Paul Bremer), hints that things won't end well. 

In fact, it does more than hint, ending with a pretty unmistakable implication that Packer thinks the "I still believe in the possibility of the United States" inspiration Holbrooke draws from his first days in the foreign service during the Kennedy era is a sign that he fails to understand America's limitations and is doomed to get his last assignment wrong. 

Now, just a few weeks after those rigged elections, we have the Obama Administration and America more divided than ever over what to do next.  If counter-insurgency is our goal and strong Afghan government institutions are the key to that effort, argues General McChrystal and many others, then the corruption and haplessness of the Karzai regime is as big a threat as the Taliban. 

So what do we do to demonstrate our resolve on this front?  Well, of course, as reported in yesterday's papers, we gather our allies together and announce that we believe Hamid's the man, will be for the next five years and that we stand firmly behind him. But it's hard not to conclude that's just public posturing.  I mean you've got to hope that there's more going on here.  So, given the colorful confrontations between Karzai and Holbrooke described in the article, I want to read on about thier next meeting, maybe seated again around a long table surrounded by scurrying aides, conveying this message of support and the nuances that go with it. Maybe with violins. 

"You're our man, Fredo, and I love you, but...."

Did I say Fredo?  I meant, Hamid.  But you get the idea.  In the end, maybe not now, maybe not for a while, maybe not until Mama Corleone dies, but it's not going to end well for our brother in Kabul, no matter how sincere-sounding our protestations of love. Because, to put a finer point on the McChrystal conclusions: There is no way to "win" in Afghanistan...or even to gracefully lose there...except to have a local government strong enough to maintain the peace when we exit.  And so in this respect Karzai is actually not just one of the principal obstacles to victory, real or declared, he is the principal obstacle.  Which is why we must hold him close until we figure out how to take care of him.  But take care of him we must.  He won't change...so he must be changed.

How Holbrooke and company manage this relationship with an ally who is also an enemy -- while they are doing virtually the same thing in Pakistan -- is bound to be fascinating to watch.   In part because the problem is so challenging. In part because Holbrooke, to my way of thinking, is an even greater asset for the United States than the way he is described in an article in which many of his detractors were clearly among Packer's sources. He's not easy. But he's relentless, serious, smart and creative  He's the best we've got who has been given the worst job. Which is why, come to think of it, the book won't do the trick, I can't wait for the movie. (Primarily because watching it, I'll know this troubling chapter in our history will be over.)  Maybe Sam Waterston can play Holbrooke  With him, we always know things will work out ok. 

But of course, for now, for those of us stuck here on this side of history (and mired as we are in reality), we recognize that critical parts of the final plot are yet to be decided-and that the key decisions about these necessarily must take place above Holbrooke's pay grade.  

Packer very effectively weaves into the profile a chilling indictment of where America's overall AfPak policy is heading. He does this with what is perhaps the core point of the story, woven in to his introduction to young Holbrooke, "Washington promotes tactical brilliance framed by strategic conformity-the facility to out-maneuver one's counterpart in a discussion without questioning fundamental assumptions." He does this with sharp quotes from outside observers all which point to the same conclusion.  (Hafez Assad's "America is short of breath." Mort Abramowitz' pithy and undeniable "Obama, in a fit of absent-mindedness, to show he was tough, made Afghanistan his signature issue because he wanted to get out of Iraq. And this is going to be Goddamned difficult." Tim Carney's "We get into relationships that give the leaders of countries the strength of their weakness.") And he does this by directly observing at the end the irony that while Holbrooke demonstrated his early promise by questioning whether Vietnam should be fought at all in Afghanistan he was simply accepting the mission given him by Obama-a mission that is well worth questioning. (Indeed, one that some in the administration, led by Vice President Joe Biden who seems via snippets in this article such a useful, iconoclastic voice on the subject that I hope the big profile of him is coming soon. Or better yet, I hope someone's listening to him.)

Reading this last point, I felt the conclusion of the piece was as poignant as it was a skeptical read on current policy. It suggested that, contrary Santayana, even those who best understood the past-and even the presidents advised by them -- were doomed to repeat it.

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